The Knowledge Systems Transfer Project: A Multiple Perspective Investigation into the Integration of a New Technology within a Business Unit by Tarr, Steven Craig
Portland State University
PDXScholar
Dissertations and Theses Dissertations and Theses
1990
The Knowledge Systems Transfer Project: A Multiple Perspective
Investigation into the Integration of a New Technology within a
Business Unit
Steven Craig Tarr
Portland State University
Let us know how access to this document benefits you.
Follow this and additional works at: http://pdxscholar.library.pdx.edu/open_access_etds
Part of the Management Information Systems Commons, and the Technology and Innovation
Commons
This Dissertation is brought to you for free and open access. It has been accepted for inclusion in Dissertations and Theses by an authorized
administrator of PDXScholar. For more information, please contact pdxscholar@pdx.edu.
Recommended Citation
Tarr, Steven Craig, "The Knowledge Systems Transfer Project: A Multiple Perspective Investigation into the Integration of a New
Technology within a Business Unit" (1990). Dissertations and Theses. Paper 1190.
10.15760/etd.1189
THE KNOw' ,EDGE SYSTEMS rKANSFERPROJECI': 
A MULTIPLE PERSPECfIVE INVESTIGATION INTO TIIE INTEGRATION OF A 
NEW TECHNOLOGY WITHIN A BUSINESS UNlT 
by 
STEVEN CRAIG TARR 
A dissertation submitted in partial fulfillment of the 
requirements for the degree of 
DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY 
in 
SYSTE1\·1S SCIENCE 
Portland State University 
1990 
Copyright by Steven C. Tarr, 1990 
All Rights Reserved 
TO THE OFFICE OF GRADUATE STIJDIES: 
The members of the Committee approve the dissertation of Steven Craig Tarr 
presented May 4, 1990. 
Harold A. Linstone, Chairman 
JohnOh 
R6y joch, Director, Systems Science Ph.D. Program 
c. William Savery, Vice Provost for G uate Studies and Research 
AN ABSTRACf OF TIlE DISSERTATION OF Steven Craig Tarr for the Doctor of 
Philosophy in Systems Science presented May 4, 1990. 
Title: The Knowledge Systems Transfer Project: A Multiple Perspective Investigation 
into the Integration of a New Technology within a Business Unit 
APPROVED BY MEMBERS OF THE DISSERTATION COMMl1TEE: 
Harold A. Linstone:thairman 
Johnol?" 
Many organizations have been attempting to build a conceptual framework for 
managing technology, with varying degrees of success. Most begin by consulting leading 
technology authorities, borrowing elements of their thinking, and adapting these elements 
to their organizational and personai situations. TI-..is dissert.ation extends this process by 
using the formal research methodology of multiple perspectives (technical, organizational, 
personal, and cross-cui.."lg) to build a case-based model of the technology integration 
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process. The research and the model construction benefits from a solid foundation 
established through a review of technology management and knowledge systems literature. 
The significant aspects of the l'esearch are tied to its objectives which can be divided 
into academic and industrial classifications: 
A~ademic Objectives: 
1. Use multiple perspectives in real-time (for input to decisions as events 
unfold) 
2. Focus on a multiple perspectives view of technology integration into an 
organization 
Industrial Objectives: 
1. Improve project effectiveness by increasing understanding of the 
technology integration process 
2. Establish a model for the integration of a new technology into an 
organization 
The development of the case-based model was the primary objective, with the other 
objectives providing the met.ltodology and subject-matter content to support model 
development. 
These four objectives are of interest to three parties: scholars who are interested in 
the theoretical and methodological aspects of technology integration and inquiring systems, 
technology developers in general who C&.li benefit from improved means to integrate 
technology and analyze success/failure, and technology developers in infonnation systems 
organizations who can obtain specific insight as well as utilize the general industrial results. 
From the multiple perspectives investigation, thirteen conciusions were reached 
about the process of integrating knowledge systems into an information systems 
organization. These conclusions are specific to the case study, but may have general 
applicability. 
The multiple perspectives methodology is then presented as the foundation for a 
technology integration model, on which tbe technology usage phases of awareness, 
motivation, and functioning capabilit'j can be complete.d. The model is described and then 
illustrated with two knowledge systems development I)I()ject cases. 
With regards to the research objectives, it is concluded that: 
1. The use of multiple perspectives in real-time are difficult and requires 
practice 
2. Because technology integration is dependent upon technical, 
organization, and personal factors, the use of multiple perspectives are 
appropriate and useful. Eight of 13 conclusions were dependent upon 
the cross-cuing process 
3. Multiple perspective analysis improved the understanding of the 
technology integration process. This understanding was sometimes 
helpful and sometimes harmful to the effectiveness of the integration 
process 
4. The proposed technology integration model, using the awareness, 
motivation, and functioning capability phases, was developed and 
exercised. This model proved useful in limited application 
Finally, a method for organizing and navigating the perspectives, cross-cuing, and 
conclusions is presented and used. 
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CHAPTER I 
PURPOSE AND OBJECTIVES 
"But the moment man first picked up a stone or a branch to use as a tool, he 
altered irrevocably the balance between him and his environment. From this 
point on, the way in which the world around him changed was different. It was 
no longer regular or predictable. New objects appeared that were not 
recognizable as a mutation of something that had existed before, and as each 
one emerged it altered the environment not for a season, but forever. While the 
number of these tools remained small, their effect took a long time to spread and 
to cause change. But as they increased, so did their effects: The more the 
tools, the faster the rate of change. " [Burke] 
"About 85 percent of all of the scientists who have ever lived are alive today. 
This sheer mass, coupled with advanced tools and numerous creative 
opportunities has increased the rate of change to the fastest point in human 
history. It has been said that the Industrial Revolution increased productivity by 
a factor of 100. According to Carver Mead at Cal Tech, the microelectronic 
revolution is estimated to have increased infonnation based productivity by a 
factor of 1,000,000." [Wriston] 
The management of technology is a newly named field of practice and study. 
Functionally. it has existed for thousands of years, but the increasingly rapid rate of change 
in recent years has caused the management of technology to emerge from the background 
of scientific and industrial activities as an essential focus of modem researchers and 
managers. Many companies were designed for a time past, when rapid technological 
change was not as pervasive. Today, technological change must be accompanied by 
orga.llizationa1 cha.'!ges which are compatible with the technology and with changes in the 
personal working styles of the employees working within the organization. These 
modifications must be designed to encourage and accommodate innovation and change. 
Part of the process involves identifying and removing obstacles to adopting new 
technologies and part involves developing mechanisms to rapidly, smoothly, and soundly 
adopt new technologies. 
The National Research Council [Management] defines the management of 
technology as a field of activity which "links engineering, science, and management 
disciplines to plan, develop, and implement technological capabilities to shape and 
accomplish the strategic and operational objectives of an organization." Beyond the 
innovative processes in R&D, the management of technology includes the controlled 
introduction and use of technology in products. manufacturing processes, and internal 
organizational functions. A key focus is the integration of technology into the overall 
business operations instead of isolating the technology within special purpose functions. 
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Many companies have been trying to piece together a conceptual framework for 
managing technology. with varying degrees of success. Most begin by consulting leading 
technology authorities. borrowing elements of their thinking and adapting these elements to 
their organizational and personal situations. This dissertation extends this process by using 
the formal research methodology of multiple perspectives to build a case-based model of 
the technology integration process. My research and model construction benefit from a 
solid foundation established tf\.rough a review of technology management and knowledge 
systems literature. 
STATEMENT OF TIlE PROBLEM 
At the center of the larger topic of technology management are questions which 
relate to processes and decisions about specific technologies or technological approaches: 
1. In what new technologies should an organization invest? 
2. What technology integration methods should be used? 
3. How fast should integration proceed? 
4. How should the integration methods be structured? 
5. lNhat are the technical, organizational, and personal impacts of changing 
technologies? 
For this research, the first question had been answered prior to my involvement 
using acceptable technological foreCasting and assessment procedures. My research 
problem was to provide an initial basis with which to answer the remaining four questions 
by building a case-based model of technology integration. Understanding of the issues 
needed to build this first approximation model should improve the capabilities of 
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U S WEST Infonnation Technologies - Services to integrate new technologies in a wen-
defined, responsive (to company and market demands) manner. My research is intended to 
improve the process by the thorough analysis of the integration of knowledge systems 
technology into the business unit, which provides the insight needed for the development 
of the model (based on the findings of the case study) of the infrastructure needed for 
effective technology integration to occur. The major assumption is that such a model 
accurately captures the essential aspects of the business unit being studied and it is in a 
fonn that can be used by practitioners. The model has been developed by discovering and 
capturing the essential elements (technical factors, groups, and people) along Technical, 
Organizationai, and Personai (T-O-P) dimensions. The context in which the organizational 
and personal actors view other T-O-P perspectives are used to gain understanding of the 
Knowledge Systems Transfer Project, which is described in Chapter 2. Some examples of 
the types of questions that can be asked of this model are "What factors facilitate andlor 
inhibit the technology integration process?," "What are the factors dependent on the nature 
of the technology, on the characteristics of the receiver, on the characteristics of the 
provider, and on the nature of communications between the provider and receiver?" 
Before continuing further, I would like to relate my use of the tenn "technology 
integration" to the tenn "technology transfer." I differentiate because of the greater depth 
connoted by "technology integration" and because this research focusses on using the 
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technology in an organization after t.'le technology has been acquired. As this paper 
proceeds, my focus on "integration" will become increasingly clear. However, at this point 
let me clarify the more common term to provide a basis on which to build. 
Tne process of integrating a new technology into an organization is often called 
technology transfer. This term is often misused, misunderstood, and misinterpreted. By 
examining the two words in this phrase, a possible cause becomes clear. 
In Webster's Ninth Collegiate Dictionary, "technology" is defmed as "a scientific 
method of achieving a practical purpose" and as "the totality of means employed to provide 
objects necessary for human sustenance and comfort." While the latter definition is more 
general and elusive, it adds an important dimension to the fonner: technology need not be 
science-based. Most of our technology development is based upon empirical evidence, 
often based on practical experience rather than scientific theory. 
Webster's defines "transfer" as "an act, process, or instance of transferring" and 
"the carry-over or generalization of learned responses from one type of situation to 
another." The first definition indicates the action orientation and the second describes the 
content of the action. 
In the case of technology transfer, the carry-over of learned responses is with 
respect to some objects that are used for human sustenance and comfort. This carry-over 
can be viewed in two distinct dimenstions, one which is personal and the other which is 
organizational. P,!ople and organizations have the capability to transfer information and a 
number of combinations are possible, e.g. person to person, person to organization, 
organization to organization, etc. Additionally, the organizations involved may be at 
varying levels of size and function, further adding to the complexity. 
To this point, my argument has not addressed the technological aspects of 
technology transfer, other that to put in perspective that technology need not be science-
based. While technology transfer, if the above definitions are accepted, is primarily 
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concerned with personal and organizational issues, the technology itself is central to the 
transfer process. When technically-oriented people and organizations engage in technology 
transfer, there may be a tendency to rely on u'ie merits of the technology as the propelling 
mechanism for successful technology transfer, when in fact a balance must be struck 
between technical and non-technical factors. 
As will be described. there has historically been little need for efficient or timely 
technology transfer to be conducted within U S WEST. The current status of knowledge 
systems as an emergent technology provided a convenient case in which to study the 
internal technology integration mechanisms and to develop an initial model, based on the 
US WEST case study, that can be utilized for other emerging technologies. Reliance on 
my literature review made it possible for my results to be presented in a manner which may 
be useful to other technology transfer practitioners. 
Technology integration mechanisms are needed that are sufficiently robust and at 
the same time address the practical implications for the organizational unit This requires 
striking a balance between flying-by-the-seat-of-your-pants technology integration and 
overdone technology integration projects that lose sight of the purpose and goals of the 
integration process, often through excessive study of the problem, drawn out planning, and 
encumbering measurement procedures. 
SIGNIFICANCE AND OBJECTIVES OF THE RESEARCH 
Though the multiple perspectives methodology has historically been used for 
retrospective analysis, the present research is based upon the belief that the multiple 
perspectives [MI:') methodologyl can be used a) proactively in real-time (i.e. to exa.T.ine 
events as they occur) to guide the technology integration process and b) in retrospect to 
ISee Chapter IV. Multiple Perspective Methodology for a description of multiple 
perspectives. 
facilitate the development of an integration model. The significant aspects of the research 
are tied to its objectives which can be divided into academic and industrial classifications: 
Academic Objectives: 
1. Use multiple perspectives in real-time (for input to decisions as eVents 
unfold) 
2. Focus on a multiple perspectives view of technology integration into an 
organization 
Industrial Objectives: 
1. Improve project effectiveness by increasing understanding of the 
technology integration process 
2. Establish a model for the integration of a new technology into an 
organization 
Development of a case-based model is the primary objective, with the other 
objectives providing the methodology and subject-matter content to support model 
development 
First, a description of the academic objectives: 
1. Use multiple perspectives in real-time (for input to decisions as events unfold): 
The first academic objective tests the use of multiple perspectives in real-time (Le. to 
examine events as they occur). Previous in-depth studies have shown the usefulness of 
Linstone's MP for planning and determining the future of a project [Umbdenstock] and for 
historical analysis to be used for future decisions [Sapp]. The Knowledge Systems 
Transfer Project was initiated in April of 1988 and was coming to its end in December of 
1989. By using multiple perspectives (T-O-P) to plan project activities and to deal with 
problems as they occurred, the intention was to detennine if multiple perspectives could be 
used to guide a systems approach to the technology integration project The results of 
activities throughout the project were available to assess the utiliP] of the methodology. 
6 
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2. Focus on a multiple perspectives view of technology integration into an 
organization: The second academic objective examines the value of multiple perspectives 
when applied to the process of technology acquisition and deployment. The intention was 
to detennine, for this case study, if understanding of the technical, organizational, and 
personal perspectives, and their cross-cuing could result in either a) successful technology 
integration or b) a substantial ability to analyze and understand failure or inadequate results, 
thus enabling faster, more effective corrective actions. 
Secondly, a description of the industrial objectives: 
1. Improve project effectiveness by increasing understanding of the technology 
integration process: The first industrial objective uses multiple perspectives to increase 
understanding of technology integration. Central to this was to enable one perspective to 
provide insight to another when problems are encountered or when project plans were 
being developed. 
2. Establish a model for the integration of a new technology into an organization: 
This is the primary objective. Multiple perspectives methodology was used to provide 
increased understanding of the business unit environment, which provided the basis for a 
model of new technology integration. This integration model is based on the infonnation 
gained from the Knowledge Systems Transfer Project (of which I was project manager), 
my literature review, and my participation i.'1 an industry consortium.2 A technology 
integration model could be applied in industrial settings because of the frequency with 
which new technologies must be integrated to maintain a competitive position. The 
essential T-O-P infrastructure and process as established for the Knowledge Systems 
Transfer Project is used as the basis for the technology integration model. 
2See the Sponsorship Statement for a description of the consortium which will 
provide access to this infonnation. 
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The activity under study involve a large number of factors which may have had 
some relevance to the overall plan. The task in building a model is not just to construct a 
theoretical model that will take all of these factors and their interrelationships into account, 
but to extract those factors that are found to have the most significant effects on the 
technology integration process and construct a model using these factors. There is no 
guarantee that an overlooked area will not have a significant impact on the result. These are 
the "gray areas" which [Karatsu] refers to when contrasting various management styles, 
and beL'lg aW:lTe that gray areas exist is one strength of the multiple perspectives 
methodology. 
The four research objectives are of interest to three parties: scholars who are 
interested in the theoretical and methodological aspects of technology integration and 
inquiring systems,3 technology developers in general who can benefit from improved 
means to integrate technology and analyze success/failure, and technology developers in 
infonnation systems organizations who can obtain specific insight as well as utilize the 
general industrial results. 
DOCUMENT PREVIEW 
As will be discussed, Linstone's multiple perspectives is a systems approach which 
considers a problem from tlLTee distinct perspectives: technical, organizational, and 
personal.4 Each of these perspectives illuminate a problem from different angles and can 
affect each other through cross-cuing, which is the influence of one perspective on another. 
Using the following outline of the dissertation as the guide, this section will discuss each 
chapter, giving examples of what each contains: 
I. Purpose and Objectives 
3see Chapter IV for a brief presentation of inquiring systems. 
4The perspectives are discussed in Chapter IV. 
II. Background and Context 
III. Review of Selected Literature 
IV. Multiple Perspective Methodology 
v. The Technical Perspective 
VI. The Organizational Perspective 
Vll. The Personal Perspective 
VIII. Integration and Cross-Cuing 
IX. C..onclusions about the Objectives 
X. References 
XI. Appendices 
Chapter I briefly introduces the problem area, the issues, and the research 
approach. The purpose and significance of the research is briefly described, as well as the 
academic and industrial objectives. 
Chapter II provides the background and context relevant to the U S WEST 
Knowledge Systems Transfer Project. This includes descriptions of events and processes 
leading to the establishment of the Project 
In Chapter m, selected literature is reviewed in the three areas relevant to this 
research: Computer-based knowledge systems, technology transfer processes, and 
systems-oriented analysis methodologies. 
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Chapter IV presents the methodology for this research. Included in this section is a 
discussion of traditional problem solving, how different inquiring systems affect an 
observer's views, an explanation of basic multiple perspectives concepts. and the guiding 
philosophy for this research project The specific T -O-P components of the methodology 
and associated analysis will be given in the following descriptions of chapters V. VI, and 
VIT. 
In Chapter V, the technical (T) perspective is used to examine the rational aspects of 
the technology integration including the technology of knowledge systems, employee-base 
attributes and statistics, origins of the Knowledge Systems Transfer Project, financial 
analyses, knowledge system project selection techniques, and quantitative goals and 
measurements of the Project. These are presented, explained, and critically evaluated to 
show their influence on the Project. 
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In Chapter VI, the organizational (0) perspective is used to view the technology 
integration project, looking at the various organizations individually, their dynamics, and 
their interactions. The internal and external views are researched and documented, 
providing a basis for analyzing organizational interactions as a group of systems operating 
within a larger supersystem. Many distinct organizational perspectives exist both outside 
and inside an organization and understanding these different views is central to the analysis 
of actions and events. In addition to the fonnal organizations, informal organizations are 
identified and assessed since they often playa role equal to or greater than those which are 
formally dermed. 
Descriptions of U S WEST internal organizational responsibilities as seen by 
organization actors will address the centralized/decentralized control issue, the departmental 
control issues within Information Technologies - Services, and traditional organizational 
response to new technologies. Case study materials are supplemented by organizational 
material obtained via two industrial consortia: One is Bell Communications Research 
(composed of the seven post-mvestiture regional telecommunication finns) and the other is 
an expert systems implementation group which draws major corporate members from the 
United States (and occasionally abroad). The latter is more completely described in the 
Sponsorship Statement 
In Chapter vn, the personal (P) perspective is used to examine the third dimension 
of the technology integration process. The central characters, their backgrounds, their 
behaviors, and key actions and decisions are identified. and assessed for the impact on the 
Knowledge Systems Transfer Project. Analysis is focussed on the identification of 
personal and situational characteristics which predispose these characters towards the 
tendencies shown by their behaviors. As in the O-perspective, the infonnal roles are 
identified and examined witt'l as much attention as the fonnal roles. 
11 
In Chapter vm, the depth and diversity of T-O-P dimensions are integrated to 
provide the basis for cross-cuing. Combining the results obtained through these selective 
filters enabled a composite picture to be built of the project dynamics. I then use the insight 
gained from cross-cuing to present a Technology Integration Model and describe its use on 
two knowledge systems projects. 
Chapter IX, Conclusions, contains a section describing my conclusions with 
respect to the research objectives, followed by a presentation of my observations about the 
research process. 
SPONSORSHIP STATEMENT 
U S WEST has established an Advanced Technical Education Program (A TEP), 
principally within Infonnation Technologies, Marketing, and Engineering organizations. 
As a sponsored participant in ATEP, educational funds were provided to me to conduct this 
research. Additionally, significant official company support exists because the results of 
this research will be directly beneficial to the Infonnation Technologies Group. 
My position as an employee of U S WEST and head of KSTP provided access to 
the resources necessary for successful completion of my proposed research. In addition to 
ongoing access to the technology, work groups, and individuals associated with the 
Project, I was able tc obtain significant documents describing the events leading to the 
fonnation of the Project. 
Over many years, I have developed working relationships with a large number of 
people in the infonnation systems, human resource, financial, and managerial staffs. This 
facilitated access to infonnation that might otherwise have been unobtainable. A key part of 
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this involvement is with the TecbForum, a semi-fonnal organization of senior technical 
people. This group operates as an effective mechanism for internal infonnation exchange. 
A significant resource for personal and organizational perspective issues was my 
participation in an expert system implementation group, organized by Decision Support 
Technology, Inc. in Boston. This group brought together a number of leading pioneers5 in 
the field of applied artificial intelligence, expert systems. and infonnation systems 
development, to create a unique and practical approach for organizations6 to implement 
those technologies. The group has worked together for one year, which has given the 
participants an opportunity to see the evolution of the technology in different organizational 
settings. 
5Primary advisors were Randall Davis (MIT) and Ed Mahler (DuPont). 
6Participating organizations included: Allstate Insurance, American Airlines, 
American Express, Boeing, Colgate-Palmolive, FMC, GTE Laboratories, Harvard 
Business School, Metropolitan Life, MIT Sloan School, Sea-Land, U.S. Postal Service, U 
S 'VEST, Xerox. 
CHAPTER II 
BACKGROUND AND CONTEXT 
To better understand the research setting, this chapter provides background and 
context infonnation about technology transfer before and after the divestiture of Bell 
Operating Companies from AT&T, a description of U S WEST, and a brief history of the 
Knowledge Systems Transfer Project. 
TECHNOLOGY TRANSFER BEFORE DIVESTITURE 
The Bell System led the development and use of communications technology 
throughout most of the 20th century by focussing on the goal of universal service-
providing basic telephone service anywhere in the United States at an affordable price. 
This goal had far-reaching ramifications for the manner in which new technologies were 
explored, developed, and deployed. 
With the goal of universal service, a functional approach to company organization 
was taken. AT&T and its subsidiaries were aligned so that tasks in each functional area 
were perfonned by specialists in that area in order to maximize efficiency. The local 
operating companies were responsible for satisfying the particular needs of the 
communities they served, but they all used standard technology and procedures which were 
centrally developed. 
All of the switching and transmission technologies needed to operate the 
telecommunications network were developed by Bell Laboratories, produced by Western 
Electric, and implemented by the operating telephone companies. Pan of the operational 
computing technology was also deployed in such a manner. Dming field trials within the 
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operating companies, field characterization studies provided the data needed to set realistic 
performance objectives and to supply the developers and systems engineers with essential 
feedback. These field trials were conducted by employees of Bell Labs, Western Electric, 
or AT&T with the operating company employees assisting. There was little attempt to 
transfer the technology to the operating companies at any depth other than that needed to 
operate the new technology, because the roles of the Bell System component companies 
were well defined. 
These roles were radically altered as a result of the 1982 Modification of Final 
Judgment (MFJ), which terminated an eight year old U.S. Departtnent of Justice antitrust 
suit against AT&T. The MFJ ordered the divestiture of the integrated Bell System and 
AT&T set January 1, i984, as the target date for completion of the massive7 restructuring. 
TECHNOLOGY TRANSFER AFrER DIVESTITURE 
Since divestiture of the 21 operating telephone companies into seven independent, 
competitive regional corporations, a number of changes in regulation and market orientation 
have occurred. Where the Bell System was once the near-exclusive provider of many 
telecommunications products and services, nearly all of them are now open to the forces of 
competition. 
One of the seven dwarves is U S WEST, which conducts regulated 
telecommunications business in 14 western states (exclusive of California and Nevada) and 
unregulated telecommunications through the world. As can be expected, the relationships 
between the seven regional companies and their principal technology supplier, Bell 
Laboratories, changed significantly. Bell Labs was reorganized into AT&T Bell 
Laboratories and Bell Communications Research (Bellcore), with the latter to serve the 
7Just prior to the time of divestiture, the integrated Bell System had about 1 million 
employees and about $160 billion in 3!';sets. 
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regional telecommunication companies. Unlike the pre-divestiture situation where AT&T 
owned its subsidiaries, these seven regional companies &-e co-owners of Bellcore. 
Additionally, AT&T's subsidiaries cooperated with each other, while the seven post-
divestiture regionals are competitors in most of their lines of business except basic 
telephone services. This means that the major R&D source for each regional company is 
shared with siA competing companies. While Bellcore has an importa."lt role to play in 
certain technology areas, a pmprietary internal technology source is also needed. 
In 1984, U S WEST commissioned SRI to review its technological capabilities. 
The SRI report indicated that their were deficiencies in U S WEST's ability to develop 
new technology and move it through development into the marketplace. This was not 
unexpected and indicated the historical lack of need for efficient or timely technological 
capabilities within the old Bell operating companies. At present, the task is not only to 
build the internal technology source, but also to establish an understanding of technology 
transfer in the new company which is as effective as the infrastructure of the old integrated 
Bell System. 
DESCRIPTION OF US WEST 
In order to understand what U S WEST is today, some of its historical roots must 
be explained. U S WEST's predecessor, the Bell System, was a very successful 
institution. Early in this century, it brought about tremendous changes in the 
communications industry. Just before World War I, the Bell System was threatened by the 
Department of Iustice with an antitrust suit, subjected to private antitrust suits and other 
expensive litigation on all sides, and embroiled in some of the fiercest competition in 
American history. Theodore Vail, who was then president of AT&T. took on all of these 
problems and created the environment of regulated monopoly. In the process, the Bell 
System persuaded the Department of Justice not to file an antitrust suit. 
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The key in that success was the signing of an agreement with the Department of 
Justice, which, among other things, caused the Bell System to divest itse1f of the 
ownership of We stem Union. AT&T was also able to win most ofits private antitrust 
suits, and then to use statutes which created regulation to completely eliminate competition 
in the telephone industry. In that new environment it didn't take long before the telephone 
replaced the telegraph as the primary means to communicate, and by the end of World War 
n, the era of regulated monopoly and the era of the so-called natural monopoly had begun. 
The real advantages of regulated monopoly did not become apparent until after 
World War II, when technological innovation allowed the Bell System to convert from 
operator services to dial tone service. In addition, microwave technology became a 
dominant way to provide long distance communications, and Bell Laboratories developed 
solid state technology. These technological advances were the main components in 
facilitating the re-introduction of competition in the telecommunications industry. By the 
end of the 1960's the phenomenon of the natural monopoly had become obsolete by virtue 
of the presence of competitors who were using the new technologies. The management of 
the Bell System did not recognize the reality of this change, or if it did, it resisted the 
reality. 
It adopted a strategy that can be characterized as the castle syndrome [DeMuth]. 
The castle syndrome required management to pull up the drawbridge, barricade itself 
behind the parapets, and defend itself against the barbarians who wished to tum the 
industry over to competition. Those within the fortress did not believe that competition 
was in the best interest of the kingdom. They thought that regulation was a protection from 
antitrust violations, and that there was only one market, the telecommunications service 
market, which involved end-to-end responsibility which was in the best interest of the 
public. 
The events that have transpired since then have shown that these managers were 
wrong on all points. Regulation proved to be no protection from the antitrust laws. 
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Instead of one market, the telephone industry had been divided into four markets by 
changing technology: customer premise equipment, long distance, equipment 
manufacturing, and local exchange. As important, the public, and in particular the business 
community, no longer supported end-to-end responsibility. Businesses were spending 
millions of dollars on customer premise equipment and inter-city communications provided 
by competitors to AT&T. 
AT &Ts managers did not realize that it was the public, not company management, 
who determined what was in the best interest of the public. They didn't acknowledge that 
the status quo of natural monopoly could not be maintained when technology and society 
were changing. 
The major assault on the Bell System was the antitrust suit filed by the Department 
of Justice in 1974. Depending on your view, the lawyers who were responsible for the 
filing of this suit were either anti-Bell System or pro-competition. It was clear that they 
believed that regulation was inadequate for protecting the public or for provide the 
technological advances for future telecommunication products and services. 
When the divestiture occurred on January 1, 1984, U S WEST quickly positioned 
itself as one of the leaders of the deregulation and a major proponent of full competition. 
So U S WEST has essentially come full circle. Theodore Vail converted competition into 
a regulated monopoly and now the regulated monopoly is being converted back to 
competition. It is the forces of competition which guide the U S WEST directions of the 
present day, and these forces have significant impact on its use of technoiogy. 
A major business strategy of U S WEST is to be one of the best companies in the 
world in the total spectrum of activities required to meet customer needs, from research, 
through product development, into marketing and delivery. A simple examination of this 
shows major information flows in two directions: from research to the markets and from 
markets to research. Technology transfer occurs at this macro level and at innumerabie 
levels within the vast continuum, throughout the relationships of the U S WEST 
subsidiaries. While the specific names of subsidiaries, their organization, and their 
relationships to customers continually changes, the identities of core U S WEST 
businesses have remained constant. They are: 
• Communications 
• Marketing services 
• Data solutions 
• Financial services 
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The largest subsidiary is U S WEST Communications, largely composed of three 
former Bell operating companies.8 A major unit of U S WEST Communications is 
Information Technologies - Services (ITS). which has existed in various forms for over 
20 years. In addition to the AT&TIBell Laboratories technology influence previously 
described, this business unit has been greatly affected by computer hardware and software 
vendors. These vendors playa significant role by introducing technology9 to people in 
lTS, selling these people on the benefits of the technology, and sometimes assisting with 
the first few applications of the technology. This style of introducing new technology has 
had varying degrees of success, depending on the technical, organizational, and personal 
preparedness within ITS. As fairly new technology (for vendors selling systems arId 
industry and academic workers building systems), knowledge-based systems technology 
(sometimes interchangeably ca!1ed expert systems) is a good area in which to examine 
technology transfer using an explicit, controlled methodology. 
8Mountain Bell, Northwestern Bell, and Pacific Northwest Bell. 
9Such technology is usually "new" to the organization, but less than state-of-the-art 
from an industrial andlor academic perspective. The technology is often on the leading 
edge of vendor products which lags the leading edge of computer systems technology. 
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A BRIEF mSTORY OF THE KNOWLEDGE SYSTEMS TRANSFER PROJECf 
A oroiect known as the Knowledl!e Svstems Transfer Proiect (KSlP) had its 
- - .... " WI 
origins within InfonI1..ation Technologies - Services (ITS) in late 1984 with the beginning 
of expert systems interest among Pacific Northwest aircraft, heavy machinery, financial, 
telecommunications, and insurance companies. In rrJd-1985, a fonnal expert systems 
project was proposed and potential applications were solicited from throughout what was 
then Pacific Northwest Bell. Gradually, interest in the technology grew, not only within 
U S WEST Communications, but also at U S WEST Advanced Technologies (AT). In 
1986, AT's identification of expert systems as a strategic technology for US WEST 
encouraged and stimulated the building of two prototypes \\<ithin Communications. 
Summer of 1987 found two people in the ITS organization fully engaged in prototype 
building and at least four other groups expressing serious interest in developing expertise in 
building expert systems. The fragmentation of training, tool understanding, and 
knowledge engineering capabilities were seen as inhibitors to effective use of this new 
technology. On April 15, 1988 the Knowledge Systems Transfer Project was fonned with 
a two year charter to facilitate and coordinate the transfer and integration of knowledge 
systems technology into ITS. 
The initial charter of KSTP was to work with its subject-matter partners, the Expert 
SysteiTlS Technology Group at AT, to facilitate the transfer of knowledge systems 
technologies (such as theories, methods, development tools, and languages) into the ITS 
application software groups, software development groups, and system maintenance 
groups The major goal of !he project was to transfer knowledge systems technology into 
the ITS work environment, and into the environments of the ITS client groups, such as the 
financial, engineering, and marketing departments. 
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In-depth presentation of the founding of KSTP, its specific objectives, its 
evolution, its relationships with the Expert Systems Technology Group, with Bell 
Communications Research, with vendors, and with clients, will be defined and analyzed in 
the multiple perspective sections of this paper. 
CHAPTERm 
REVIEW OF SELEcrED LITERA1URE 
This research was dependent on understanding the status of knowledge in three 
areas: 
1. Computer-based knowledge systems 
2. Technology transfer processes 
3. 3ystems-oriented analysis methodologies 
The fIrst area is important as it is the subject matter of the transfer process which 
was studied, the second area was the focus of the study, and the third represents the 
methodology I have used in carrying out the research. In the following sections, I have 
developed a description of each of these three areas at a level appropriate to provide a sound 
basis for' the research. 
C01VIPUTER-BASED KNOWLEDGE SYSTEMS 
To understand the technological part of the research a brief literature review is 
presented on the topics of artificial intelligence, expert and knowledge-based systems, and 
industrial infonnation processing. 
Artificial Intelligence 
Artificial intelligence (fta!) is a term used to describe machine systems that produce 
behavior nonnally attributed to living systems, such as the ability to adapt, reason, set and 
work toward goals, and understand relationships. This behavior must be demonstrated at a 
level which an observer would call intelligent. This observer dependence is precisely 
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where the ambiguity about what AI is and what it is not With such an encompassing 
definition of AI, most workers in the field derulle one that better suits their purposes, such 
as "expert problem solving in complex, unstructured environments with multiple obstacles 
and no strategy which can guarantee a solution" [Dede]. 
From an historical view, Earl Sacerdoti reports that the teon artificial intelligence 
was coined by John McCarthy in the 1950's to distinguish a new area of research from 
automata theory. to The key concepts developed in the early years included symbolic 
computation, knowledge-directed search, complex representation structures, and 
methodologies for integrating multiple kinds of knowledge. 
Examples of AI can be seen in robotics, natural language processing, expert 
systems, and robotics (Figure 1), but even the types of problems solved in these domains 
change, contributing to extended confusion about what AI is and what it is not. A simple 
rule-based expert system was once thought of as a prime example of AI. Now that such 
systems are in greater usage and being implemented in high-level software using standard 
programming languages, there are beliefs that this is not AI but rather another style of 
programming. 
Artificial Intelligence 
I I I I I I I 
Natural Robotics General Neural Speech Computer Knowledge 
language Problem Networks SynthesiS! Vision Based 
Processing Solving Voice Systems/Expert 
Recognition Systems 
Figure 1. Subfields of artificial intelligence. 
lOA different view, told by Joseph Weizenbaum, is that the new mathematical field 
was not attracting sufficient research funds to grow. A little brainstorming came up with 
the tenn artificial intelligence which would provide a distinct and attractive focus for 
research. He reported that the great success of this has left us with a tenn that we would 
now be better off without 
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There is no fixed definition of AI anymore than there is a fixed definition of 
intelligence. A feeling for what activities could be considered under the AI umbrella would 
be those associated with human mentality [Rhine]: 
• To respond to situations very flexibly 
• To take advantage of fortuitous circumstances 
• To make sense out of ambiguous or contradictory messages 
• To recognize the relative importance of different elements of a situation 
e To find similarities between situations despite difference that may 
separate them 
• To draw distinctions between situations despite similarities that may link 
them 
• To synthesize new concepts by taking old concepts and putting them 
togeth.::r ~ new ways 
o To come up with ideas that are novel 
Contrasting these aspects of human mentality, or real intelligence, with AI points 
out that a..rtificll'11 connotes "u.n.real." However, it is clear that AI systems are very real 
combinations of applied usage of knowledge, hardware, and software. However, some 
argument can be made about the term AI being inappropriate for what people build in this 
field, much as it would be inaccurate to say that Boeing or McDonnell-Douglas makes 
artificial birds. 
While birds fly and airplanes are flying machines, it is disputable that since people 
think, then AI deals with thinking machines. Arguments abmmd about the idea of machine 
intelligence, but most fall into four broad categories [Feigenbaum]: 
1. Arguments of emotion. Thinking is, by defmition, a human attribute. 
2. Arguments of insuperable differences. Thinking requires creativity and 
originality, and no machine can be creative or original. 
3. Arguments of no real examples. IT machines can be intelligent, why 
hasn't someone made one. 
4. Arguments of ethics. Assuming intelligent machines can be made, 
should we do it? 
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These arguments are all rooted in the ambiguity of the definition of intelligence and 
cenainly the observer's interpretation of it These types of arguments will be exhibited by 
people described later in this paper. 
There is a distinction that must be made about AI in order to come to grips with the 
range of activities it encompasses. As an intellectual discipline, AI crosses the boundaries 
of computer science, psychology, and biology, investigating the nature of knowledge and 
intelligent behavior. It is an experimental science that embodies theories in executable code 
whose performance is used to evaluate the theories and suggest refinements. 
As an engineering discipline, AI is used to apply relatively well understood 
techniques (such as search mechanisms and data representations) to build functioning 
systems which assist in the problem formulation and solution. In some cases, an AI 
system may do more than assist by providing the complete set of information and actions 
needed in a problem situation. It is in this engineering discipline that expert systems are 
primarily oriented. 
mert and Knowledge Systems 
As with artificial intelligence, it is hard to be precise, in strict definitional terms, 
about what characteristics a computer program must have to solve the types of probiems 
that would allow this program to be called an expert system. Some dimensions for 
consideration include [Chandrasekaran]: 
• Expertise in the subject-matter domain and the ability to apply that 
expertise in problem solving 
• Search through the space of possibilities 
• The ability to cope with uncertainty 
• Symbolic representation of data in rules, frames, nets, etc. 
• Explanation facilities to deal with recent questions and entire lines of 
reasoning 
• A separation of representation, control, and inferencing 
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There is a difference between an expert system and a knowledge system that is 
important but not usually made. An expert system is a program that uses combinations of 
encoded infonnation (data with context) to anive at conclusions not apparent in the separate 
pieces of infonnation. Knowledge is the combination of the information, in an active fonn, 
to yield new results. An example of the data:infonnation:knowledge sequence follows: 
1. Data: (8,0),(8,2),(8,0) 
2. Infonnation: The above represents the daily hours worked, regular and 
overtime for three consecutive days. 
3. Knowledge: If an employee is occupational or non-exempt 
management, overtime hours entitle the employee to extra pay. 
The data is meaningless without a context relevant to the reader. Putting two pieces 
of information together (employee classification and hours worked) permits some action to 
be taken, and it is this active form which is the basis for knowledge. 
An expert system and a knowledge system both use knowledge. The distinction is 
with the narrownesslbreadth of the domain and the level of system performance. An expert 
system performs a task at the level of perfonnance we would expect from an expert. A 
human expert perfonns within a narrow domain and so does an expert system. A 
knowledge system need not perfonn at an expert level (but certainly can), and must be able 
to draw upon a knowledge-base to provide assistance in problem solving. An expert 
system is a special fonn of a knowledge based system. 
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As with AI, people disagree as to whether the level of performance must equal that 
of human expens, or must only exhibit expertise at some useful level. The perspective 
adopted here is that expert systems need only display some useful expertise. That is, 
expert systems technology can produce intelligent tools ranging from assistants to 
colleagues to experts, and that even the simplest case, assistants, have many useful 
applications [Scott]. 
Expert systems are appropriate for whole classes of problems which are poorly, if 
at all, addressed by traditional computer programming, such as: interpretation, prediction, 
diagnosis, design, planning, monitoring, debugging, repair, instruction, and control 
[Waterman]. It is interesting to note that today primary responsibility for most of those 
same functions lies with humans, which is an indication of the white-collar productivity 
gains which expert systems could make possible. 
Some specific applications for which expert systems have been implemented are 
[Hayes-Roth]: 
• communication network fault diagnosis, 
• instruction, 
• medical diagnosis, 
o equipment repair, 
• computer configuration, 
• computer system monitoring and control, 
G chemical data interpretation and structure elucidation, 
• speech and image understanding, 
• financial decision making, 
• signal interpretation, 
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• mineral exploration, 
• military intelligence and planning, 
• advising about computer system use, and 
• VLSI design. 
Expert systems do not so much replace human expertise, as they leverage it to allow 
its wider usage. When experts are imminently leaving an organization, an expert system 
which incorporates the departing expert's knowledge may be the only alternative to a 
painful period while an apprentice gains expertise. For companies with complex tasks 
requiring consistent treatment for different cases, an expert system can leverage human 
expertise, speed processing, insure unifonnity, and ease coordination during changes. 
A look at the expert systems development process will provide some insight into 
how companies use expert systems. Watennan presents an informative picture of, as he 
calls it, "the players in the expen system game" [Watennan]. His chan is reproduced, 
with slight modification, in Figure 2. 
Tool 
Builder 
l if J 
OSUildS 
Uses 
...... 
Domain 
Expert 
t 14-------_ Extends and tests 
Users 
~ ttfi 
Knowledge 
Engineer 
Builds, 
refines # 
and tests f Adds data 
it 
Clerical 
Staff 
Figure 2. The players in building an expert system 
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The tool builder is an outside vendor who markets and supports an expert system 
building tool. The wert system building tool is a programming language or environment 
used by a knowledge engineer to build an expert system. The domain expert: is an 
articulate, knowledgeable person with a reputation for producing good solutions to 
problems in the field of interest. The knowledge engineer is a person, usually with a 
background in computer science and artificial intelligence, who knows how to build expert 
systems. The expert system is a collection of programs that solves problems in the field of 
interest. The ~ are anyone who uses the expert system. 
The development of expert systems is by nature subject to experimentation, 
prototyping, sometimes stopping and entirely re-coding in a different way. It can seem 
quite unruly and unmanageable. That is a mistaken impression, because expert system 
construction requires good software engineering plinciples, just like conventional 
programming efforts [Martin]. 
The expert system itself may be analyzed to contain the components indicated in 
Figure 3, again modified from [Waterman]. 
The knowledge base contains facts and structures, such as rules, relating those 
facts. Rules, it must be noted, are but one means of expressing knowledge; others are 
discussed in the section below contrasting databases and knowledge bases. The inference 
engine contains an interpreter that decides how to apply the knowledge in the knowledge 
base to infer new knowledge and a scheduler that decides the order in which to apply the 
knowledge. The user interface is the mechanism for communicating with the users by 
appropriate means, i.e. text, graphics, natural language, audio, video, and so on. 
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KNOWLEDGE BASE 
dom~ill knowledge 
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RULES, ETC. 
USER 
J INTERFACE 
INTERPRETER 
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INFERENCE ENGINE 
general problem 
solving knowledge 
Figure 3. Components of an expert system 
The expert system building tool may simply be a programming language, such as 
LISP, PROLOG, OPS5, C, FORTRAN, and others. Obviously, with just a language, the 
knowledge engineering staffs task is fonnidable: the team must craft the entire expert 
system, including the inference engine and user inte~ace. This tack is appropriate for only 
specialized applications being developed by a highly skilled team. 
A second fonn of expert system building tool is the expert system shell, which is an 
inference engine containing no knowledge of a specific problem domain. Within the 
scheme for knowledge representation provided by the shell, the knowledge engineer build~ 
a knowledge base of facts, rules, and other knowledge structures. 
An emerging fonn of expert system tool is the specialized expert system, into which 
a domain expert inputs facts about a specific implementation. Specialized expert systems 
have been fielded in the financial, legal, and medic'a! arenas [Warennan, Harmon]. 
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The remainder of this section will briefly discuss expert system shells. Space and 
time limits the discussion to generalities, but for more complete descriptions of various 
shells, the reader may refer to [Hannon] and [Watennan]. 
Besides the inference engine, small, PC-based expert system shells provide the 
following capabilities: (1) to carry on a text-based consultation in pseudo-English, and (2) 
an explanation facility to retrace and justify why questions are asked and how conclusions 
are reached. Most small PC-based shells are rule-based. 
Past generations of mainframe-based shells have had about the same capabilities as 
the PC-based shells, but this has changed recently. Mainframe tools are beginning to 
emerge with the industrial strength features needed to interact with existing large-scale 
applications 3.1!d large-scale databases. 
Large, industrial strength expert system shells have existed on workstation-type 
machines for a number of yea.rs. They provide additionai modes of knowledge 
representation, logical control, and user interface. This class of shells facilitates 
construction of systems that represent the knowledge from a variety of problem domains 
and that include a rich user interface. 
Expen system shells may present undesirable constraints if not carefully matched to 
the application being developed. The developer using a small expert system shell may 
constantly bump into limits the shell imposes on representing and reasoning about the 
knowledge base or on input/output with the user and external processes. For example, a 
small shell can make simple processes which fall outside the rule-based paradigm, like 
sequential or iterative processing, difficult to implement 
When required by the application, the knowledge engineer must program, in some 
fashion, any user interface beyond that which comes with a shell, e.g. a sophisticated 
textual interface or a graphics interface. In some expert system development efforts as 
much as 40% of the computer code developed is dedicated to creating the user interface 
[Martin]. 
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Martin also makes comparisons between expert systems development projects and 
traditional software development projects, with the conclusion that they are different, but 
not dramatically. The differences revolve around the knowledge acquisition process and its 
inherent uncertainties for the knowledge engineer and the domain expert, which lead to 
greater use of small incremental development of prototypes with constant revision and 
iteration. At this stage of technological development, these differences can impact other 
associated infonnation systems projects, which has made many developers look for stand 
alone expert system applications. A notable exception is that of the American Express 
Authorizer's Assistant, which has expert systems workstations tied to large mainframes. 
This cooperative work mode is clearly a trend of the future [Miller]. 
Knowledge Systems and Information Processing 
Datamation's hot technologies for 1989 included expert systems among the 
"projects IS execs will feverishly pursue in the year ahead." One must wonder what will 
happen to these expert systems projects in 1990, when expert systems may be displaced 
from the "hot technologies" list. Even though it may be hot, most companies are not 
committing large sums of money to the technology [Runyan]. Knowledge systems are 
actually one component of a more general trend in information processing: to deliver the 
right information to the right consumer at the right time. While this may seem obvious, it 
has only been recent years that dramatic changes in technology has made significant 
progress possible. One of these technological changes is the increased computing power 
available to the end-user, which is driving the decentralization trend shown in Figure 4 
[Statland]. 
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Figure 4. Trends towards computing decentralization. 
This trend has had dramatic impact on the software industry in nearly all hardware 
classes, but has been most visible in the microcomputer and workstation classes. AI 
technologies such as expert systems and neural networks have also benefited from the 
affordable platfonns and powerful operating environments. A survey on knowledge 
systems [Miller] asked participants "What percentages of computers do you see as being 
used for knowledge systems delivery?" The results in Figure 5 indicate the trend. 
33 
60~------------------------------------------~ 
504-----------------------------------------
404---------------------------------------
% of tool 
class 30 +-______________ _ 
for KS 
Delivery 
204------------------DOO------OCK 
10+---··-~= 
(I 
Super Mainframe LISP Workstations PC's 
1121 1988 m 1990 BI 1995 
Figure 5. Trends towards small computers. 
With a trend towards the use of lower cost PC hardware, one would expect a 
similar trend towards lower cost software. Indeed, the survey by Miller has shown this to 
be the case, by asking "what do you see as the distribution of the KBS tool market?" 
distinguished by tool cost in Figure 6. 
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Figure 6. Trends of KBS tool costs. 
With these projections, the issue of integration of these small systems into existing 
and planned infonnation systems must be considered. To integrate knowledge systems, 
the issues of reliability, perfonnance to specifications, consistency, and accuracy will be 
paramount [Sheil]. These issues have already been raised in the cases of medical domain 
knowledge systems. Who is responsible for the patient care: the doctor or the knowledge 
system or the doctors who provided lite knowledge or the knowledge engineer who built 
the system? What these philosophical questions reduce to, are the personal and social 
determinations. not the technological issues. In many domains, knowledge system 
technology is fully capable of providing as good or better infonnation in a shorter time. If 
knowledge systems are to achieve widespread commercial use, these operational issues 
muse be addressed. One suggestion is to take a low profile approach by calling the 
technology by a different name. This would serve to remove the notion of intelligence and 
the objections previously discussed. 11 Other approaches include focussing on error-
tolerant applications or advertising knowledge systems as assistants instead of as 
replacements. 
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The right-information, right-place, right-time goal is sufficiently desirable that an 
organization's employees at all levels have responsibilities to take action. Lucas has made 
recommendations for action at the senior management, division management, and IS 
management levels and all include actions to "encourage the use of new technologies." 
This was demonstrated at DEC in the case of the XSEL12 expert system, a sales 
force aid which guides and check computer configuration designs. To integrate such a 
system with XCON. Leonard-Barton found that DEC tended to three management domains 
simultaneously: 
1. Cultivating the users as co-developers 
2. Creating a network of project supporters and ensuring an adequate 
delivery environment 
3. Organizational prototyping. which is experimentation and planned 
learning about the integration of new technology13 
Leonard-Barton's research has shown that the domains are deceptive in their 
simplicity due to the dynamics of the new infonnation systems technology development 
process and the complexities of individuals and organizational groups. She also found that 
inadequate infrastrucnre (prii!1arlly support groups and resources) accounted for a 
surprising number of problems when implementing the technology. Once the technology 
was ready to be deployed, the organizational impacts were not predictable, and they were 
11 Sheil reports that at least one Silicon Valley company which produces 
engineering workstations, has instituted a company policy forbidding use of the term 
anificial intelligence. 
12expen SELing assistant, which operates as a preprocessor to the vamoose 
XCON configuration expen system. . 
131 discovered Leonard-Barton's paper nearly a year into this research project and 
the similarity of her concept and my research are clear. 
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not able to adequately simulate or anticipate its effect on the deployment of XSEL. This is 
particularly the case of a new technology with which an organization has little or no 
experience. 
The effort required to understand how to integrate knowledge systems will payoff 
if one considers the potential growth of the technology. In Figure 7, the trends as analyzed 
by two different organizations, Artificial Intelligence Markets Newsletter and DM Data 
show the following growth of the knowledge systems market [Miller]: 
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Figure 7. Predicted sales growth of KBS products. 
But before reading too much into such projections, consider that many expert 
system tools require the efforts of skilled knowledge engineers, who are in short supply. 
So in order to fully integrate knowledge systems into information processing, tools must be 
available for both the traditional applications progrnmmer/analyst and the domain expert 
with minimal computer expertise. To reach such goals, a number of extensions and 
improvements to tools are needed. 
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First is improved facilities for acquiring and testing knowledge. These facilities 
must simplify the task of transfening knowledge from the domain expert to the knowledge 
base. They must further help maintain the integrity of the knowledge base by supporting 
control of sequencing, semantic checki!lg, and cross-referencing. 
Second is the development of knowledge representation facilities that support 
reasoning from first principles, allow natural representation of spatial and temporal 
relations, and furnish improved methods for specifying uncertain knowledge. 
Third are aids tc help detennine the appropriate knowledge representation and 
inferencing mechanisms which would affect the performance of the knowledge system. 
This is especially important for real-time and mission-critical applications. 
Last are features to allow good integration of the knowledge system with existing 
applications and their data base management systems. 
It will not be possible to achieve these goals in the frameworks provided by current 
tools. Robust and weii-integrated implementations of these features will require new 
designs. These advanced tools in combination with appropriate organizational and 
individual actions will accelerate the growth of knowledge systems as a component of an 
organization's total information systems services. 
TECHNOLOGY TRANSFER 
To provide the reader with a sound basis for the my resecu-ch, a nu.-nber of facets of 
the literature on technology transfer are reviewed in the following sections. Because there 
are so many factors involved in successful technology transfer, only the major concepts are 
briefly reviewed. This is followed by a discussion of technology transfer models in the 
literature. 
An Orientation to TechnolQgy Transfer 
38 
At the most fundamental level, technology transfer is concerned with the 
communication of infonnation between people and/or organizations for the purposes of 
applying that information to innovation [Hardy, Altenpohl, Allen 1969, Allen 1977, 
Cawsgil, Quinn]. As a special case of the general problem of human communications, 
technology transfer has great significance in the process of innovation, but the very tenn 
technology transfer is actually a cause for poor communication of what the process 
involves. The im9.ge of moving or transferring something from one area to another is totally 
misleading. 111e \!Ssence of true transfer (or more precisely integration) is an extremely 
complex process. This can be seen by the cost of producing the rll'st successful 
commercial jet, the Boeing 7m. While the 707 was based on military predecessors, it took 
$127 million and severa! years in the late 1950's to transfer tile technology from the 
military division to successful commercial implementation [Hardy]. 
Although people in industry spend about 72 percent of each working day 
communicating [Hardy], very few have had any directed training in this vital activity. 
Some people are said to be "born communicators" and others quite dramatically blunder 
their way along. Communication depends upon coop.eration, so it follows that technology 
transfer is also dependent upon cooperation. There can be no human cooperation (no 
communication) without feedback and :!9 technology transfer without participation in 
communications. Only intensive, continual, and extensiv~ participation can insure 
successful communications and tb:.:: resultant technology transfer. Some of the mechanisms 
to achieve this participation wm be discussed later. 
Once communication has OCClLT'"...d, action is required to produce the product or 
service (which is based on the technology that was transferred). There are a number of 
barriers to such action, some of which are: 
o Communications style. Much scientific and technological 
communication is dry and boring. The pursuit of objectivity and 
precision are the justifications for such style.14 
• Market lag: An invention may occur at a time to meet needs, but the 
time and effort to complete the innovation process, including product 
~'1d market development, may impact the technology transfer. 
• Detrimental attitudes: The "not-invented-here" syndrome and 
professional superiority attitudes15 are two examples. 
o Educational deficiencies: R&D workers do not understand the markets 
their company targets and market workers do not understand the 
technologies being developed. 
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Reducing these barriers are a key part of increasing the efficiency of the technology 
transfer process. These few examples point out some characteristics of the process: it is 
concerned with people, organizations, and technical matters, and as such it is quite 
complex. It is an ongoing process, which is multifaceted, diversified, and constantly 
14A quote from Arthur Koestler from The Act of Creation: " ... I must mention one 
specific factor which is largely responsible for turning science into a bore, and providing 
the humanist with an excuse for turning his back on it It is the academic cant, of relatively 
recent origin, that a self-respecting scientist must be a bore, that the more dehydrated the 
style of his writillg, and the more technical the jargon he uses, t.lte more respect he will 
command I repeat, this is a recent fashion, less than a century old, but its effect is 
devastating. " 
15This is particularly noticeable in AI. Workers with advanced degrees, often 
working in specialized . environments (expensive hardware and software, LISP, Prolog, 
and the pretense of the research lab), often view industrial application (which is the 
completion of the innovation process) as a less worthy endeavor. Conversely .ilose 
involved with industrial application characterize the R&D workers as "blue sky folks" and 
"people who play with toy problems. II What neither group is willing to admit is that the 
full spectrum is necessary and one could not exist without the other. 
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changing, thus requiring skilled. knowledgeable management. Not surprisingly, these 
preceding characteristics indicate another, that tecbnology transfer is costly if it is done well 
and extremely costly if done poorly. 
The Asian and Pacific Centre for Transfer of Technology, 16 in their Technology 
Atlas, has prepared a description of problems and constraints in achieving tecbnology 
induced progress [Sharif]. The following material is derived from the Technology Atlas. 
The problems can be grouped into five sets. The first set includes those related to 
the understanding of the unique characteristics and related aspects of technology: 
• Technology is a combination of both tools and knowledge on how to 
use the tools 
• A technology has value beyond a product or process in isolation. It has 
economic, social, and political value. 
• Technological specialization has increased the interdependence of 
technologies, with the need for integration processes and the people and 
organizations designed to perfonn the integration. 
• Technological advancement can be viewed as a measu..Te of 
organizational development. 
A second problem set is due to variances in perceptions and preferences, such as: 
• The "not-invented-here" syndrome 
• The converse of the "not-invented-here" syndrome, where it is 
perceived that external technologies have greater value than those 
developed internally. 
160 f the Economic and Social Commission for Asia and the Pacific. The 
Technology Atlas included twelve country policy studies including Bangladesh, China, 
India, Indonesia, Japan, Republic of Korea, Malaysia, Nepal, Pakistan, the Philippines, 
Sri Lanka, and Thailand. 
.. Following the trends, without selectivity, when deciding the focus for 
building technological capabilities. 
A third problem area concerns organizational infrastructure and its associated 
management practices, including: 
• Ineffective R&D programs 
o Effective R&D programs, but ineffective linkage to technology 
application 
• Greater emphasis on gaining knowledge, lesser on applying it. 
o Absence of formal technology monitoring, forecasting, and assessment 
processes (including delivery of findings to the point of use). 
• Compartmentalization of technology by organizational design (within 
groups, divisions, departments). 
o Ineffective coordination by organizational officers and managers who 
have other pressing concerns. 
o Technological directions considered at low levels of management (often 
due to unqualified senior managers or ineffective leadership). 
A fourth problem area concerns the level of commitment to technological 
considerations and leadership behavior: 
.. Policy makers not getting sufficient fmancial. organizational, and 
political support. 
.. Technologists not being exposed to management and market concepts 
which affect their work:. 
• Planners 3J."1d Dial,agers depending on their biases and inclinations rather 
than understanding other perspectives. 
o Poorly planned and executed changes in policies, organizations, and 
technological directions. 
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. The fifth and last set of problems are those represented by the attitudes and 
preoccupations of people, sucll. as~ 
• Top leadership operating in a crisis mode, attending to the hot issue of 
the moment instead of controlled, thought out management. 
• Policy decisions made in response to immediate political and economic 
pressures, at the expense of longer-tenn technological strategy. 
• Scarcity of time to develop and act upon sound technological plans, due 
to ceremonial duties, crisis mode of operation, and intellectual clutter. 
• Turf wars, empire building, suspicions, lack of confidence, 
fingerpointing, and failure to accept responsibility. 
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Most of the problems are internally focussed and within the control of the people 
within the organization, assuming the necessa..ry levels of commitment can be obtained. A 
number of problems are more external and not within the control of the organization. 
These are viewed as constraints, three sets of which are listed below. 
The first constraint set is due to dependence on exter.pal assistance, from other 
organizations or consultants, during the organizational development p.;riod, such as: 
.. Decisions to select development projects, as influenced by competing 
organizations. 
co Directions presented by consultants which reinforce dependence on 
outside assistance. 
.. Irrelevant work being done due to external pressures (market forces, the 
latest technical wizardry) in the presence of ill-defined and unmanaged 
internal priorities. 
A second set of constraints results from the very communications that is the essence 
of technology transfer: 
• Unrealistic aspirations due to mass media hype, which is especially true 
in a..'1ificial intelligence. 
• illusions of ac~eving in a short period of time what other role model 
organizations have achieved over a much longer time period. 
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As previously stated, the practicing technologist gets much of the infonnation from 
internal associates, but the external information sources contribute to these communications 
pressures. Allen has found that consultants, government representatives, customers, and 
vendors are all sources of information for technologists [Allen 1977]. Each of these 
sources carry their own perspectives and apply pressures as listed above. 
The third set of constraints applies primarily to late starters as they engage in the 
dual problems of situational change and developing strong technological directions: 
• Old practices and procedures must be replaced by those more 
appropriate for the new situation, as defined by the operating 
environment. 
• There is a high propensity for suboptimization due to narrow 
specialization, organizational fragmentation, and professional isolation. 
• Tne skin structure of the labor force is in conflict with the needs of the 
organization as defined by the new operating environment. 
These lists of constraints are not intended to be exhaustive, but are meant to give 
some examples of what a changing organization faces. When they are considered with the 
preceding problems, barriers, and communications issues, a sense of the breadth of the 
technology transfer process can be obtained. 
IxPes of Technology Transfer 
There are a number of different types of technology transfer. Among them are 
nation to nation, company to company, department to department (within one 
organization), group to group, and person to person. This is shown in Figure 8. Transfer 
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can also occur between any of these, and by inheritance, a transfer to a low level can also 
be viewed as a transfer at a higher level. For example, if Compa.'lY A transfers technology 
to a group in Company B, we may call it company to group transfer, but it is also a 
company to company transfer because the group is a member of Company B.17 
~tion :> ~ation :> 
C§mpanV ~mpany~ 
<:§::epartm~ ~partm~ 
~oup :> ~oup :> 
0 rson J 0 rson :> 
Figure 8. Different types of technology transfer. 
Consideration of technology transfer at the intemationallevel requires the inclusion 
of factors such as geography, culture, economy, social structures, religion, business 
climate, and government policies [Samli]. While reduced in magnitude, a number of these 
factors also apply to technology transfer at the lower levels, such as differences between 
work groups in separate cities or organizations but still within the same company. 
Mechanisms for effecting the transfer depend upon the characteristics of the 
technology provider and the technology receiver. When both are advanced. licensing is an 
effective mechanism; from an advanced to a developing receiver, infusion of capitai, 
170f course all technology transfer can be viewed exclusively as person to person, 
since this is where the exchange occurs, either personally or through documents or 
artifacts. 
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management and technical knowledge and skills, and sponsored R&D are effective; from a 
developing provider to a developing receiver, cooperative ventures can be used to share 
costs, knowledge, and risk [Cavusgil]. 
At the industrial level, a number of technology transfer mechanisms are possible, 
but they must be carefully used because they can also be used to suppress technology. 
Acquisition of patents through R&D or purchase can lead to patent consolidation, which 
allows control of the rate of development of the technology; sharing of key patents with a 
select group via a patent pool enahles the control of common markets by preventing new 
competition from outside the group; licensing a technology for limited use allows the 
licensor to suppress the use of the technology in a particular market; and takeovers enable 
the acquiring company to take control over the development of a new technology which 
may threaten an existing technology controlled by the acquiring company. 
Patent acquisition and development as a defensive technology transfer measure is 
exemplified by AT&Ts entry into radio technology. 18 As reported by Dunford: 
"AT&T was the first company to organize a coordinated research effort aL'lled 
at producing a quality system of radio ("wireless telephony") transmission and 
reception, but it entered radio research as a defensive measure because of the 
c1ai. uS being wade about the potential of radio which, if true, could have had a 
serious impact on AT &Ts investment in wire communications. AT&T secured 
for itself a central position in the development of both radio and telephone 
through securing the patents on a few specific inventions: loading coils, the 
mercury-arc repeater, and the three-element vacuum tube. 
Since the beginning of the Bell system, it had been company policy to 
consolidate patents to maintain its telephone monopoly ..• More than just 
providing a monopoly, patent consolidation can delay the introduction of new 
technology. AT&T held back the combined handset and dial system for 20 
years because of its investment in the existing technology and associated 
emphasis on cost-saving through standardization." 
I8This sheds more light on the evolution of the AT&T monopoly described in the 
Background and Context section. 
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To narrow down these diverse considerations to the domain of the Knowledge 
Systems Transfer Project, a distinction of reliance on technology sources is helpful. In a 
study on entrepreneurship and technology, Roberts made four distinct sub-defmitions of 
technology transfer [Roberts 1969], which viewed how dependent a new company was on 
its technology: 
• Direct technology transfer spa.;ifies those situations in which the new 
company could not have been founded without technology that was 
taken from a source organization by an entrepreneur and deployed in his 
company. The transferred technology was essential to the existence of 
the new company. 
~ Partial technology transfer is when the technology from the source 
organization is important, but technologies from other sources also 
contributed to the success of the new organization. 
• Vague technology transfer occurs in the situations in which some 
technology transfer OCCUlTed, but the transfer was of general skills 
rather than of specific ideas or devices. 
• No technology transfer is when nothing from the source company could 
be specifically identified as being transferred into the new company. 
By applying these categories to the general industrial arena, they are helpful in 
characterizing the type of technology transfer occurring with the Knowledge Systems 
Transfer Project Knowledge systems technology was not created by U S WEST or any 
of its predecessors. There is no primary source organization for the technology, but there 
is a large number of general skills and knowledge that has been imported to the Project for 
transfer to other organizations. While this falls into Roberts' "vague" category, and the 
tenn "vague" has misleading connotations, it illustrates that KSTP is assimilating the 
technological components from a wide variety of external and internal sources and 
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transferring: it to other people and organizations within U S WEST for application in new 
problem domains. It is this level of technology transfer that is the focus of this research. 
Different Names for Technology Iran. 
Technology transfer means more than "taking a thing that is here and moving it over 
there" [Schon]. There are many terms in use which attempt to put a symbolic label on a 
very complex, broad process. Having already discussed the definition of technology 
transfer and my preference for the term "technology integration," I have willingly submitted 
to using tecbnology transfer as the commonly used phrase. This section describes a few 
more terms and what some authors mean when they use them. 
The Technology Atlas report [Sharif] is produced by an organization that uses 
"transfer of technology" in its name.19 This usage basically follows the defmition 
developed earlier in the paper you are now reading. However, the report [Sharif, page 28] 
discusses "issues in technology assimilation," "steps involved with assimilation," 
"prerequisites for assimilation," and presents a framework for assimilation. The concept of 
assimilation is much closer to my preference of "integration" by connoting activity to 
incorporate the technology into an organization (or in the report's case, a country) for 
productive use. 
Erdilek and Rapoport report on a philosophical argument about when transfer has 
occurred [Erdilek]: 
"Some participants in this debate contend that technology is not really 
transferred unless the knowledge that has been transferred is actually used by 
the transferee. Others argue that what the transferee does or can do with the 
knowledge he or she receives should not be a factor ill detemlining whether a 
transfer has occurred, although they recognize that the mastery of that 
knowledge is a critical factor in examining the effect of any given transfer. The 
fact that the technology is knowledge rather than some tangible product makes 
the concept of transfer a difficult one to define operationally. When a product 
crosses a national boundary, it is on longer in its original location. Whether it is 
used or not, it can be said to have been transferred. However, in transferring 
19nat organization is the Asian and Pacific Centre for Transfer of Technology 
know!edge, the transferor is not giving up the knowledge, but is essentially 
sharing it with others. If the recipient does not understand what he receives, 
can it still be called knowledge'? We do not think so." 
I would concur that understanding of what is received is necessary, and would 
further agree that putting the knowledge to actual use is a prerequisite for successful 
technology transfer. In my preference, if a recipient does not actively use the knowledge 
and skills in some innovative way, effective transfer or integration has not occurred. 
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Another tenn occasionally used is "technology diffusion" which is used 
synonymously with "technology transfer" by the recently fonned Technology Policy Task 
Force of the U.S. House of Representatives Science, Space, and Technology Committee. 
The Task Force's emphasis is on "facilitating the diffusion of technology through the 
economy." More insight into what this might mean can be gained by a review of diffusion 
models in the next section. 
Monger introduces another term, "technological absorption," which is not explicitly 
defined. However, this short passage provides a defmition by context [Monger]: 
"Rapid change introduces confusion about when to buy into a new technology 
and when to discard an old one. Thus, many managers have come to believe 
that they are scrambling to keep up with technological innovations in vain. No 
matter how hard a manager may try, absorbing new technology as quickly as it 
develops seems impossible ... Generally speaking, the ability to rapidly absorb 
new technology is desirable." 
This idea of absorption gives the impression that new technology is somehow 
soaked up like a sponge, without any conscious directed effort. 
One last phrase is the "management of technology transfer" [Cavusgil]. This quite 
simply and importantly states that the technology transfer process, whatever name you 
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attach to it, must be managed with the skills and knowledge of the field. It will not happen 
by itself, and will not have good results without proper management. 20 
Technological Rates of Change 
Technological change often occurs through a series of successive substitutions and 
diffusions. In this section, I will briefly introduce the topic of tecbnological substitution 
and how it is related to the technology transfer process. Diffusion will be explored in 
greater depth, as a phenomena in its own right, and as related to intemal organizational 
diffusion. 
At an individual level, the rate at which new technology is introduced is dependent 
upon the recognition of need and acceptance of the new technology by people [Pearson]. 
This individual behavior, however, has been shown to have a remarkably consistent 
behavior when examined from a larger view. This is the S-shaped curve and its sequential 
overlap through successive evolutionary changes in technology. In this view, technical 
advance is when one product or service is substituted by another, such as horse buggies by 
cars, paper mail by electronic mail, or natural materials by synthetic. 
Also incorporated in the concept of diffusion is the behavioral theory that 
acceptance is an adoption-imitation process [Teotia]. The new technology is first adopted 
by a few people, the innovators, who in tum influence other people to adopt it. 
The discovery or invention phase of a new technology involves a broadening of the 
concept, testing it, and assimilating the finds into an accessible technical knowledge base. 
Matching of the discovery or invention to a technological need and creating a first viable 
product is the next phase. Then the diffusion phase begins, in which the new product or 
service spreads throughout its target population. It is during the diffusion phase that 
20nus also brings to mj~~ the many people and organizations who say they are 
engaged in technology transfer bu( are clearly unaware of the breadth of the process and the 
commitment required to successfully integrate a new technology. 
substitution of one technology for another occurs, as shown in Figure 9, where 
Technology A is displaced by Technology B, then Technology B is displaced by 
Technology C. 
Technology A Technologies A & B Technologies A & B Technologies B & C 
Relative Market Shares 
Figure 9. Substitution of one technology for another. 
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Mensch theorized that there were institutional barriers which caused the S-shaped 
curve in technological adoption [Mensch]. He calls this the bandwagon effect, where 
"individuals - instead of passing by with a somewhat unifonn frequency rate - first do not 
come at all, bl;t shonly after some forerunners do show up, the whole party marches by 
together." Once initial barriers are broken, this gives rise to the dramatic steepening of the 
slope of the S-shaped curve. 
Within an organization, some specifically cited barriers to diffusion in a study of 
100 major corporations [Vandennerwe, Debreyne] were: 
• Difficulty communicating observable benefits and showing evidence to 
support them. 
• Risks are perceived as too high, which some call "corporate inertia," 
"lack of entrepreneurial thinking," and "internal ideological attachment 
to prior technology." 
• Interdepartmental resistance and lack of consensus on benefits, with 
conflicts aligning along departmental boundaries. 
• Politics and psychological barriers such as fear, rivalry, jealousy, bias 
and self-interest 
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• Lack of clear access to power base, getting to the right people and the 
right time. 
Once these barriers have been overcome, Fisher and Pry, based on the study of 
several technological substitutions, concluded that when a technology captures about 5% of 
the market, there is a high probability that it will continue to spread until it completely 
replaces the former technology. This observation is useful in the case of knowledge 
systems adoption from a heuristic viewpoint, but not absolutely, because there is no 
concise definition of what the displaced technology would be, and therefore no possible 
definition of the size of the market. So it is not possible to know when the critical mass has 
been achieved, other than to perhaps observe a rapid increase in the usage of the 
technology. 
Achievement of critical mass has implications for the technology-leader and 
technology-follower strategies often adopted by organizations.21 These strategies ask the 
basic questions of whether it will pay to be a leader or a follower, and if a follower, what 
will give the best technological competitiveness. In these leader-follower cases, the 
individual growth curves for the two organizations give rise to the concept of coupled 
technology transfer [Raz] in which the curve of one unifonnly lags that of the other. 
21 This is described in the section on Technology and Market Linkage. 
Depending on the characteristics of the two organizations, leadership advantages can be 
quickly lost if the follower is a fast follower with superior non-technological strengths. 
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As the technology spreads, there will naturally be an increased number of 
organizations in these leader and follower roles, which can accelerate the growth of the 
technology. This spreading of a new technology among the universe of potential adopters 
is what is referred to as diffusion. To increase the likelihood of an organization gaining its 
share of benefit from a diffusing technology, it must plan to implement appropriate 
modifications to the technology so as to shape the characteristics of each group of potential 
users of the technology in their market segments [Talaysum]. In this view the adoption of 
knowledge systems technology will benefit from tailoring the technology offered to clients 
so as to more directly benefit their needs. For example, offer PC software if the client 
owns and uses PC's, workstation software if the client owns and uses workstations, etc. 
Stoneman notes two main themes which are not always adhered to in the study of 
diffusion and which has bearing on the adoption of knowledge system technology. First, 
is that the observed diffusion pattern will be the result of interaction between the consumers 
and the suppliers of the technology. From this it follows that changing the frequency or 
quality of interaction will change the rate of diffusion. Second, the diffusion process is 
based on rational behavior. This is less certain with lmowledge systems technology due to 
1) its association with the mystique of artificial intelligence and 2) the irrational desire of 
many managers and technologists for the "magic bullet" which will solve their major 
problems. 
Having examined the concept of diffusion, there are weaknesses in the concept that 
must be pointed out [Gold 1983]. First, is that the diffusion model makes enOllIlOUS 
simplifying assumptions, such as that prospective users have fixed and basically similar 
objectives, operations, decision processes, products, and evaluation criteria. Second, the 
technology itself, especially knowledge systems technology, undergoes numerous 
significant changes in capabilities over time, such as reliability, operating flexibility, and 
efficiency. Third, is that the universe of potential adopters is known and fixed. This is 
definitely not the case for knowledge systems technology. 
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To conclude, the diffusion process must be kept in perspective, using the sigmoid 
curves as a rough mental image, but tempered by knowledge of their limitations. Research 
has shown [Gold 1983] that em>rs in estimating the expected technological benefits of 
innovations center on underestimation (often considerable) of the time needed to achieve 
functioning innovation, overestimating utilization rates when determining benefits, and 
underestimating the need to make adaptive adjustments in areas of the business associated 
with the new technology. And fmally, Tressel observed that "the process of industrial 
technology transfer depends upon a critical and random diffusion of ideas." The process 
must be better than "random" if it is to be amenable to direction-setting and management. 
TechnoIQgy and Market Linka~e 
With evolutionary technology, there is a natural sequence of events that provides a 
clear path from an idea to a marketable22 product and this path is typically a variation of a 
previously traveled path. Revolutionary technology, on the other hand, has no clear 
sequence of events, no map for guidance, and less protection from heading towards a dead-
end. This implies that there should be different management techniques for each of these 
situations, and while this is true, it is perhaps more surprising that there are fundamental 
similarities in managing each situation. 
The primary similarity is that both evolutionary and revolutionary are based on the 
same core strengths of current corporate technologies in products, materials, systems, or 
production processes. It is logical to start a revolutionary project from the technology areas 
22Market, as used here, refers the domain of people willing to invest in a product, 
either as a fmished good or a service which the people can use. The latter is more 
applicable to KSTP. 
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that an organization has most familiarity and expertise. The additional benefit from this is 
that an organization's present markets can also be used to evaluate progress in such areas as 
customer needs, competition, pricing, distribution, service, and reputation. Even in 
internal technology integration, these market forces are active. 
To effectively use these core strengths requires an integrating process that can be 
used to plan and control the alternatives for future technology directions. 
There are a number of arguments about the desire to relate revolutionary technology 
to the marketplace because there may not be a market or even a perceived market need for 
the technology being researched. Evolutionary technology is much easier and more 
accurately related to the markets. Strategic technology planning can use the technology and 
market knowledge to provide some help in determining the R&D areas to emphasize. 
These four steps suggest how this can work:23 
1) Establish an explicit framework for analyzing markets and technology 
2) Analyze the market requirements 
3) Analyze the technology requirements 
4) Determine levels and priorities for technology investments 
This is not necessarily a process for technology planning but provides a structure 
for organizing and thinking about the task of defining priorities. Step one requires close 
interaction between technology and market planners to develop "units of analysis" to relate 
operating unit strategy to technology and provide a common basis for comparing and 
integrating technology and market factors. The desired situation is to have market pull 
dominate t..'te technolog-j push, although revolutionary technology often results in the latter. 
Step two determines the most important markets based on future returns and 
relationship to core business areas. The market leverage is based on needs or wants that 
231 am indebted. to Robert C. Larson for discussions about these steps and helping 
me understand their usefulness in setting corporate R&D direction. 
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affect the clients purchase decision including function, acquisition cost, ease-of-use, 
operating cost, reliability, serviceability, and compatibility. Different products and services 
in knowledge systems technology will be more or less sensitive to any number of these 
acquisition factors. Those that make a difference to the customer are the ones chosen for 
further evaluation. An example of this would be the current status of robust knowledge 
systems software. Such software requires relatively expensive hardware. This is a barrier 
to purchase for many consumers and is therefore a worthwhile area for an appropriate 
company to pursue, and a number of companies are doing this. 
Included in the market analysis is a competitive product profiling in the same criteria 
listed previously. This puts the absolute market demand into a usable perspective by 
comparing an organization's competitive technology position with that of other 
organizations. Where a strong demand is shown from customers and an advantage exists 
over competitors, the market is viable for further development. 
A difficulty in the market analysis is found when dealing with technologies that may 
be discontinuous in their life span. This may cause incorrect analysis of test market results 
as shown in Figure 10 [Tauber]. 
Over time, the discontinuous technology is a much better investment for an 
organization, but the short test market period would obscure that observation. The obvious 
point is that the discontinuity is not seen until time has passed, as there is no guarantee that 
the technology would exhibit continuous behavior and perfonn miserably. One possible 
solution to this is to conduct a longer test market period to see if the curve continues to rise. 
Even this will not always work because market research depends on clients to recognize 
their own needs and seek products to fill them. With discontinuous technologies, the 
consumer does not recognize the need until use of the technology creates the need. 
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Figure 10. Misleading test market results for a technology. 
Step three dermes the technologies which could support the market-based 
technology requirements, detennines the maturity of the technologies via technology 
forecasting, evaluates the current resource base including required skills, and examines 
future competing products to detennine how cost and perfonnance might change over time. 
The primary objective of this step is to identify the technology options which are available 
to the organization. 
The technology forecasting process has not been as useful to corporations as the 
availability of techniques might suggest, due to forecaster's inattention to implementation 
factors. Critical elements necessary for forecasting include [Fusfeld 1980]: 
1) A fonnal integrating mechanism into organizational planning 
2) Forecast presentations that meet the planners' needs 
3) A planning cycle in synch with technology change 
4) Top management support 
5) Complete forecasting including competitor capabilities 
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Technology forecasts that are not driven by corporate strategic planning needs will 
not be as successfully used as those that are so driven. Much of the historical emphasis in 
technology forecasting has been on technique development as opposed to full utilization of 
existing techniques. 
Market and Technology Convergence 
The combination of steps two and three lead to a view of four guiding strategies for 
an organization's direction depending on specific market and technology positions, as 
shown in Figure 11: 
High 
Market 
Leverage 
Low 
Relative Technology 
Competitive Position 
Higb Low 
leadership fast-follower 
searching withdrawal 
Figure 11. Strategies for specific market and technology positions. 
Depending upon the relationship of market leverage to competitive position, a 
company will choose the most feasible strategy. The fast follower strategy is common to 
large organizations which enjoy a certain amount of stability simply due to their size or 
entrenchment. Fast followers try to learn from leader's mistakes so they can develop an 
improved, more reliable product that may include advanced features while avoiding 
innovations that may turn out to be failUi~s. A technology l~ader with no market searches 
for customers. Finally, low market leverage and low competitive position guides a 
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company to withdraw from that technology. But if there is sufficient motivation to pursue 
a technology, alternative development plans may be utilized. By noticing the similarity of 
Figure 11 with Figure 12 [Fusfeld 1985], you can see that a withdrawal may lead an 
organization to the use of venture capital, or that other gradations of weakness may lead to 
joint ventures. While Fusfeld developed this for external applications, it can also be 
applied to internal technology transfer activities. 
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Figure 12. Funding for certain market and technology positions. 
The fourth step uses the results of the these market/technology analyses to 
determine levels and priorities for technology investments and the mix of funding options. 
The objective is to establish a balance between short and long term business goals and 
ensure a continual flow of technology to meet the needs of the business. Even though this 
stepwise description implies a procedure for mechanically generating technology directions, 
it cannot be perfonned as such. The meeting of the market and technology dimensions in 
59 
this framework are meant to provide a way of thinking about the development of a business 
strategy, and Philip Smith points out that the market-technology linkage process should 
create some tension [Smith]. If it does not, the analysis process probably isn't working 
and the market and technology should be revisited. 
l.&adership and Personnel Components 
There are three major aspects of the personal dimension of technology integration. 
First, leadership from managers and executives must create the atmosphere which enables 
the staff to work productively. Second, personnel issues are an essential part of creating 
and maintaining a productive environment. Third, communications transcends all levels of 
management and all types of work functions as the binding factor in technology integration. 
Each of these three major aspects will be discussed in the following sections. 
Leadership. Effective use of technology in a company cannot be limited to fonnal 
mechanisms for passing ideas and new developments into and out of the technology 
organization. Technology must be viewed as a vital part of a cOIporation, and as such, 
must have the attention and active support of executives.24 At the heart of managing 
technology effectively is managing the entire company effectively. A few factors appear to 
be central to this effectiveness. 
Risk Takin~. By nature, new technology is risky. Out of 100 ideas, 10 may be 
worth pursuing, and only 1 may end up being produced In order to find that one 
survivor, the executive must be willing to take substantial risks and accept the 
accompanying losses. The one survivor is not to be labeled "the successful idea" because it 
is the process that succeeds or fails. The undeveloped ideas provide a learning 
environment and a rich history for later use by the organization. 
24por my purposes executive includes those throughout the corporation in addition 
to those in the technology organizations. 
60 
The practice of innovation will be cause for organizational unrest because it leads to 
new ideas and change. Any new idea will not be accepted at first, no matter how good it 
seems to the originators. At best, open-minded people will listen attentively and remain 
neutral, gradually giving support as the idea is further developed and presented. At worst, 
resistance forms, defensive maneuvers begin, and the opposition solidifies. Perseverance 
and commitment are required if the idea is to gain widespread acceptance. 
This situation poses certain problems for executives, who must know what to 
support and when and how to support it. This requires the ability to trust the idea 
-
champions, even when the risk seems great. 
An example of this is provided by Walter Wriston, fonner chainnan and CEO of 
Citicorp. He took explicit measures to stimulate innovative learning which had a high risks 
[Bennis]: 
• He authorized many experiments; almost any good idea that someone 
had was supported. Funhennore, he convinced managers that this was 
the way to succeed .. 
• He encouraged the hiring of bright nonconventional types like his 
successor, John Read, an engineer who headed consumer banking and 
E.dwin Hoffman, an executive vice president with a Ph.D. in molecular 
biophysics. He promoted them quickly, too, when they succeeded. 
• He did not fire people when a risky venture failed. Instead, he'd assign 
the person to a more senior executive for a year or two to recover and 
recharge for another experiment. Consistent failure, of course, did 
result in dismissal, but Wriston seemed to think if you haven't made 
mistakes. you having been ttying hard enough. 
This executive behavior is not widespread in Western corporations and is even 
more rare in Japan where the demerit personnel system is used to evaluate employees. A 
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person with a demerit or a failure is eliminated from the list of candidates under 
consideration for promotion to higher positions.25 Employees with no or few demerits are 
not eliminated, causing managers to tend not to take risks which may lead to a failure. 
Researchers and developers are also risk averse, choosing the wait-and-see strategy for 
someone to step forth as an advocate of a new research area. This is at least one cause of 
the perception of slow progress in Japanese R&D. To attempt to alleviate the problem, a 
government agency (the Ministry of International Trade and Industry, MITI) breaks the 
stagnation by being a leader for promoting new directions in indusnial innovation [Eto]. 
Finally, there are cases where the risk decision lies only with an individual, which 
points out the need to have the right type of person in that decision role. Experiences at 
General Motors Research Laboratories has shown that some problems or opportunities are 
of such vital importance to the organization that work should proceed without a clear 
mechanism for moving the research from the labs into production [W olffj. Without 
individuals having the intuitive sense that the research must proceed without the traditional 
organizational proof, the R&D is destined to plod along in a predictable, controllable, and 
unsatisfying manner. 
Treatment of Failure. To underscore the conttast between the demerit system and 
Wriston's style at Citicorp is a particularly strong illustration of the productive treatment of 
the occasional failure. At mM many years ago, a promising junior executive was a central 
figure in a high risk venture that ended up losing $10 million. mM's founder and then 
chairman Thomas Watson, Sr. called the nervous man into his office. Before Watson 
could say anything, the junior executive said, "I guess you'll want my resignation," to 
25nte extent of this practice is disputable, for the DEC/SRC study [Report] states 
that "Japanese culture does not punish individuals for failure, with the result that failures 
can be lessons." Nevertheless, the point here is that any practice resembling a demerit 
system can reduce innovative behavior. 
which Watson replied. "You can't be serious. We've just spent $10 million educating 
you!" 
So while it is necessary for an executive to take risks, it is further required that 
some means for learning from mistakes and channeling the lessons learned into a more 
productive working environment. 
IXW of Management Style. A major part of the executive culture is a result of 
individual management style. The effect of style on innovation is profound and must be 
explicitly addressed. An R&D executive must search out the factors that encourage 
innovation and integrate them into his or her personal style. 
A number of bureaucratic barriers to innovation have been detennined to have 
severe impacts on large companies [Drucker 1985]: 
• Top 1Dai1agement isolation • Intolerance of fanatics 
• Short time horizons • Accounting practices 
• Excessive rationalism • Excessive bureaucracy 
• Inappropriate incentives • Poor atmosphere 
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While some of these are organizationally entrenched, such as accounting practices, 
some are clearly within the control of individual executives. Top management isolation is a 
pervasive problem because risk perception is inversely related to the familiarity one has for 
the subject matter being considered. Lack of contact with customer and the employees 
doing the work are the chief causes of isolation. Information filtered through intermediate 
managers is not sufficient to understand the fundamentals of the business, nor is the direct 
experience an executive may have had 20 years ago. 
Intolerance of fanatics is a common characteristic of executives in large corporations 
because the path to success for those very executives was through confonnation and 
working within established norms. Fanatics with different ideas about doing things are 
often viewed as not being team players, and are ostracized from the mainstream. A more 
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productive practice for everyone is to actively include these people in important 
discussions, to value their perspectives as a rich source of innovative ideas. Recall that all 
innovation is, by definition, a deviation from what cUITently exists. 
Alfred Sloan, Jr. showed not only acceptance of diversity but aggressive pursuit. 
He felt that disagreement was the best way to expose all of the important facets of an issue. 
He is reponed in [Drucker 1979] as saying at a top General Motors committee meeting, 
"Gentlemen, I take it we are all in complete agreement on the decision here." As everyone 
nodded yes, Sloan continued, "Then I propose we postpone further discussion of this 
matter until our next meeting to give ourselves time to develop disagreement and perhaps 
gain some understanding of what the decision is all about." 
Also under considerable executive control are the incentive and reward 
mechanisms. Reward systems in most large companies are designed to minimize 
surprises, which naturally affects innovative efforts. An innovation may disrupt existing 
company plans, upset power structures, and challenge the status quo. Few large 
companies reward innovators with compensation comparable to their contribution. Doing 
so would alter the perceived stability of the company and might bring on the problem of too 
much innovation in a company staffed with managers ill-prepared to work with such 
dynamics. 
Highly innovative periods for many companies have been when senior executives 
have taken personal interest in sponsoring new technologies through the growth stages to 
commercialization. These executives mayor ma "lot have a technology background 
themselves. Examples include David Sarnoff wh( A RCA for over 40 years through the 
radio and television eras; Thomas Watson at mM; Richard Hewlett at Hewlett-Packard; and 
Frederick Close at Alcoa vw.ith the aluminum-clad skyscraper and aluminum cans [Graham]. 
The limited time of senior executives obviously means that they cannot attend to everything 
and the recent trends of having financial and legal people fill executive roles has resulted in 
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less attention to company fundamentals: the products and services that are their sole 
support. These trends have resulted in executives in large corporations staying away from 
the technology, perhaps because they feel it is too complicated or unimportant Neither 
case is true. 
In technology-oriented companies, essential managerial characteristics include 
openness to technical possibility, belief in potential, a receptive attitude, and a true interest 
in technology. Formal education in the sciences and management are helpful, but not 
sufficient on their OWO. Many executives who were educated as engineers end up 
disinterested or bored with technology, while other executives without a formal technical 
education have a burning desire for technology and what it can do for people. It is the 
nearly constant enthusiasm for the work that is required for success. 
Personnel Components. Issues of human resources are most important in an 
technology-onented environment, simply because people are the sources of creativity and 
innovation. It is often said that creativity cannot be taught and innovation cannot be forced. 
It is possible, however, to create an environment that is conducive to the innovative 
process. A first component is having the personnel types match the company 
characteristics and desires. Second is the use of staffing policies to stimulate innovation. 
Third is providing the right organizational culture. And a fOUIt.'l is the creations of a secure 
working environment To accomplish the R&D mission of an organization requires explicit 
formal management of these human resource components. 
Personnel T)!pes Needed. Because the staff is the company, its composition will 
determine what the company can and cannot accomplish. Different types of companies 
have different characteristics and desires, which lead to different technological 
requirements. 
Operationally, the problem is to be able to assess what is needed and take action to 
fulfill those needs. An essential part of this is to relate the company type, characteristics, 
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and desires with the technological requirements. In tenns of evaluating the needs for 
people with specific skills and knowledge, the long range needs of the corporation can be 
linked to skills development through a conceptual framework [Yanagishita] as shown in 
F~gure 13. Figure 14 describes some of these organizational types and how they affect the 
staff requirements [modified from Glasser]. 
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Figure 13. A conceptual framework for skills development 
Type of Company 
Independent Research Lab 
Small Instrument Man-
uf2Ctme!' 
Medium-large, high-
technology manufac-
turing compiiHY 
Large systems house 
Small product factory 
Medium-sized product 
house 
Characteristics 
Sells res<"...l!!Ch !!!!d tech-
nology development, 
single researcher or small 
teams; primarily 
experimental science; 
high technology 
Conceives, develops, 
sells small sophisticated 
instruments or packaged 
experiments and experi-
mental hardware; high 
technology 
Conceives, develops, and 
sells a complex line of 
sophisticated equipment 
or chemical basic maleri-
als and material systems; 
high technology 
Conceives, develops, and 
sells one- or several-of-a-
kind complex major 
systems; ultra high tech-
nology 
Innovative products, low 
technology, large manu-
facturing runs 
Big daddy of small prod-
uct factories, some tech-
nology, mostly innova-
live engi."leering 
. Large multiproduct house Substantial research and 
innGvation in manufac-
turing processes; some 
product research; medium 
technology 
Company Desires 
Continuous outpouring of 
new technology con-
cepts; expansion of lab-
oratory facilities; en-
hancement of reputation 
A few sophisticated pro-
grams each year leading 
to new instruments; fimd-
ing for lab and man-
ufacturing facility devel-
opment; low-risk, high-
potential internal pro-
grams 
Technical depth in a few 
significant areas of tech-
nology; worldwide repu-
tat~on in equipment 
performance; unique 
innovative devices; 
aggressive sales and 
distribution 
Depth in critical tech-
nologies; systems analy-
sis and synthesis 
capability; customer ! 
market knowledge and 
critical assessment; total 
system design ability and 
knowledge; system and 
hardware reputation 
One or two new products 
or product improvements 
per year; low-cost design; 
low inventory !Iarge pro-
duction runs 
As above; moderate 
technology capabilities 
Develop critical tech-
nologies for product 
lines; innovative ! 
patentable product de-
signs; cost and customer 
conscious designs 
Staff Requirements 
Independent, highly mo-
tivated scientists; con-
tacts with university and 
government labs; en-
trepreneurial types 
Many high-technology 
innovators; en-
tl'epreneurial skills and 
motivation; well-directed 
programs compatible 
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with facilities; competent 
design of sophisticated 
equipment 
Highly motivated sci-
entific team; innovative 
engineering concepts and 
designs; in-depth product 
improvement and product 
field suppon; strong 
patent position; strength 
in critical technology ar-
eas 
Key technology; sci-
entific teams and labs; 
systems engineering ca-
pability; frequent I effec-
tive customer contact; 
pragmatic engineering 
design and analysis; ex-
perienced engineering and 
developmental testing ca-
pability; aggressive 
personnel development 
programs 
One or two innovative 
designers; pragmatic en-
gineering skills (i.e. nar-
row); factory support 
As above; some labo-
ratory capability and 
skills 
Some scientific and lab 
capability; innovative 
engineering; pragmatic, 
producible designs; cus-
tomer and market aware-
ness 
Figure 14. Organizational types and staff requirements. 
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The external factors affecting long range plans are in the business environment 
The market needs and technological seeds (market demand-technoiogy push) are analyzed 
in combination with business results to estimate opportunity gains and losses. The effect 
of business results on the technology plan is dependent on how the new technology budget 
is managed. If the budget is set to accomplish specific long tenn corporate needs, the 
business results may have only a small effect on the technology plan. If, however, the 
budget is a fixed pen:entage of revenues, it will be subject to every change in corporate 
financial perfonnance. 
The technology plan is decomposed into technological specialties which can be used 
to assess what potential a staff member has in that specialty and the potential that is required 
to fulfill the plan. The technological potential gap can then be addressed by: 
• Retraining existing personnel 
• Hiring from colleges and universities 
• Hiring a specialist from another company 
• Reassigning a specialist from within the company 
If all of these options are determined to be infeasible, then the technological 
specialty cannot be filled. This would require an iterative adjustment of successively higher 
organizational plans, and perhaps corporate goals. 
Stimulating Innovation Through Staffing. The use of staffing policies to stimulate 
innovation C3..11be used to bridge t'NO other kinds of gaps: 1) the gap between infonnation 
available for innovation and the infonnation actually delivered for innovation and 2) the gap 
between technology results and technology effectively used. Roberts characterizes these as 
"gaps of input" and "gaps of linkage" [Roberts] and offers some alternatives for the 
technology organization to address these gaps.26 
26ne Technology Atlas [Sharif] also identifies technological gaps, which are 
characterized by technology, human, organization, or infonnation gaps. The technological 
gap is a composite of these components. 
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One alternative is critical functions staffing, which focuses on having the right 
people in three key groups. First, the corporation's top management must provide the risk 
accepting environment I discussed previously; second, the fundamental technical people 
must be competent in problem finding and solving; and third is a group that provides the 
essential linkage of the critical functions. This third group is not as easily recognizable as 
the first two, but they have a similar common denominator: it is to provide the 
interdepartmental functions for bridging the input and linkage gaps. Briefly, these roles are 
the: 
• idea generator who comes with new ideas 
• entrepreneur who is the active proponent of the ideas 
• technical, market, and manufacturing gatekeepers [Roberts 1979, Davis, 
Allen 1977] who each use their expertise in detennining the viability and 
future directions for ideas 
• program manager who integrates ideas into the corporation 
• sponsor who as a senior manager provides the protection and 
nourishment for an idea to prosper 
In many cases these roles are filled by a number of different people, for example, 
there may be a number of sponsors working together in there own areas of influence, all of 
which are required for success. It is also reasonable for one person to fill more than one 
role, such as the idea generator who has the entrepreneurial desire to carry the idea through. 
An important managerial observation, though, is that multi-dimensional people are not 
common, so those who are not entrepreneurs must not be expected to attempt to be so. 
This would surely mean that ideas would not be as well developed as if a true entrepreneur 
were to fill that role. 
An alternative to critical function staffing is the product team approacr The key 
aspect of this approach is the absence of technological work within a separate function 
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group, isolated from the other groups needed to effectively use the technologies. A multi-
functional group is created with members from other groups in the corporation, such as 
manufacturing, finance, and marketing. In a sense, it is combining many parts of the 
critical function staffing into one team. Such a multi-disciplinary team composition results 
in products and services very different from those designed in isolation. 
Personnel arrangements are an important part of technology transfer. Because the 
process is essentially social in nature, it involves people in all organizations and at all 
levels. Technology transfer is all to often viewed as an object or an event: a report, a 
meeting, or a presentation. This is a mechanistic view of technology transfer and it can be 
improved upon by establishing a flow of technology. To develop this flow the concept of a 
receptor is useful. A receptor is an individual within various corporate groups who 
understand or are willing to learn about linkages between emerging technologies and 
product opportunities [Soloway]. They act as local champions and paths for two way 
communication. For example, the marketing and technology departments can be effectively 
linked with the presence of receptors in each organization. The marketing people become 
much more aware of the available technology and the research people learn how to focus 
toW&-ds market demand, even over long time frames. 
Technology transfer can be attempted by a number of methods which can be 
categorized as procedural, human, or structural [Roberts 1988]. Procedural methods are 
mechanistic devices intended to bridge the technology units with the appropriate receiving 
units, often via joint planning and joint staffmg along some predetennined procedures. An 
example of this is the MCC computer research consortium, which includes over 20 
computer corporations as members. Human methods focus more on the personal 
interactions. These methods include informal meetings, reports. and conversations arising 
from individual initiative and fonnal actions such as intergroup movements of personnel to 
transfer infonnation. MCC also has some of this component, but it is somewhat 
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constrained by legal entanglements due to the competitive natme of the member 
corporations. Infonnal technology transfer is too hard to control and works best within 
one corporation or among non-competitive organizations. The structural methods have 
specific organizational units devoted to technology transfer. Often these units have a finger 
in many functional groups and are supposed to act as a fonnal conduit for infonnation. 
Of the three methods, the conect combination is subject to the characteristics of the 
corporation. The structural approach is often the least successful because of conflicting 
organizational pressures on the group. It can be useful only when a well-defined mission 
can be stated and accepted by all groups using the technology transfer group as an 
infonnation source or sink. The human approach is usually the most successful because of 
the interpersonal dynamics. The procedural methods are most effective when used in 
combination with human methods. Finding the combination for a particular organization is 
the key to effective use of technology. 
Creating a Secure Working Environment. Technology workers have many 
motivators which are similar to all workers, such as those that are on Maslow's hierarchy. 
Perhaps they are somewhat more concerned with higher issues such as self-actualization. 
It is beyond my scope to attempt to comprehensively address motivators for such 
employees, but there are a few factors unique to technology workers that are very 
important. 
One is the need for protecting the job security of high risk workers. This is 
provided by the executive belief in the uncertainty of research efforts and the belief that this 
is the way to operate. Tnis is most difficult for managers with experience only in 
traditional management environments. These managers try to force research-dependent 
innovation as they would an engineering program. They apply pressure and throw money 
around without taking the time and effort to think about what they are trying to accomplish. 
At early stages of exploration, motivation can be encouraged by a manager providing true 
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interest (the love of technology mentioned earlier), support, and enthusiasm. Only when a 
project moves into a state of technical readIness can the usual motivating techniques of 
pressure, money, resources, and deadlines be effective. If a manager applies the latter 
techniques inappropriately, the high risk workers may quite justifiably feel that their job is 
in jeopardy. Premature pressure by RCA managers led to many of the most difficult 
periods during the development of the video player. 
Companies that operate their technology organizations as cost centers which receive 
a fIXed percentage of corporate results add another instability factor. The need for a 
sustained effort in certain technology areas may be overridden by the limited funding in a 
period of poor company perfonnance. This could cripple a company for a much longer 
time than the temporary downturn in business. Figure 15 illustrates one way of minimizing 
the internal expansion and contraction [Iwata]: 
Different 
Industry 
o 
Venture 
Business 
o 
Parent Company 
Core Group 
of 
Employees 
Subcontractors 
I a.grouem.> 
Core 
Employees 
Subcontractors 
Figure 15. Minimizing company expansion and contraction. 
Different 
Industry 
Business 
By regrouping the structure of the parent company and its relationships to different 
industries, venture businesses, and subcontractors, it may be possible for the parent 
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company to become more stable. The tradeoff here is in the substantially smaller size of the 
group of core employees. This is of greater importance in the technology areas, but can be 
addressed by the tie-ups with different industries and cooperation with venture businesses. 
The greater number of avenues for technology can provide a needed flexibility in dynamic 
industries. 
The many dimensions of operating a productive technology organization involve 
executive culture, staff selection, resource planning, incentive policies, outside alliances, 
and control of development One area I would like to concentrate on to summarize is the 
integration of external practices into American business. An attempt to introduce any alien 
management style into a cultural environment may result in a clash of style that will not 
realize the desired positive benefits. A manager must carefully select the parts of that alien 
style and craft a good fit for it within the existing framework. If adopting such styles do 
not lead to significant benefits, a different strategy may be in order. For example, rather 
that trying to out perfonn the Japanese in manufacturing and production (where they have 
cultural strengths supporting their efforts), channel resources into design work and 
innovative research (where Americans have cultural strength). This may put more 
emphasis in software-based computer technologies because of the individualized, creative 
nature of software development or may mean the growth of the Ph.D. research staff. 
Communications 
In a joint study of Japanese companies by the Digital Equipment Corporation and 
Semiconductor Research Corporation [Repon] technology transfer is defined as the 
communication of skills among individuals and groups. As simple as this is, it does focus 
on the essential factor of communications. However, the process is much more complex 
because 1) there is much information to be communicated in addition to skills and 2) there 
is often no concentrated, well-defined group of peers with similar goals. Instead, the target 
audience is scattered, poorly defined, and representative of a broad spectrum of interests. 
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A number of questions can be posed about technology transfer communications, 
such as: 
• What are the information sources and channels? 
• In what order are sources searched? 
• What is the difference between scientific communication and 
technological communication? 
• How does the organization influence communications? 
• What is the effect of geographic separation? 
The following sections will address each of these questions, and then explore some 
differences and similarities between horizontal and vertical (in an organizational hierarchy) 
communications. 
What are the information sources and channels? In a study of 17 R&D projects 
[Allen 1977], it was found that about 11 % of the ideas for solutions to technological 
problems came from the technical staff, about 9% came from company research, about 
29% came from customers, and 51 % came from all other sources. These other sources 
included the literature, vendors, analysis and experimentation, unpaid consultants, and 
government agencies. Within a project, Allen found people make essentially no distinction 
of a co-workers job performance ra.ting when asking for solutions. However, when people 
ask: for solutions outside the immediate project, they ask higher performers seven times 
more often than poorer performers. When using external contacts to assist in problem 
solving, most people turned to vendors for generating criteria for idea evaluation, setting 
limits on the evaluation, and testing alternative evaluation approaches. This is a particularly 
interesting observation, given the more commonly perceived sales role of vendors. 
When accessing literature for their work, workers most often referred to 
unpublished reports and doc:uments, but accessed professional journals to aid in the direct 
solution of a problem, broaden their knowledge, and keeping abreast of developments in 
74 
their field. In 134 observed instances [AlIen 1977], the desired infonnation was found in 
personal files about 41 % of the time, in a library (primarily the company library) 27% of 
the time, and in a colleague's files 12% of the time. 
In another setting, direct personal communications has been found to be effective in 
Japan [Report]. Direct person-to-person contact is seen as the most effective way of 
transferring technology. This is done by numerous face-to-face meetings and the 
movement of people from organization to organization. As straightforward as this 
mechanism appears, there are concerns. The experiences at the MCC [Stotesbury] showed 
problems with employee rotation. MCe, as a consortium of companies willing to invest in 
breakthrough computer technology, wanted to transfer the technology back to the 
sponsoring companies via rotations. What they learned very quicIdy was that if they were 
to wait for the employees to carry the technology back to their companies, it was far too 
late. They couldn't wait two years for technology transfer to occur; it had to be a 
continuous managed process of infonnation flow between MCC and the shareholders. 
This illustrates the dependency of the desired rate of transfer on the dynamics of the 
technology being developed. 
In what order are the sources searched? In a study of 111 infonnation searches 
[Allen 1977], written literature was the source most frequently selected f.u'"St, followed by 
internal personal contact, and external personal contact. However, the most frequently 
used sources were internal personal contact, followed by the literature, and then external 
personal contact. 
What is t.l)e difference between scientific COllli'ilUnication and technological 
communication? There is a major difference in communications among scientists and 
communications among technologists which must be recognized within an organization. 
Technologists publish less and spend less time reading than do scientists [Allen 1977]. A 
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major diff~J.cnce on a number of dimensions can be seen in Figure 16 [adapted from Allen 
1977]. 
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Figure 16. Communications among scientists and technologists. 
The different usages of infonnation channels is of major importance in building the 
technology-market linkage previously described. For field-specific technological 
information, it is transferred primarily through personal contact, primarily through close 
association with co-workers in their own organization. Scientists keep track of each 
other's work through external organizational visits, seminars, and small invitational 
conference, supplemented by infonnal exchange of written material long before it reaches 
publication. Technologists are limited in many of these activities by the imposition of 
organizational barriers. 
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How does organization influence communications? The structure of internal 
communications networks were conducted by asking people to report all of their internal 
communication contacts [Allen 1977]. The pattern of the contacts was then compared with 
the structure of the fonnal orgaruzation as represented on organizational charts. Infonnal 
contacts (lunches, recreational activities) were also recorded. Within the fonnal 
organization, communications were much heavier within the confines of the fannal 
boundaries, no matter the number of fonnal divisions. Within the infonnal organization, 
when there was social contact between any two individuals, the probability of technical 
communication was significantly higher than when no social contact existed. 
What is the effect of geographic separation? Research has shown that the tendency 
to communicate varies dramatically with the distance separating two people [Allen 1977], 
as shown in Figure 17: 
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Figure 17. Effect of distance on worker communication. 
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A leveling appears at about the 30 meter distance, after which the probability of 
personal contact remains fairly constant out to great distances, with the asymptote at .03. 
This data is for people without an organizational bond, but the data is very similar for those 
with such a bond. The asymptote moves to a probability of about .08 at distances over 30 
meters, with corresponding increases in the lesser distances. This shows an improvement 
with an organizational bond, but still quite low. If the other person is in the same building, 
but on another floor, the communications probability decays much faster. 
Communications can be viewed as occurring in at least two dimensions, vertically 
and horizontally, and combinations of the two. Vertically, managers at every level of the 
hierarchy respond to a flow ofinformation from above and below. From the technologists 
and managers below, he or she receives ideas about technical possibilities and for new 
projects. From above, managers receive signals about directions the company, division or 
business unit want to move in. This flow occurs informally, as well as through the 
planning and budget process, frequent program reviews with those immediately above or 
below, monthly meetings attended by m~ltiple levels of managers, and periodic meetings 
with the highest ievels of management As previously discussed, executive behavior has a 
strong influence on communications because the balancing of ideas from below with 
signals from above is replicated at every level, resulting in a continuous adjustment of 
programs and plans. 
In a Battelle study [Tressel], innovative methods of communication with executives 
were developed and tested because of two principal barriers to successful information 
transfer to this group: 
1. Decisions are made at a management level where time is at a premium 
and interest is general rather than technical. When selling new ideas it is 
essential that potential customers come to believe in the quality of the 
ideas and to believe that they are worth exploring even though many 
may not relate directly to today's problems. 
2. Good material is often lost in the deluge of communications, such as the 
paper blizzard, electronic junk mail, or too many meetings. Time is 
valuable and the competition for it is intense. A concise, articulate 
presentation of the idea in an attractive package is necessary. 
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The basic stages of these communications, whether applied vertically or 
horizontally, include identifying the target audience, selection of the material, packaging it 
for the audience, delivering it via the proper channels, and filtering and responding to 
inquiries. 
In addition to the vertical dimension of formal organization communication, there 
are prestige or status hierarchies [Allen 1977] in which individuals of high status will tend 
to be attracted to and communicate frequently with one another. Individuals of low status 
will neither like nor communicate with one another as much. Between these two groups, 
the lower status individuals direct most of their communication towards the higher status 
people, but this communications is not reciprocated. For low status people who have some 
desire to move up the formal organization, their level of cominunication with high status 
people is particularly high, sexving as a substitute for real upward mobility. Easily 
identifiable status attributes such as having a doctorate promotes the formation of tightly 
knit cliques which have free internal communications, but restrained extemal 
communications. 
Horizontally, technologists have extensive and ongoing contact with the other 
business units, engineering, product, and marketing people. This interaction occurs among 
counterpa.rts at every level. Technical people use phone calls, joint working sessions, and 
exchange of written reports. Managers study each other's strategic plans, visit each other, 
and engage in joint planning of large programs. The businesses describe their needs to the 
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technologists, and the technologists describe the technical opportunities and solutions it can 
offer. Mutual adjustment to address market demands is the desired result. 
Horizontal and vertical communication can support each other. Managers can more 
readily justify their programs to superiors if an operating unit is demonstrably interested. 
They will also tend to pay more attention to those business units whose businesses are 
considered by corporate to be higher priority. The two flows of communication can also 
create tensions. The vertical chain is more likely to stress long-term needs while the 
businesses often have short-term needs. When strategic decisions or technologies change, 
it can have a wrenching effect on well-established working relationships built around 
familiar technologies. 
Technology Transfer Models and Concepts 
This section will describe a iiWilbt;l of technology transfer models and concepts 
found in the literature. Aspects of these will be used in the construction of the technology 
transfer model for knowledge systems in the case study. 
ZeIdman. There are three fundamental parts of the transfer model: 1) champions, 2) 
transfer teams, and 3) a fully developed transfer plan. A champion is an internal member 
of the organization who recognizes the potential of the product and pulls team members 
together to see the product or service produced as a result of the technology transfer. To 
prepare people to do the specific tasks, a transfer team must be developed. Primary 
training and personnel development should be focussed on the unique aspects of the 
technology transfer. The transfer plan includes addressing the issues of manpower, 
resources, budget, measurements,27 status checks, and corrective actions. Standard 
project management concepts must be applied, such as critical paths, float paths, workforce 
availability, and resource utilization. 
27Warfield ma.lces a distinction between success measures (did you reach the goal) 
and performance measures (how hard did you try). 
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Roberts [1979]. In technology transfer there is a gap between infonnation available 
for innovation and the information actually delivered for innovation and 2) the gap between 
tecbnoloc i results and technology effectively used. Roberts characterizes these as "gaps of 
input" and "gaps of linkage." 
Modell: To bridge these gaps, Roberts has proposed the critical functions stafrmg 
model. Briefly, this model is role oriented, including: 
• idea generator who comes with new ideas 
• entrepreneur who is the active proponent of the ideas 
• technical, market, and manufacturing gatekeepers [Roberts 1979, Davis, 
Allen 1977] who each use t.lteir expertise in detennining the viability and 
future directions for ideas 
• program manager who integrates ideas into the corporation 
• sponsor who as a senior manager provides the protection and 
nourishment for an idea to prosper 
Model 2: Roberts also discusses the product team approach, where the distinct and 
separate technology group does not exist. Instead, the product team is a multi-functional 
organization with representative members drawn from the functional parts of the business. 
Model 3: The bridging approach views technology tra."lsfer processes as 
procedural, human, or structural. Procedural methods are mechanistic devices to transfer 
technology, human methods focus more on personal interactions, and structural methods 
have specil9.c organization units devoted to technology transfer. 
Tne critical functions staffing model, the product team approach, and the bridging 
approach are more fully discussed in the Personnel Components section. 
Leonard-Bartoo [1985]. Leonard-Ba..tton sees a gap between the inherent value of 
the new technology and the ability to put it to work effectively. She views the management 
of technological change as a difficult dual role of technology developer and implementer. 
The framework of implementing new technology includes the following components: 
1. A marketing perspective will involve users in the design phase of a new 
technology and prepare the organization to receive the technology. 
2. Implementation managers must develop internal marketing plans to deal 
with multiple internal markets. 
3. Legitimate resistance to change must be anticipated. 
4. An appropriate amount of technology promotion must be used so the 
promotional activities are not perceived as hype. 
S. A pilot operation should be conducted before total introduction of the 
innovation. 
6. An implementation team under the leadership of an executive sponsor 
should be assembled. 
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Reilly. At the Control Data Corporation, a successful technology transfer program 
was implemented in three stages: The first, preparation, involves early involvement by the 
acceptor, a team approach and commitment, defined objectives and expectations, and 
management involvement and support. Second, transfer is considered complete when 
requirements have been met and the acceptor takes ownership of the technology. Third, 
results are measured using perfonnance to acceptance criteria, acceptor support for the 
technology, knowledge of whether the technology operates in production with measurable 
results, arid an ongoing process control. 
Gruber. As a result of an MIT Conference on the Human Factors in Technology 
Transfer, thfee models were developed, the first of which is called the science-technology-
utilization topology, shown in Figure 18. 
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Technology 
Practical need 
and usa 
____ ~T~im~e~ ____ ~ 
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figure 18. The science-technology-utilization topology model. 
The arrows depict the communications paths: a) science to science, b) science to 
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technology (over a long time period), c) science to technology (fast), d) technology to 
science (such as instrumentation), e) technology to technology, f) use to use, g) technology 
to use, and h) science to use. 
This model shows the communications paths among three major channels of 
activity in technology transfer. It provides a topological view of the relationship between 
science, technology, and the uses of science and technology. This model makes it possible 
to identify the various transfer points and to consider possible sources of idea generation. 
It also illuminates the need tc define what type of technology transfer is being proposed in a 
given situation. However, a severe limitation of this model is its failure to address personal 
and organizational factors in technology transfer. 
The second model, in Figure 19, is a probabilistic one which, in its simpiest form, 
shows a series of probabilities that might be considered in order to determine whether the 
given technical information would be transferred into a new use that would result in 
diffusion. 
= P(ldeal _ P(researchl _ P(developmantl_ P(producllonl _ P(lnnovatlon) _ P(dillusionl 
Figure 19. The probability of transfer model. 
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In reality, a view of technology transfer based on this model would not be so linear, 
such as when some aspect must be sent back to the research step because of problems in 
ihe development step. 
The third model, in Figure 20, examines the magnitude of transfer as a function of a 
set of factors. 
Magnitude of transfer = f(source, natilre of item to be transferred, structure of 
channels for transfer. potential recipients of item to 
be transferred) 
Figure 20. The magnitude of transfer model. 
This model does not have the directional aspect of the second model. As such the 
variables are viewed as more independent and more likely solved simultaneously rather 
than sequentially. 
Bmm. The communications agent model emphasizes the point that the mechanism 
of technology transfer is one of agents, not agencies. This is carried forth to the idea that it 
is the movement of people among organizations that achieves technology transfer, rather 
than the dissemination of infonnation through communications systems. 
Ounjian. At GTE, a study of 21 technology transfers resulted in a model which 
represents the activities that may be needed to achieve successful transfer as shown in 
Figure 21. 
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Figure 21. The GlE technology transfer model 
This model represents a sequence of situations and the extent of the tasks perfonned 
at each stage of the process depends on the nature of the technology and the receiving and 
sending organizations. For example, with technology transfer within the research 
laboratories, the tasks may not go past the technical feasibility stage. This is much like the 
science-to-science technology transfer in the first Gruber model. Because GTE is product 
and service oriented, the full range of activities depicted in this model are used to drive 
towards utilization of the technology. 
Sharif. The Technology Atlas has proposed a framework for what they call "the 
generation of indigenous technology," depicted in Figure 22: 
85 
Needs and Capabilities 
Assessment 
! 
Technological III-- Resource Assessment 
Forecasting and i.-;s R&D 
Assessment Iiii-- Demand Assessment 
! 
Prototype Development 
and Testing 
~ 
Financial Investment 
~ 
Production 
~ 
Commercialization 
Figure 22. Framework for the generation of indigenous technology 
There are a number of requirements to be fulfilled at each step of this framework. 
Needs assessment requires assessment skills, access to data, and the resources to analyze 
the data. Resource assessment also requires assessment skills, but needs data specific to 
the construction of a resource profile. A significant part of the framework is the demand 
assessment, which requires an assessment of the market for the technology and what the 
market trends indicate. Often overlooked in this or any other technology transfer model is 
what must be done in the event of success. The demands of production and 
commercialization are quite different from earlier stages, and must be addressed by 
providing such things as maintenance procedures and tools, product and service marketing, 
distribution networks. 
Tomlin. General Electric views effective technology transfer as part of linking 
centralized R&D groups (CR&D) with the business units. Successful transfer is seen as 
depending on first building a commitment to the technology/product, and then actually 
transferring it. 
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The desire of industrial scientists to see their work commercialized is reinforced by 
perfonnance measures that include successful technology transfer. Gaining the 
commitment of the operating business is usually luuder. CR&D engineers, scientists, and 
project managers must sell their work to the businesses and they are more likely to be 
successful if they begin in the early stages of the project 
CR&D then tries to convince the business to invest in the project, even if only on a 
small scale. If the CR&D has already done considerable work on the technology, it might 
argue that, with a bit of business unit funding, it would direct its attention to applying the 
technology to their needs. Or, the R&D manager might offer to invest substantial assessed 
funds in exploring the technology if the business unit would make some investment 
Gaining a psychological investment from the business unit is more important than the 
contract at this stage. Once commitment is secured, the actual transfer tends to be fairly 
smooth. Movement of personnel in both directions is viewed as a particularly effective 
mechanism. 
SYSTEMS-ORIENTED ANALYSIS METIIODOLOGIES 
Systems management techniques offer certain methodologies and procedures to deal 
with organized complexity. A number of these techniques are briefly reviewed in the 
following sections. 
Systems Engineering MomhoIQgy 
This deals with what Hall defines as the three fundamental dimensions of systems 
engineering: 1) Time, segmented by milestones/phases, 2) Flow of mandatory logic steps, 
and 3) Knowledge of a discipline, profession, or technology. These dimensions can be 
applied in a general systems approach to solving problems. 
The first dimension, the milestones/phases, is also referred to as the coarse 
structure because it defines the major steps of the systems engineering process: 
• Program Plan: what does an organization want to pmsue? 
• Project planning is one component of a program plan 
• Systems development implements the project plan 
• Production: actually making what you planned to make 
• Distribution or phase in 
• Operations: using the product 
• Retirement or phase out 
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The second dimension consists of the logic components, also known as the fine 
structure. These are usually perfonned in an iterative manner, not necessarily in order, for 
each step in the coarse phase. 
• Problem definition: study of needs and environment, collection and 
analysis of data for problem fonnulation 
• Value system design: states objectives and decision criteria for all 
alternatives 
• System synthesis: compilation of alternatives 
• Systems analysis: deduces consequences of alternatives 
• Optimization: Previous four logic steps plus modeling 
• Decision making step: uses output of system synthesis and value system 
design to select best alternative 
• Planning for action: communicating results. scheduling, resource 
allocation, perfonnance measures, feedback control system 
The third dimension consists of the domain knowledge which must be used with 
the other two dimensions. Examples of these domains include such fields as medicine, 
engineering, and information sciences. 
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In these dimensions of systems engineering are two components that need particular 
attention: 1) the planning aspects and 2) the value system design. 
As.pects of Planning and Yalue Systems 
The pIanning process is very important to a planning unit because there are limited 
resources for the process and, to have accurate plans, as many people as possible must use 
as much relevant information as possible. Planning concepts are transferable among 
various planning units regardless of their unique attributes. Warfield introduces the 
planning unit which exists in its environment and is controlled by its managers. 28 By 
using a transferable process, only the distinctive details need to be added. Greater 
efficiency is obtained by a common generic process. It is along the lines of this concept of 
transferability on which the applicability of my technology transfer model is based. 
A planning process can be transferred more easily if it is flexible. There are a 
number of alternative purposes of planning on which technology transfer can be based: 
e Detenninistic activity programming (e.g. a cookbook recipe. no decision 
points) 
• Milestone programming (activities with decision points) 
• Disaster avoidance 
• Opportunity identification 
• Priority setting 
28In spite of the general applicability of planning concepts, each planning unit is 
unique in some respects and the environments of two planning units of the same type may 
be quite different. 
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• Renewing management capacity (a fresh outlook on things, away from 
the day to day operational concerns) 
• Setting goals and defining success 
• Others, such as personnel needs, career paths, etc. 
Future events Lllclude some surprise and some expected. If all were surprise, 
planning would be futile. If all were expected, planning would be minimal. Reality is 
somewhere in between, varying with the specific situation. By going through the planning 
process, the uncertainty of the fi.lture can be explicitly addressed. 
Values dominate the planning activity and must be elucidated in order to determine 
the desired sequence of events to obtain goals. Once these have been resolved, the 
planning process is almost algc . :,anic, but getting to that point is most difficult. Part of 
the value identification process includes forecasting and futures analysis by disciplined 
methods such as scenarios. 
The commonly stated goals and objectives are actually surrogates for values. By 
clearly stating objectives, it becomes possible to explore the desired and also to 
operationalize it. If it is known what is desired and why it is desired, it is often much 
easier to detennine how to attain it 
As the foundation for a project, explicit value definition is essential. Inattention to it 
has often been the cause of project failures because it was "obvious to everyone" that the 
project was a good idea. Many people seem to think that their enlightened perspective is 
automatically shared by people in power and that those power people will help a project 
progress. However, the burden is on the project staff to transfer the new, perhaps 
conflicting, values to others so that the benefits of their project can be realized. By 
proceeding through this "selling" process, the project staff will likely refme the view of 
what the project purpose is. It is too easy for a project team to immerse themselves in 
"what to do" while neglecting "what we want," which results in the tools for achieving 
goals becoming primary goals themselves. 
The Task-Oriented. Transient Organization 
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Warfield discusses the task-oriented, transient organization (TOTO) which has 
unique composition, purpose, and indefinite life span such that some aspects of traditional 
management can be applied but others cannot. 
If a task is at a level of complexity where an individual effort lacks breadth and a 
group effort lacks depth, then an organization can be built for the purpose of working on 
the task. It is created, may change in composition or form, and disbands in a transient 
fashion. A TOTO realizes its strength from a combination of group activity and the 
individual activity of group members. 
Particular attention must be given to group dynamics in a TOTO. Participation in 
group activities must be regulated and managed to derive greatest benefits. This includes 
managing the group size and ensuring that all opinions are heard, because their often is no 
time to repair long festering damage. Conservatism must not be permitted to inhibit 
progress. Participants in the group must know what the expectations are for the group. 
help define the value system. a..nd contribute to group direction. The group must also be 
expected to evolve through the four small group development stages which include 
forming, storming. norming, and performing. The leader must have sufficient knowledge 
of the subject area to provide leadership, and must be aware that sponsors and the group 
will become impatient during the first three group development stages. 
In a TOTO, the leader must recognize that mental limits will be revealed during 
critical time phases including bounded rationality (which may cause premature structuring), 
avoidance of complexity, abrogation of group results, and self-serving participation. The 
skills of the leader are instrumental in dealing with disagreements, conflicting interests, risk 
taking, and time required. It is natural for the burden of integration of work activities to fall 
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mostly on the leader. but this task must be shared with group members. Sharing of these 
burdens frees the leader to attend to other tasks, and will create greater bonding among 
group roles. The group and individuals must be balanced for quantity and quality of ideas, 
including the encouragement of diversity and controlled conflict 
It, the case of the Knowledge Systems Transfer Project, certain aspects of a TOTO 
are evident, as may be the case for other technology transfer processes. KSTP was, by 
charter, only to exist for two years, with the purpose of integrating knowledge systems 
technology into the infonnation systems organization and the skill sets of the employees. 
Additionally, it had unique composition in that team members were sponsored29 by three 
different fonnal organizations within U S WEST, and each of the team members had 
unusually strong academic education and industrial experience. 
Multiple Perspectives Methodology 
Multiple perspectives is a systems approach to analysis which considers three 
distinct perspectives: technical, organizational, and personal. Each of these perspectives 
illuminates a problem from different angles and can affect each other through cross-cuing, 
which is the influence of one perspective on another. These are perspectives as defined by 
Linstone, and as the primary methodology for this research, they will be discussed in the 
next chapter. 
29Salary, expenses, capital funding, and management support. 
CHAPTERfV 
MULTIPLE PERSPECfIVES METIIODOLOGY 
Multiple perspectives offer a robust way of looking at decisions and problem 
domains, especially in sociotechnica! areas such as technology integration. Traditional 
solution methods work well when applied to appropriate problems, but fall short of 
providing satisfactory information when technological and human systems are involved. 
TRADnlONALPROBLEMSOLVING 
Historically, the practice of systems analysis in socio-technical domains has fallen 
short of the goals of a systems approach; narrow, quantitative focus has slighted benefits of 
broad, qualitative view. Well structured problems lend themselves to technical analysis and 
solution through the use of currently accepted scientific paradigms [Linstone]: 
1. Problems can be abstracted from the world so they can be solved 
2. Solutions should be optimized 
3. Systems are analyzed and attempted to be understood via reductionism 
4. Inquiry relies on data and models 
5. Information is quantified as much as possible 
6. Investigators are characterized as unbiased and objective 
7. The individual is ignored in the quest for objectivity 
8. The passage of time is viewed as being linear 
Many of these have been used to provide significant progress to technological 
advancement and are well suited when limited to the appropriate situations. However, a 
systems integration approach means an investigator must solve problems within the context 
of an entire system. Taking a reductionist approach to one small part of the system is 
insufficient because, while it appears to provide infonnation on that small part, the 
infonnation may not be accurate at a system level. 30 
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Any investigator woddng at the system level knows how messy the investigation 
can become. It is 1."1 these ill-structured inquiries that a broad, cohesive approach must be 
taken. The softer the problem, the greater the need for a wide scope of inquiry, such as a 
macroanalysis at broad level. 31 
The counterpart to this is microanalysis, which is often used as a fa~ade for pure 
objectivity. It often relies on many of the data-quantification-optimization type of methods 
listed above. These are necessary but insufficient parts of analysis of soft systems 
problems. The differences between the two types of analysis are: 
Macro - objectives may not be clear, quantitative data may not be available, 
uncertainty, somewhat protected from suboptimization, used by 
professional analysts and decision makers 
Micro - clear objectives, controlled suboptimization is allowed, quantitative 
data is available, certainty. results in technical recommendations, used 
aimost exciusively by professional analysts 
Choosing appropriate style of analysis is difficult, increasing with the number of 
variables and uncertainty. When studying a system, there are many different levels of 
knowledge systems32 being used and tested against each other. They fonn knowledge 
30nte failed introduction of new Coca-Cola™ is an example [Gelb]: "The new 
Coke fiasco might have been avoided had market researchers concentrated more on 
consumers' emotional ties to the existing product. Coke drinkers believed that Coke stood 
for traditional values ..• so they felt betrayed when the product radically changed overnight. 
Quantitative research often fails to uncover such fierce but unarticulated loyalties ... 
Researchers must use more qualitative methods ... " 
31 There is an urge to use the word comprehensive here, an urge that must be 
resisted. No investigation is comprehensive or all-inclusive, although it must be 
sufficiently broad to satisfy its purpose. 
32This use of knowledge systems refers to human knowledge applied to the 
understanding of a system, not the computer-based knowledge system. 
complexes which are much more enlightening and useful than any single knowledge 
system. The difficulty, however. lies in actually coupling these multi-level knowledge 
complexes. As will be discussed, this coupling is facilitated by the multiple perspectives 
methodology. 
DIFFERENT INQUIRING SYSTEMS 
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A number of different inquiring systems have been described in the literature which 
have bearing on the development of multiple perspectives. First, a Lockean inquiry would 
focus on empirical aspects. looking for agreement among observations andlor data as a 
basis for truth. In this inquiry mode. experience is key and no weight is put on theoretical 
considerations. Second, a Leibnizian inquiry system relies upon formal models and 
theoretical explanation. Truth is based on analysis and does not rest on data obtained from 
experience. Third is a Kantian inquiry system in which empirical data is coupled with a 
theoretical model to form a truth based on synthesis. Kantian inquiry also can use multiple 
models which are combined for greater synergy. 
There is danger in each of these inquiry systems is their tendency towards 
oversimplification. Economic studies often drive complex phenomena to simple results 
such as a pie chart or a curve. An understanding of the construction methods for these 
results enables a person to appropriately use the results. but far too often this understanding 
is missing. The limited insight provided by looking at a two-dimensional line graph 
becomes more troublesome when a person equates the graph's behavior with that of the 
real world 
A Singerian inquiring system addresses the tendency towards oversimplification by 
providing much more breadth to the inquiry. Churchman [1971] describes a Singerian 
inquiry system as: 
• A meta-inquiring system which includes all other types of inquiring 
systems 
• A pragmatic method, so that the truth content is relative to the objectives 
of the inquiry 
• A non-terminating process33 which is holistically focussed and 
constantly attempts to pull in more infonnation 
• A system in which the investigator is at, integral part of the inquiry 
This last point openly admits that the observer is part of the system and that it is 
foolish to masquerade such inquiries as "objective" or "unbiased." This stance is very 
consistent with the physical law that the position and velocity of a particle cannot be 
measured simultaneously because measuring one affects the other. In an inquiry, the 
investigator is a probe which interacts with what is being observed, selects what is to be 
observed, and fIlters out what is considered irrelevant to the investigation. 
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Multiple perspectives can be classified as a Singerian inquiring system in that it 
considers three distinct viewpoints from which to conduct an investigation: the technical 
perspective, the organizational perspective, and the personal perspective34 as shown in 
Figure 23 (adapted from [Linstone, Bowonder]). Characteristics of these perspectives are 
listed in Appendix A. 
33Which relates to my earlier comment that comprehensive inqu~ry is not possible. 
34For an excellent, complete explanation of the multiple perspectives subject see 
Linstone's text, Multiple Perspectives/or Decision Making. 
ORGANIZATIONAL 
PERSPECTIVES 
Fi~e 23. Multiple perspectives. 
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The technical (T) perspective dominates most research and structured inquiry. It is 
focussed on quantitative data, models, reductionist methods, optimization, and strives to 
give the illusion of objectivity. In technical subject-matter areas, such as the information 
systems domain of this study, the T-perspective reigns supreme. The ration~l. a...1J.~lytic 
aspects of the T-perspective is what separates it from the organizational and personal. So 
h'1. addition to quantitative methods, any fonnal structuring method. is aT-perspective, 
including such diverse items as organizational charts (or any other type of hierarchical 
decomposition) and causal digraphs.35 Information from the T-perspective is easiest to 
acquire because 1) much T -data already exists, 2) many people are fluent in the methods, 
and 3) there is often little resistance to parting with T -data. 36 
35 A directed graph consists of a drawing of nodes and arrows (showing direction) 
connectin~ the nodes. . 
3b'fhe dominance of the T-perspective is taken to extremes in at least one notable 
effort to establish a quantitative index to measure the facility with which technology is 
transferred [Foster]. By such quantification, it is claimed that disparate technologies could 
then be rank ordered. 
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The organizational (0) perspective dominates the inquiry methods within 
organizational settings, such as companies, government agencies, and volunteer groups. 
But further than these, the O-perspective also includes infonnal groups that may not have a 
name, may not be readily identifiable, and whose members may not recognize the existence 
of a group. People in organizations do not deal with their environment from an abstract 
view. Practical necessities and needs mold their perceptions of their organizational 
interactions and what they must do to survive and to prosper. The O-perspective is both 
subjective and objective in that it views the world according to a mix of uncertainties and 
standard operating procedures, with satisfaction rather than optimization as a goal. 
Planning, and action on those plans, tends to be incremental and representative of the status 
quo method of doing business. 
Linstone summarizes some of the ways that the O-perspective helps investigators 
analyze socia-technical systems: 
• Identification of the pressures supporting and opposing a technology 
• Insight into the ability to absorb a technology as limited by 
organizational incrementalism 
• Increasing the ability to facilitate or inhibit the implementation of a new 
technology 
o Bringing out impacts that may not be evident when viewed by other 
perspectives 
• Development of practical policy 
Because there can be many organizational actors within an investigation, there can 
be many different O-perspectives on the same socia-technical system. Each organization 
forms its own basis on which its members ground decisions, regardless of the correlation 
of this basis with other organizational views of reality. This basis may be subtle and thus 
require in-depth examination to discover. 
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The personal (P) perspective is the most difficult perspective to obtain. A major 
question an investigator faces is the distinction between a person making a statement that 
reflects either the organizational or the personal view. How does one know which is 
which? Personal motivations and aspirations playa major pan of the P-perspective. 
Elusive qualities such as leadership, charisma, personality, power, and strength come into 
play. 
P-perspective actors shape the use of new technology to a great degree. What does 
this offer to the total analysis? First, is that it can serve as a precursor to the organizational 
perspective, in that organizations are composed of individuals. Second, some individuals 
exhibit such strong behavior that they dominate a situation, dwarfing the role of the 
T -perspective and the O-perspective. Third, the communication of complex issues may be 
., 
more effective from the P-perspective, such as brief stories or quotes. Finally, at a 
minimum, the personal actors are participants in the adoption of new technology and can 
therefore add to the understanding of the entire process. 
Any phenomena can be viewed from any of the three perspectives, and can be 
communicated using any of them The key in choosing which perspective to use to 
communicate findings is to match the perspective to the audience. Thus if the audience is 
T-oriented, use a T presentation methods, 0 methods for an 0 audience, and P methods for 
a P audience. 
While each of the perspectives provides insight into the investigation, it is the 
combination of these through cross-cuing that is the culmination of the study. Cross-cuing 
provides ail h,tegrated view of the situation, illuminating aspects that may have remained 
undiscovered by any of the perspectives alone. This is shown pictorially in Figure 24: 
T persoective 
Need, task, plan 
(effectiveness, efficiency) 
J 
Organization (0) 
(implementation, feasibility) 
J 
Individual Positions (P) 
(motivation, acceptabifity) 
Q perspective 
Organization Position 
(ori3n~;,. a/iiaiiiics, 5iiaitigjj 
/ \ 
Role Market Conditions 
1 J 
Policy Plan (T) Create Market, PrOdUClS (P) 
P persoectiye 
Image 
/\ 
Need 
Statement (T) 
PolDntiai in the 
current selling (0) 
Figure 24, Cross-cuing of T -O-P perspectives. 
This wide applicability of multiple perspectives can be seen in the precursors to 
Linstone's work as given by Allison's models of the Rational Actor, Organizational 
Process, and Bureaucratic Politics [Allison], Steinbruner's Analytic, Cybernetic, and 
Cognitive paradigms [Steinbruner] , and Anderson's Rational, Organizational, and 
Cognitive perspectives [Anderson]. Recent additions to the multiple perspective area 
include Standke's Technical, Philosophical, and Political dimensions [Standke] and the 
Asian and Pacific Centre for Transfer of Technology's Technoware, Humanware, 
Inforware. and Orgaware components of technology [Sharif]. 
APPROACH TO THE INVESTIGATION 
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It is within the multiple perspectives concept that this investigation takes place. The 
study examined the technology transfer process as a system as opposed to a reductionist 
analysis of one small part of the process. There is a very real danger in either of these two 
extremes: in the large view, the study can become so general that little meaning is derived; 
in the small view, the piece chosen for study may be so separated from its context that it is 
irrelevant to the dynamics of the entire technology transfer process. The use of multiple 
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perspectives is intended to give sufficient substance to the large view.37 The specific 
T-O-P components of the methodology and associated analysis are given in the following 
descriptions. 
The technical (T) perspective examines the rational aspects of the technology 
transfer including the technology of knowledge systems, employee-base attributes and 
statistics, origins of the Knowledge Systems Transfer Project, financial analyses, 
knowledge system project selection techniques, and quantitative goals and measurements of 
the Project. These are presented, explained. and critically evaluated to show their influence 
on the Project. 
The organizational (0) perspective is used to view the technology transfer project, 
looking at the various organizations individually, their dynamics, and their interactions. 
The internal and external views have been researched and documented, which provides the 
basis for analyzing their interactions as a group of systems operating within a larger 
supersystem. Many distinct organizational perspectives exist both outside and inside an 
organization and understanding these different views is central to the analysis of actions 
and events. In addition to the fonnal organizations, infonnal organizations are identified 
and assessed since they often playa role equal to or greater than those which are fonnally 
defined. 
Descriptions of U S WEST internal organizational responsibilities as seen by 
organizational actors address the centralized/decentralized control issue, the departmental 
contrr,~l issues within Corporate Information Systems and traditional organizational 
response to new technologies. Case study materials is supplemented by organizational 
37Unstone argues that "a pluralistic approach is seen as essential for the expansion 
of knowledge. This ... suggests that the 0 and P perspectives make us see the limitations 
of the T perspective, just as three-dimensional space helps us understand the limitations of 
one-dimensional space. The ultimate value of the multiple perspective concept may be to 
spur the redefmition of "systems analysis" in the realm of human-social-technological 
systems." 
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material obtained via two industrial consortia: one is Bell Communications Research 
(composed of the seven post-divestiture regional telecommunication finns) and the other is 
an expert systems implementation group which draws major corporate members from the 
United States. 
The personal (P) perspe£tive examines the third dimension of the technology 
transfer process. The central characters, their backgrounds, their behaviors, and key 
actions and decisions are identified and assessed for their impact on the Knowledge 
Systems Transfer Project. Analysis is focussed on the identification of personal and 
situational characteristics which predispose these characters towards the tendencies shown 
by their behaviors. As in the O-perspective, the infonnal roles are identified and examined 
with as much attention as the fonnal roles. 
While individuals at upper, middle, and lower levels of management, and staff 
members of other organizations are obvious choices for inclusion in the P-perspective, 
some P-perspectives are client oriented. In other words, the role the clients play in 
knowledge system identification, selection, and development is important to the evaluation 
of the technology transfer process. 
As in the O-perspective, additional insight into this Project is gained through the use 
of the industrial consortia. 
An important part of the P-perspective comes from Ascher, who indicated the 
imponance of background and context factors which he called core assumptions. These are 
often unstated, but have significant influence on the phenomena being investigated. The 
utility of core assumptions to the investigator is dependent on their explicitness, 
plausibility. and recency. These characteristics are especially relevant in the technology 
transfer domain because of the increasing rate of technological change and the 
correspondent difficulty for people and organizations to quickly adapt. 
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The depth and diversity ofT-O-P dimensions are then integrated. to provide the 
basis for cross-cuing. By that point in the rese31~h and dissertation, it will be clear that 
each of the three perspectives yield results not otherwise obtainable. Combining the results 
obtained through these selective filters enables a composite picture to be built of the project 
dynamics. The primary method was to construct an interaction chart to show the 
relationships between components of the three perspectives. This, ill combination with the 
literature and consortium company infonnation, are the basis of the technology transfer 
model. 
Even though I have treated the perspectives as separate, distinct categories of 
inquiry, there are some important qualifications to such a separation. While the T-
perspective is factual and fJXed, there exists a continuum of the range of perspectives 
between the O-perspective and the P-perspective. Personal perspectives are visible in small 
infonnal groupings, small fonnal organizational units, and successively larger 
organizational units. Each has a distinct perspective which must be considered as part of 
the large view of multiple perspectives investigation. Additionally, because organizations 
are composed of individuals, the P-perspective is able to provide better understanding of 
the O-perspective. 
The preceding paragraphs describe what was done at the project level. Additional 
goals of the research were to examine the utility of multiple perspectives concepts when 
applied to real-time incident analysis and to post incident analysis. In other words, can 
T -O-P and cross-cuing be fruitfully applied as events are unfolding, and how well do they 
work when used to analyze an incident after it occurs.38 Implicit in this is the idea that if 
such application is feasible, there would be an impact on the strategy taken during the 
incident or after the incident The aspects of multiple perspectives that I have discussed in 
38 An incident is some event that has a notable impact, pro or con, on the project. It 
may transpire over a matter of hours, days, or even weeks. 
this section are applied to the secondary research objectives in the Conclusions, Chapter 
IX. 
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CHAPTER V 
THE TECHNIC.A,L PERSPECIlVE 
The technical (1j perspective dominates most research and structured inquiry. It is 
focussed on quantitative data, models, reductionist methods, optimization, and strives to 
give the illusion of objectivity. In technical subject-matter areas, such as the infonnation 
systems domain of this study, the T-perspective reigns supreme. The rational. analytic 
aspects of the T -perspective is what separates it from the organizational and personal. So 
in addition to quantitative methods. any fonnal structuring method is aT-perspective, 
including such diverse items as organizational charts (or any other type of hierarchical 
decomposition) and causal digraphs. Infonnation from the T -perspective is easiest to 
acquire because 1) much T-data already exists, 2) many people are fluent in the methods, 
and 3) there is often little resistance to parting with T -data. 
The following sections explore the technical perspective infonnation which had an 
impact on the establishment and development of the Knowledge System Transfer Project. 
THE 1ECHNOLOGY OF KNOWLEDGE SYS1EMS 
The intent of this section is to understand the technical aspects of meshing 
knowledge systems with existing USW ITS technology. A picture of the ITS technology 
is developed by examining the operating environments, software tools, how new 
teclmology fits with this current technology, and application identification and selection 
procedures. 
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Computer Qperating Enyironment 
U S WEST information systems operate primarily in an IBM or compatible large-
scale mainframe computing environment As of 1988 the main data center systems can be 
characterized by the attributes listed in Figure 25 [Ernst]. In addition to U S WEST 
(company #6), data is also listed for the other six regional companies which resulted from 
the AT&T divestiture. 
Hardware Data #1 #2 #3 #4 #5 #6 #7 
Computer Centers 20 b 12 21 7 17 19 
Data Center ft:l (000) 898 925 762 983 836 832 1147 
Number of Mainframes 46 45 110 60 36 54 48 
MIPS 1396 1442 1385 1571 997 1671 1225 
Data Storage (ternbvtes) 6000 4500 3418 4757 2530 6047 3605 
Figure 2S. Attributes of regional company computing capacities. 
To balance the Information Systems characteristics with certain company 
characteristics, Figure 26 lists comparative data for size of the seven regions telephone 
operations [Emst]: 
Company Size #1 #2 #3 #4 #5 #6 #7 
Access Lines 12-31-87 14.4M 16.1M IS.7M IS.1M 11.1M 11.6M 12.3M 
Access Lines 12-31-88 14.9M 16.6M 16.4M 15.5M l1.3M 11.9M 12.9M 
Customer Bills 1988 142M 145M 167M 139M 115M 112M 118M 
# of Toll Messages 1988 3.2B 2.8B 
-
3.3B O.9B 1.2B 2.8B 
Figure 26. Company size data for regional companies. 
Observe certain facts, such as the greatest number of MIPS, the second to the 
smallest number of access lines in both 1987 and 1988, and the fewest customer bills 
distributed in 1988. 
Additional computing access resources include the hardware listed in Figure 27. 
Tenninals 
Desktop Computers 
Printers 
Control Units 
Modems 
Miscel1aneous 
54,521 
15,960 
18,933 
5,230 
75,139 
4,650 
Figure 27. Company internal personal computing hardware. 
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This equipment and the hardware listed in Figure 27 are interconnected via an 
internal communications network. This network consists of a configuration using SNA, 
X.2.5, and BANeS and is available 24 hours a day, 7 days a week. However many 
applications which users may wish to access are not available continuously. 
Software Tools 
A wide variety of knowledge systems software tools have been used and/or 
recommended by the Knowledge Systems Transfer Project. This is primarily due to the 
immatmity of the technology. Delaying standardization minimizes the drawbacks a 
company can experience when standards are set prematurely. 
Guidelines are provided in the form of a chart of shells (tools) that are 
recommended (Figure 28) to be used in developing the software instead of using 
programming languages such as LISP or PROLOG. 
Without detailed knowledge of the project or hardware, it is conceivable that some 
other development shell or programming language might be appropriate. 
In addition to the tools listed in Figure 28, applications have been prototyped, and 
in some cases developed, using other software such as KEE, a powerful hybrid shell 
which was operating on a SUN workstation. Also, other major efforts were originally 
developed in Goldworks, and evolved towards pure LISP implementations. As existing 
tools evolved and new tools appeared on the market, they were also evaluated for potential 
use on a knowledge-based system. 
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EXPERT SYSTEMS SHELLS 
Si.II Illlll"lIt"._ Cmp Gold"lIra Ln.' S Peno".' EXSYS VP 
COlUllfll+ Ezpert 
V.IIIl., Camegic Gold Hill InCcmnaIian Tcus CAIntdl Papaback: 
Group Builde:m lns1zurnc:mI! Software 
C ... $0.00 $7,500 $685 $3,000 $395 $249 
Uppcrnnge $300 5,000 
AnD. Recuning $3.soo $2,500 $0.00 $0.00 $0.00 $0.00 
OS ."PJIO"e" UNIX DOS DOS DOS DOS DOS 
11 TI UNIX 
Gc:Jaa VMS 
VMS 
MACHINES 
SJDlboIic X 
TI Explore.r X X 
VAX X X X X 
SUN X X 
mM370 
PC Test View 286/386 X X X X 
Macintcah X 
OIhezs X X 
AddUl.II.' CommonUSP Humming- 512KRAM 512KRAM 512K 512KRAM 
R.,.ircllllUtll" Borard RAM 
wf2B6 
Figure 28. Approved expert system shells. 
Current U S WEST software strategy suffers from a set of problems common in 
much of industry: 
!> When to change from the use of one tool to another, either due to 
changing technology or increased demands of the application. Some 
applications are initiated on a small PC-based tool, but must be ported to 
a larger hardware or software platform. One accounting application in 
U S WEST has faced this issue with much difficulty. In addition to 
adapting to the new hardware and operating system, such a pert may 
involve risky changes to the knowledge representation. 
• Dealing with common weaknesses of software tools, such as non-
intuitive interfaces and underlying mechanisms, the presence of bugs, 
and poor to non-existent integration with large database. 
o Supporting changes and enhancement to the knowledge-base, as rules 
proliferate or a better domain understanding is obtained. Graphical 
maintenance tools are desirable and are present in some of the tools. 
For complex domains, however, maintenance facilities are not 
satisfactory. 
• Managing growth of the application and its proliferation to new areas of 
business. Knowledge-base control (similar to version control in 
traditional software development), module communications, and 
knowledge-base security are not commonplace. 
New TechnolQgy Fit with Current TechnolQgy 
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Most of these problems relate to the use of knowledge systems technology with 
larger databases. Knowledge systems technology has historically worked in stand-alone 
mode, i.e. an isolated application running on a single machine, restricted to a single 
domain. A 1987 Teknowledge survey indicated that 50% of all knowledge systems are 
standalone. 40% were loosely coupled systems, in which the knowledge system generates 
database queries and waits for response, and the last 10% were tightly coupled. were the 
knowledge system has direct access to an internal database, such as a PROLOG-relational 
database implementation. 
U S WEST Information Systems Architecture has been pushing towards the 
loosely coupled model via a distributed technology platform. In this environment, nodes of 
systems can interact with other nodes through a network of processors and file servers. At 
certain levels of the network, message protocol standards are enforced. This provides 
inter-system transparency and establishes whether the protocol will be at the semantic or 
syntactic levels. 
Total service time, as a composite of network time and processing time, are of great 
importance in all transaction processing. Knowledge-based systems have an additional 
constraint: they are almost always in controi, exhibiting asynchronous behavior. The 
degree to which this loose coupling can provide adequate service intervals to knowledge 
systems will affect the ability of future systems to provide viable service. 
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There is expected to be a finite ability fox an organization or a person to absorb new 
technology. One way of looking at the information systems organization's abilir-j is to 
view how much is invested in new development 
CIS manages a very large operating budget in support of its U S WEST customers. 
A budget review conducted in 1987 for the combined companies of Mountain Bell, 
Northwestern Bell, and Pacific Northwest Bell, showed that less than 5% ($20 million) of 
the proposed 1988 IDC budget ($400M) was available for new development (Figure 29). 
This compares poorly to an industry benchmark of 11 %,39 and is an indicator of a 
potential inexperience in developing new software and using new technologies. 
39U S WEST commissioned the study by Nolan, Norton & Company in1987 . 
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Figure 29. Relative IS operating budgets 1988. 
AIWlication Identification and Selection 
Within the Knowledge Systems Transfer Project, a set of documents have been 
assembled to assist the first-time knowledge system development team in identifying and 
selecting domains appropriate to the technology. These consist of the following: 
1. Expert System Proposal - This is a blank copy of the worksheet used in 
the assessment of a potential expert system application. It is brief (two 
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pages) and fairly simplistic as a first pass screening mechanism. It is 
generally applicable to all knowledge systems applications. 
2. Generic Expert System Benefits - A general survey of possible benefits 
of using knowledge based technology in a project is contained in this 
document. It provides suggestions on discovering potential benefits of 
a proposed application, including such areas as training, level of 
perfonnance, productivity, responsiveness, auditing, explanation, 
knowledge preservation, consistency, reproducibility, and many other 
issues. 
3. Qualifying Engagements for Expert Systems - A look at how the 
Knowledge-Based Systems group detennines which applications are 
appropriate for them to work on. Mostly appropriate for those 
considering KBS development of their project, but provides insight into 
what qualifies and what does not. 
4. Estimating Return on Investments for Expert Systems Projects -
Explains how to figure return on investment for an expert system 
project. It is particularly relevant to the T-perspective in that it reviews 
traditional investment evaluation techniques in the context of knowledge 
systems development. Specific areas include net present value, 
profitability index, internal rate of return, and expected values. 
5. Return on Investment Worksheet - This is a spreadsheet to help in 
figuring return on investment, using techniques described in item 4, 
above. 
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This group of documents comprise the procedural view of how applications are 
identified and selected for further work. Each of these provide essential insight into the T-
perspective of KSTP operations. The above listed items 1 through 4 are included in 
AppenrlixB. 
EMPLOYEE BASE ATIRIBUTES 
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The intent of this section is to understand the nature of the employee body on a 
population basis and to examine the workforce potential to work with new technology. 
Company profile comparisons and employee characteristics. 
Company Profile Conm~ 
To provide a large view of the staffing environment within U S WEST, a 
comparison is made among the seven regional telecommunications companies which 
resulted from divestiture. Figure 30 [Ernst] shows how US WEST CIS compares with 
the information systems organizations in the other six companies. Again, U S WEST is 
company number 6. 
:'!I 
#1 #2 #3 #4 #5 #6 #7 
Ac:ccss Lines ('!& of Awnge) 104.9 116.5 115.5 108.9 79.8 83.6 90.7 
Rank (based on Ac:ccss Lines) 4 1 2 3 7 6 5 
Rank (baaed CD ACUIal Force) 4 6 5 2 7 1 3 
ACIlIal Fcm:e 4626 3227 4374 5023 2729 5178 4918 
Expcc:!Cd Force 4507 5005 4962 4678 3428 3591 3896 
ACIlIal· Ellpec!Cd 119 ·1778 -588 345 -699 1587 1022 
Figure 30. IS staffing levels of the regional companies. 
All of the comparisons are based upon the assumption that the number of access 
lines (to the telecommunications network) is a valid measure on which to base infomtation 
systems needs. The first row was computed by adding the number of access lines of all 
regional companies and dividing by seven. The average was then used to compute the 
percentage for each company. Thus U S WEST ranks 6th on this measure. The total IS 
workforce was 5178, which is the largest of the IS staff figures. Based on the previously 
computed average, a company equal to this average (i.e. at 100% on row 1) would have a 
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certain expected IS workforce. The last row lists the difference between the actual and 
expected staff numbers. Observe the large overstaffing in U S WEST IS, using this 
measure. 
Additionally, a comparison can be made on the ratio of the number of workers 
dedicated to new development projects to the total IS workforce. Figure 31 [Ernst] depicts 
this. 
#l #2 #3 #4 #5 #6 #7 
New Devdopment WorlQcm:e 316 337 347 290 129 491 622 
Toul WorlQcm:c 4626 3227 4374 5023 2729 5178 4918 
Pcn:cut ofNewlfoul 6.83 10.44 7.93 5.77 4.73 9.48 12.65 
Rank 5 2 4 6 7 3 1 
Figure 31. Workers dedicated to new IS development. 
U S WEST ranks third in new staffing for new development on a ratio basis. 
However, the company ranks second in tenns of actual people deployed on new 
development. This could imply that significant progress is being made in the use of new 
technologies, using the new development projects as opportunities to move ahead of the 
traditional data processing base. Whether this is true or not depends on the effects of the 
other perspectives and will be explored during cross-cuing. 
Advanced Technical Education Program 
A major part of the T-perspective can be seen within the Advanced Technical 
Education Program, which is designed to upgrade the knowledge of selected management 
and technical employees in specific areas of technology. The program includes a three tier 
approach: 
Tier I: Employees with undergraduate degrees work toward a graduate 
degree in information sciences by taking one or two graduate 
courses per quarter or employees wishing to increase their 
technical abilities through participation in seminars and classes 
Tier ll: Employees with undergraduate degrees work toward a graduate 
degree in information sciences by taking two or three graduate 
courses per quarter while working on a part-time basis 
Tier m: Employees with undergraduate or graduate degrees work toward 
a graduate degree in infonnation sciences on a full-time basis 
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The selected employees receive full salary, benefits, tuition, books, and 
miscellaneous expenses. The cost to the company will vary depending on the school and 
the program requirements. For example, local part-time study could cost less than $1000 a 
year but a full-time Ph.D. program involving a company-paid employee move could top 
$300,000 total. 
In the post-divestiture world, the bulk of U S WEST and, in particular the 
information systems organizations, can be characterized as high-tech companies without a 
complete set of high-tech capabilities. This is largely because of the historical 
organizational roles oriented towards operational telecommunications. 
Top management sensitivity to this was made evident by their commissioning of 
SRI International to conduct a study of US WEST technical issues such as software 
excellence, market focus, and technology systems. This study reco1ll..T.ended a number of 
technical remedies centered around applied research, hardware and technology, and 
establishing a planning and budgeting mechanism at the corporate level to facilitate these 
new directions. To increase the chances of success, the recommendations included the 
creation of technology forums to keep management and staff on the leading edge of key 
trends and rewarding the technical staff for marketing contributions. TIi.e intent was to 
keep the focus of applied R&D towards the continued financial success of the corporation. 
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In Figure 32, a brief comparison of technical expertise used in the Bell System 
days, and that required in the competitive environment, provides a view of the magnitude 
of the forthcoming transition: 
THE PAST 
• Programming 
o Analysis 
o Batch Expertise 
• Operations 
• System Test and Implementation 
o Telecommunications 
• System Maintenance 
THE FUTURE 
includes the past 
• Data Asset Management 
• End User Computing 
• Artificial Intelligence 
• Human-Computer Interface 
• Software Engineering 
• Computer Graphics 
• Database Technology 
• Distributed ProCessing 
Figure 32. Technical expertise needed pre- and post-divestiture. 
Educational Statistics 
Coincident with the top management activity were concerns at the technical and 
technical management level. To gain an understanding of what they were dealing with, 
exhaustive data analysis was perfonned on various attributes of the employee population. 
One analysis showed that 78% of all US WEST employees had no college education and 
0.4% had computer science degrees. Restricting the study population to the Infonnation 
Systems staff showed that even in this technical area, 58% did not have a college degree 
(Figures 33 and 34) and only 9% had computer science degrees. The interest in these 
numbers has been great, as seen by the volumes of this data that has been produced under 
such titles as: 
.. Advanced Degrees Earned by Managers and Analysts: Infonnation 
Systems Organizations 
.. Advanced Subjects Studied by Managers and Analysts: Infonnation 
Systems Organizations 
• Percentage of Employees with Four-Year College Degrees or More, IS 
Organizations 
• Ratio of Degrees Held to Total Number of Managers and Analysts, IS 
Organizations 
• Distribution of Ages of Managers and Analysts. IS Organizations 
• Years of Service Distribution in the IS Organizations 
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The focus on these statistics indicate their association to the real issues of 
inadequate productivity levels, low level of advanced technical knowledge (as distinct from 
skills, which can be gained through training), and lack of theoretical background for 
understanding of the technologies. The demographic statistics are significant because it is 
hard to motivate middle-aged, loyal, financially secure employees to sacrifice their time and 
effort to improve their technical capabilities. A DYNAMO model [Tarr] was developed to 
help understand the effects of these demographics and possible policy implications over the 
next five to ten years. 
To effectively utilize the statistical worker profiles the context of the company's 
future business plans must be incorporated. Rapid advances in technology, even when 
purchased from outside suppliers, has led to increased automation and higher operational 
efficiencies. Coupled with slow economic growth and a steady downsizing of the 
corporate workforce, the opportunity to hire new, technically qualified employees is 
decreasing. Additional constraint is imposed buy the fact that demand for technically 
skilled people, especially in computer science and electrical ent.neering, is increasing 
beyond the available supply. These factors put additional impetus into the development of 
internal programs for employee education. 
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For an another "T" perspective on the merits of the Advanced Technical Education 
Program, consider this excerpt from another report commissioned by US WEST and 
directed by consultants from Nolan, Norton, and Company from 1987: 
"Information Systems must be designed, tooled and developed into a 
streamlined manufacturing facility for competitive and support systems. This 
facility requires the development or recruiting of highly skilled professionals 
with many new skills. Massive training and hiring are called for. " 
2.758 
Advanced Degrees Earned by 
Managers and Analysts: 
Information Systems Organizations 
Note: Percentages enclosed in pan!ntheses are calculated 
based on !he IOta! number of employees in Ihis 
categOry (2.758) 
1.012(37) 
4-Year Degrees 
(Or More) 
143 (5) 
Some Collage 
or Associate 
Degree 
575(21) 
Bachelor of 
Science 
First 
Degree 
6 
SA 
34 
2ndBS 
34 
Master of 
Arts 
36 
Master of 
Science 
1 
PhD. 
Second 
Degree 
31 
2ndBA 
8 
BS 
29 
Master of 
Ans 
2 
2ndMA 
1 
BA 
11M 
2ndMS 
Ph.D. 
Third 
Degree 
3rdBA 
11M 
MS 
2ndMA 
Ph.D 
13 1 
Master of Science 2nd MS 
2 
PhD. 
Figure 34. Advanced degrees in the IS organization 
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Recent data indicate that the number of ITS employees grew by over 7% from 
January 1987 to January 1989. but the percentage of those holding a college degree of any 
sort remained constant at about 38%. Of 166 newly hired employees, 37% had a college 
degree, 17% of the total had at least a bachelor's degree in computer science, and 11% had 
at least a bachelor's in business. Of the 105 new employees without college degrees, 94 
were hired as a Member of the Technical Staff. This is shown in Figure 35: 
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Figure 35. Educational level of new hires. 
The total number of employees holding some type of degree in computer science in 
1987 was 237. In 1989, the number had risen to 241, but given the increase in the total 
information systems population, the computer science resource, expressed as a percentage, 
had declined from about 9% to 8%. Of additional interest is that the Western and Eastern 
regions of ITS showed increases in their computer science educated staff. Tnis means that 
the Central region suffered technical expertise losses so great that they more than offset the 
gains, as shown in Figure 36: 
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Figure 36. Computer science degrees by geographic region. 
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Taken together, these data has implications for the preparedness for U S WEST to 
work with new technologies such as knowledge-based systems, which has an impact on 
competitive capabilities. The impact of this aspect of the technical perspective can be seen 
in later sections. 
Technical Skills Assessment 
With the movement towards increasing technical capabilities, the need for assessing 
performance becomes apparent Prior to divestiture, there was relatively little activity in 
this area. The company is making up for that now, with every management group 
including the issue in their plans and deliberations. The "T" focus of these efforts can be 
seen in the purpose statements of one group: 
• Prepare a detailed list of the skills required 
• Prepare a recollunendation on how to administer and implement the 
skills list 
• Prepare a recommendation on how to validate the reasonableness of the 
skill levels 
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As a result of this personnel evaluation process, advancement is predicated on a 
completed skills matrix, a satisfactory training record and work history, subjective 
management assessment, and an employee development plan. Not only must this 
evaluation be done for prospective promotions, but may also be required for avoiding a 
demotion due to deficient or atrophied capabilities. Most people become very interested in 
continuing education when a demotion appears as the alternative. 
ORIGINS OF KSTP 
The recognition of expert systems as an important technology for U S WEST was 
first articulated in 1984, and by 1987, there were a number of work groups exploring the 
technology. The concern that each of these groups were duplicating certain functions and 
the concern that external training of people was expensive and of uneven quality, were 
early motivators towards the establishment of KSTP. A research committee was fonned to 
examine these issues and to make recommendations40 on future action to take. 
Training Costs 
In 1987, it was estimated that over $80,000 was spent on external training by the 
Bellevue. Washington staff alone. No data was available for the Denver, Colorado and 
Omaha, Nebraska staff organizations. Using this incomplete data, it was decided that 
internal course development would be beneficial because such training costs were only 
going to increase. This was a strong motivator for the fonnation of KSTP. 
Resource Allocation 
Analysis was done on two dimensions. First was an estimate of the dollar 
distributions over the two year life of the project as shown in Figure 37. This distribution 
40nte text of the report, less proprietary references, is included in Appendix D. 
was spread by examining the five major functions (in the left column) and detennining 
what proportion of the available resources would be allocated to each. 
Year 1 Year 2 
1 "'. I.., 14~ 2nd half 1 ... 1. .. 14~ ") .. ..1 l.Al&' .;...;;;..u.Uo..:iUI. £.., .. it&iU&L ..,u,u .. LULl. 
Training 30% 25% 10% 
Technical Support 30% 15% 15% 15% 
Technical Currency 40% 20% 15% 15% 
Development 15% 20% 30% 45% 
ATEP 15% 15% 15% 15% 
Figure 37. Percentage resource allocations for KSTP 
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These functions, as originally proposed, are described in the following paragraphs. 
As will be seen in later sections, these functions did not always tum out as planned. 
"The Training function is targeted primarily at the key players in an expert 
system development project: the knowledge engineer, his or her manager, and 
the domain expert. The project was to produce a core curriculum of courses 
covering basic and advanced expert systems concepts. Potential courses 
included: 
.. Artificial Intelligence & Expert Systems Overview 
• Introduction to Expert Systems . 
• Knowledge Representation 
.. Knowledge Acquisition Techniques 
.. Expert Systems Project Management 
.. Specific Expert System Building Tools. 
The Technical Support objective is targeted at potential and active knowledge 
engineers. The project staff will deliver talks and demonstrations on demand to 
groups interested in learning about the technology in general. To leverage the 
expertise developed by groups with development efforts across as wide an 
audience as possible, the project staff will organize and support a users group. 
In addition, the staff will provide direct consultation to clients with development 
efforts, including problem identification, preliminary design, rapid prototyping, 
project-tool matching, and testing and validation. 
The Technical Currency objective is targeted at active knowledge engineers 
and CIS support groups such as SDME (Standard Development and 
Maintenance Environment) and Infonnation Resources. Project staff will be 
responsible for ensuring that the most up-to-date infonnation regarding expert 
systems theories and tools are reviewed. Via the users group, that information 
will be shared with all groups actively developing expert systems. Support 
groups will be kept current on the state-of-the-art for tools in the environments 
of their areas of responsibility. 
The DeyelQpmem objective is targeted at the company at large, focused 
through client organizations. Project staff will design and implement at least 
one large expert system with important financial rewards. This effort is 
intended to be both an opportunity to build full-scale development expertise in 
the project staff and the client group, and a major vehicle for delivering the 
benefits of the technology to the corporation. Potential candidates exist today 
for this application in efforts currently in various phases within the company. 
The project staff will work with the client group from its current state to a 
finished production system, and provide support necessary to enable the client 
organization to maintain the finished system. 
The Advanced Technical Education objective is targeted at the company at 
large, focused through selected members of the project staff. Members of the 
project staff will participate in A TEP to develop advanced computer science 
knowledge required to maximize the benefit of the transfer of expert systems 
and artificial intelligence technology, as they mature, into the mainstream of CIS 
systems." 
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The other resource allocation area was specific dollars over the two year time frame, 
as shown in Figure 38. The objective of staff training was to bring all members of the 
project staff to the same level of exposure to expert system concepts, to provide training on 
specific software tools, and to develop expertise in the training of others. 
The software estimate was an educated guess, with the original proposal stating "it 
is premature to specify exactly what software will be purchased for the project" Hardware 
provided funds for additional workstation and printer purchases. The travel budget was 
largely due to the U S WEST-wide nature of the project 
Year 1 
Staff Training $30,000 
Software $100,000 
Hardware $130,000 
Travel $36,000 
Trahii..ig l-vf~.L;als $7,500 
User Group/Affiliates Support $10,000 
Miscellaneous $10,000 
Total Expense $323,500 
Salary $250,000 
Total Annual Budget $573,500 
GRAND TOTAL PROJEO BUDGET 
Year 2 
$0 
$0 
$0 
$36,000 
$2,500 
$10,000 
$10,000 
$58,500 
$250,000 
$308,500 
$882,000 
Figure 38. Estimated dollar distributions for KSTP expenses. 
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In the research committees recommendation report, the preceding is the extent of the 
technical perspective analysis. Once the project began, there was an occasional T -issue 
raised but largely the issues were in the organizational and personal domains. 
FORMAL ORGANIZATIONAL STRUCfURE 
Since divestiture, the information systems organization has changed many times. 
During the existence of KSTP there were two major changes, the first due to 
regionalization41 and the second due to internal conflicts between information systems and 
the advanced technology organization. These transitions have been phased and continue 
even today in order to reduce the combined regional staffs and to be more responsive to the 
market units of U S WEST. When KSTP was initiated, the CIS organization consisted of 
5300 employees, organized as shown in Figure 39. Within this organization, there was no 
clear cut place to position KSTP, so a modified matrix approach was adopted. This is 
shown in Figure 40. 
41 Regionalization is the process by which the separate organizations of the old 
Mountain Bell, Northwestern Bell, and Pacific Northwest Bell combine into single units to 
serve the entire new corporation. The information systems staffs work towards 
establishing single systems, such as one billing system, for the entire company and to 
standardized on uniform processes and procedures. 
Hicks 
Corporate 
Information Seruices 
Figure 39. CIS organizational structure. 
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Each of the primary project sponsors (Medina, Gunter, and Schroder) agreed to 
provide headcount (2,1,2 respectively), and sufficient capital and exper'.i:~ money to 1) 
support the allocated headcount level and 2) to support the general needs of the project, i.e. 
those costs associated with group functions more than with individuals. In the initial 
KSTP Memorandum of Agreement42 additional resources were agreed to by U S WEST 
Advanced Technologies, but were not realized during the project Therefore, from a T-
perspective, the most signific:.tnt impact of the AT group was their complementary, but 
largely independent technology development efforts. There were no reporting or funding 
relationships. 
42See Appendix C. 
Headcount 
Resources 
Louis Schroder 
Headcount 
Resources 
Figure 40. KSTP sponsorship structure 
Headcount 
Resources 
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In January of 1989, the Advanced Technologies organization and Corporate 
Infonnation Services were combined into a single functional organization (although legal 
identities remained separate). The rationale was to bring the organizations closer together 
and to foster teamwork. This organization had great impact on the dynamics of KSTP, 
both positively and negatively. These will be explored in the 0 and P analysis. 
The infonnation systems organization was spread across a number of geographic 
locations, with employees located across the entire 14 state region but primarily in the cities 
listed in Figure 41. 
Geographic Distribution of Information System Employees 
1.50% 4.18%1.82% 
23.27'1'0 
1.50% 
39.65% 
III Albuquerque, NM 
C Bellevue and Seattle, WA 
iii Denver, CO 
II Minneapolis, MN 
mJOmaha,NE 
m Portland, OR 
m Salt Lake City, UT 
Figure 41. Geographic distribution of IS employees 
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The effect of regionalization, ongoing organizational realignment, and geographic 
separation foreshadow significant influences on the efforts to integrated a new technology. 
Regionalization forces the confrontation of different cultures and operathig practices, which 
are seen in the 0 and P perspectives. Ongoing organizational realignment adds to the 
dynamics, as people no longer remain in one organization to stabilize and no organization 
remains intact long enough to develop its own identity. This requires a deep look into the 
o and P dimensions to provide insight beyond the T orientation of the organization chart. 
Geographic separation causes severe communications problems, as discussed in previous 
sections. Dealing with these forces was a major component of KSTP work plans. 
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PROJECf MEASUREMENT 
As discussed in the literature review on technology transfer, one of the difficult 
issues is knowing when technology transfer has occurred. One part of the difficulty is 
defining what is to be measured; a second part is how it will be measured; and a third part 
is establishing an acceptable value for the measurement. 
For KSTP, the research committee report implies some potential measurements: 
• Training courses should be developed, at some quality level 
• One large expert system with important financial rewards should be 
developed 
• Financial constraints are stated, enabling variance measurements 
To actually manage the project, the KSTP team developed a rather quantitative 
spreadsheet tracking tool and a more qualitative Macintosh™ HyperCard tracking tool. 
Contact Log 
The HyperCard tool was used by all team members to maintain a Contact Log, 
keeping a record of client and vendor contacts which had a bearing on the project (index 
shown in Figure 42, log entry shown in Figure 43). This tool was used as input to the 
spreadsheet tool which tracked project status within a number of key perfonnance areas, 
with specific items within each area (Figure 44). At each quarterly checkpoint, the Contact 
Log, personal calenders, and other documents were reviewed, summarized, and input to 
the Project Evaluation spreadsheet. Results were analyzed (even if they matched 
projections) to detennine if adequate progress was being made. In some cases, items were 
deleted or added. In cases of variance from projections. causes were assessed. 
Depending on the cause, future projections may be adjusted up or down. 
KSTP Contact log 
'11'8. III"'" illllilllI! Iii .a l.t ....... 81 •• , a .... ;a 118W lag lI11try 
1 ... &. .. 1 ..... ...t: • _n."" ..... _..1 ... .1 .... ,.~ .. lia ... LI •• 
sel'a_. 
14,19S9 
1 14,1989 
1 18,1989 
1 18,1989 
18.1989 
14.1989 
April 25.1969 
April 25, 1969 
April 26,1969 
April 27 I 1 999 
April 27 ,1999 
April Z9 I 1 999 
Shart Ter m Dell. GrDUP 
Venture CaPital (SumbOloD1C 
LevelS for Dave SCIlt ndele 
Ma1nteRan::e Sum!XJluum 
Knu1Son', Starr Meet1na 
I"",ntll'~" CaPital f3vmbolog1c 
1:15 Client Approach 
n11 and JETS 
ISLE I DTP 
E911 
,JETS I erDd~ 
S~mbG1D9ic Tc,tin9 
Figure 42. Contact log index. 
ladd Entryl 
I Status I 
I Calender I 
HelD] 
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o Add 
o lIalp 
o lDelete 
o R8U lilt (ohantes) 
o Print 
o,ntect Cafe: l.Jun.2, 1989 
Oat!! Added: l.June 6, 1 gag 
vendar: 
tontatt: 
Log Entry Screen 
A.Ug.5t I 0 I 1999 
I + I l1ain Henu I .. I 
Figure 43. Contact log entry screen. 
Spreadsheet Analysis 
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Without analyzing the spreadsheets in detail (Figure 44 and Figure 45), it is 
sufficient to observe the mapping of the key areas to the original project objectives in 
Appendix C. There is also an automatic projection mechanism built into the spreadsheet 
which support the assumption that a certain number of consultations will lead to a certain 
number of exploration and analysis engagements, leading to a number of development 
projects, and finally resulting in a number of production systems. This was a simple case 
of working the numbers, assuming that with large enough numbers in the early stages, 
something would make it through to production. 
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Ju11588 Od1588 Jan1589 Apr1589 Jul1589 Oct15 89 
Exp Act Exp Act Exp Act Exp Act Exp Act Exp Act 
Training 
Curriculum Recommendation Done x 
Curriculum Recommendation Updtd x x x x 
ESATIKSTP Partnership A 
ES Training in Place (A) 
Number of People Trained 0 0 5 10 30 60 60 
Percentage of Trainees thru KSTP 90% 90% 90% 9O'k 90% 
Library Updated wi Training Refs. x x x x x x x 
Tools 
Mainframe Tool Selected x 
Mainframe Tools Installed 1 2 3 
Recommended PC Tools Identified x x x x x 
Library Updated wi Tool Refs. x x x x x x x 
Forma' CommunlClltions 
Number of ESIGlKSUG 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
Participation in AI Team 0 0 1 1 0 1 0 1 
Epistemological Flyers 1 2 2 2 2 
Executive Briefings 5 5 0 5 0 5 0 
Industry/Academic Lis/sons 
Carnegie Group Project x x x x x 
BeUcore x x 
ES fmplementation Group x x x x x x 
University Contacts 2 2 3 2 2 2 2 
GUIDEISHARE x x x x x x 
Consultations 
General 5 5 15 15 20 20 20 
Training 5 2 5 20 40 40 40 
Tool 5 ? 4 10 20 20 20 
Total 
.-
neierenee Library Established x 
Reference Materiat Maintained x x x x x x x 
Exploration and Anslysls 
Number of Engagemenls 3 3 6 7 10 12 20 25 
Costs of E&A Engagements 
Prob Selection Techniques ID'd x , 
Prob Selection Techniques updld x x x x 
Establish HyperCard Contact Log x x 
Maintain HyperCard Contact Log x x x x x x x x 
Number of Small Tools Distributed 5 5 5 5 
Percer.tage on Permanent Loan 20% 60% 60% 600/0 
Figure 44, Project activity measunnent. 
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Ju11588 Od1588 Jan1589 Apr1589 Jul1589 Oct1589 
Exp Act Exp Act Exp Act Exp Act Exp Act Exp Act 
Deve/opmont 
Number of Engagements 2 3 3 6 8 12 14 
Number oi CiS Ceniers inwived . 2 2 3 3 3 3 . 
Costs of Dev Engagements 
Demo Prototype 2 3 3 4 5 6 6 
Field Prototype 0 0 0 2 3 4 4 
Prodlldion Systems 0 0 0 0 0 2 4 
Value- of Product to Client (C) 2.5 2.5 2.5 2.5 2.5 
Value- of Process to Client (C) 2.5 2.5 2.5 2.5 2.5 
Mainframe Production Systems 
Number 0 0 0 0 1 2 
Development costs ($millions) 
Annual dollar benefits 
Annual dollar costs 
Net annual value 
All Other Production Systems 
Number 0 0 0 1 2 
Development costs ($millions) 
Annual dollar benefits 
Annual dollar costs 
Net annual value 
Contribution to Corpor.t. 
Goal. 
Technical % (D) 
Organizational @ (E) 
Personal A (F) 
Personsl Development 
Job Satisfaction (avg, scale 0-5) 4 4 4 4 4 4 
Educational (ATEP Participants) 1 3 3 3 2 2 
Hours Traininglperson 20 20 20 20 20 20 
Promotions 0 0 2 0 0 0 
Career Growth (8) 
-Average values of on 0-3 scale, supported by dollars where possible 
# Investment spreadsheet analysis (allached) I I I 
% Technology characteristics and technological environment; economics 01 technological 
adoption and deployment; evolutionary considerations 
@ Upper management, middle management, lower management, technical/professional; 
technoloqy transfer; JinkaQe with comoanv llI'CJ!trarns 
A Description of individual behaviors affecting the deployment of knowledge system technology; 
technoloqy transfer; human resource management 
Figure 45. Development activity measurement 
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These are internal KSTP measurements. External to the project, no one had stated 
requirements nor expectations for KSTP performance. 
An additional measurement was client feedback. Each month, more or less, clients 
were asked to rate the level of service which they received from KSTP (poor, fair, good, 
excellent), to provide suggestions for improving service, and to offer ideas for other 
potential knowledge systems applications in U S WEST. 
CH..4\PTER VI 
THE ORGANJZATIONALPERSPECfIVE 
The organizational (0) perspective dominates the inquiry methods within 
organizational settings such as companies, government agencies, and volunteer groups. 
But further than these, the O-perspective also includes infonnal groups that may not have a 
name, may not be readily identifiable, and whose members may not recognize the existence 
of a group. People in organizations do not deal with their environment from an abstract 
view. Practical necessities and needs mold their perceptions of their organizational 
interactions and what they must do to survive and to prosper. The O-perspective is both 
subjective and objective in that it views the world according to a mix of uncertainties and 
standard operating procedures, with satisfaction rather than optimization as a goal. 
Planning, and action on those plans, tends to be incremental and representative of the status 
quo method of doing business. 
At it matures, an organization becomes a system with a logic of its own and the 
weight of tradition and inertia. The deck is stacked in favor of the tried and proven way of 
doing things and against the taking of risks and striking out in new directions. 
IDENTIFICATION OF TIIE ORGANIZATIONS 
To analyze the organizational entities in this study, major units having impact on the 
integration of knowledge systems technology were identified and grouped into the 
following categories: 
• Internal formal- A U S WEST unit whose members mutually identify 
and whose members can be readily identified by non-members due to 
official U S WEST sponsorship. 
• Internal infonnal- AU S WEST unit whose members mayor may not 
mutually identify and whose members may or may not be readily 
identified by non-members. No official U S WEST sponsorship exists. 
o External formal- A non-U S WEST unit whose members mutually 
identify and whose members can be readily identified by non-members 
due to some type of official sponsorship. 
• External infonnal- A non-U S WEST unit whose members mayor may 
not mutually identify and whose members mayor may not be readily 
identified by non-members. No official sponsorship exists. 
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The organizations included in each of these four categories were investigated while 
looking at the following areas: 
• members and size 
e official goals of the organization 
• unstated goals 
o technology view (benefit or victim of new technology, hire/fire due to 
new technology) 
• physical environment 
• peoples perceptions of stability and vulnerability to influence 
• Clarity of how to achieve objectives and stability of environment 
o tasks 
o division of tasks 
o responsibility for task completion 
o environmental linkages 
" operational structure (as opposed to formal) 
• power over knowledge systems development 
• resources 
" resource division between DOING WORK and CONTROL, real power 
(POlicy control) 
" resilience in unpredictable situations 
• uncertainty coping behavior: communications, task coordination, 
developing routines and rules 
• programmed responses (SOP's ), unwritten rules and how they are 
circumvented 
• non-programmed responses 
• incentives and reward system, explicit and implicit 
• information flow within the organization 
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Each of these areas were not necessarily found within each organization and, in 
many cases the information about that area was not essential for the analysis of the 
technology integration process. Therefore, in the sections that follow, only the factors that 
bear on the research topic are discussed. 
Before analyzing the organizational perspective of KSTP itself, there are some 
contextual pieces that must be described. These are the relevant organizational views of U 
S WEST and Corporate Information Services. 
US WEST 
As described in Chapter II, U S WEST is largely composed of Mountain Bell, 
Northwestern Bell, and Pacific Northwest Bell. The attempts to merge these companies 
into one amalgamation have proceeded slowly. Slow speed is not, of itself, a negative 
factor because the significant differences in company cultures cannot be forced together by 
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ultimatum. U S WEST faces unique problems not faced by any of the other six regional 
telecommunications companies, such as a 14 state operating region (which means 14 public 
utility commissions to interact with), wide geographic reaches (from the Great Lakes to the 
Pacific Ocean, from Canada to Mexico). and the resulting social and cultural differences 
crossing such a vast region. The company is addressing these issues by actively pursuing 
deregulation from the utility commissions, investing in internal communications networks, 
and heightening individual awareness of pluralism as a fundamental part of the business. 
With a history of service orientation, pre-divestiture market responsiveness had 
been minimal, essentially in the mode of telling customers, "Here is what we sell." Now 
~re is a strong move towards market orientation, with a realignment of the company into 
market units which are focused on serving the unique needs of their customers. In tum, 
the market units tell the U S WEST support organizations, including infonnation system, 
what they must have to serve their customers. In this way, the market units define what the 
priorities are for software development. 
While these efforts are unfo~ding, there are limitations to the way the business can 
operate, such as the inability to transfer internal budget dollars across company lines. This 
is due to a combination of regulations, accounting system limitations, and the fact that the 
three telecommunications companies are still legal corporate entities. There are also 
unregulated subsidiaries of U S WEST that must not be subsidized by the regulated 
companies. For example, when a U S WEST knowledge systems training class was held, 
it was pennissible for employees of regulated and unregulated companies to attend. Those 
from the unregulated subsidiaries had to pay their fair share and the FCC dictates a specific, 
rather involved procedure for this. 
Operationally, U S WEST is a systems-oriented and systems-dependent company 
in the fullest sense. The telecommunications network operates as a very large, complex 
system and the management of such a network requires a workforce that reflects the system 
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in tenns of complexity and communications needs. One vendor viewed the company with 
amazement, saying, ''The more we look at U S WEST, the more complicated the picture 
becomes in terms of a giant and complex network of systems that need to communicate." 
As a large organization, U S WEST is less able to implement timely change. 
Because it takes a fair amount of time to see results. the company, if it wishes to survive in 
a competitive world, must have a long time horizon with less discounting than many other 
businesses. 
A rapidly fading remnant of the old Bell System is the matemalistic relationship 
between the company and the employees, as was evidenced by lifetime emplo~ent, good 
benefits, good working conditions, high integrity, and high regards for the individual. 
With market pressures and the incessant demand for short-term financial performance 
(which is not unique to U S WES1), the matemalistic qualities that attracted the current 
workforce are becoming memories. 
Promotion from within is an enduring company value that has served as a stability 
factor in the past but shows some signs of weakening when business needs necessitate 
incorporation of new talent Key players are being lured from other companies to fill new 
world voids that cannot be filled by experienced old-school managers, many of whom say 
they've changed. but act in accordance with a career of organizational conditioning. 
As with most stable bureaucracies, there has been an historical resis!mce to change. 
By necessity, this resistance has been diminishing since the day AT&T and the U.S. 
Department of Justice announced divestiture as the solution to the government's anti-trust 
suit However, the entire corporation and its standard operating procedures were 
established in a different era. With these legacies, rapid change is not possible even when 
it is needed. This is very visible with large software systems that were designed to 
incorporate approved utility rate changes once a year, and are now faced with weekly or 
daily change demands to keep up with market demands. 
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Consistently strong financial perfonnance is another organizational trait which plays 
a prominent role when considering the time and money costs of change. The old AT&T 
"blue chip" stock for widows and orphans is a difficult legacy to maintain. While U S 
WEST stock has risen in value and continues to issue respectable dividends, the uncertain 
future of telecommunications dming the transition from regulated to unregulated causes 
new efforts to be viewed as strategic investments in the future, at the expense of short-teno 
payoff. 
CORPORATE INFORMATION SYSTEMS 
CIS has some inherited (from U S WEST) and some of its own organizational 
factors which influenced KSTP. The three company cultural issue is manifested to an 
extreme within the organization. The resolution of cultural differences are met without 
decisiveness. Turf battles go on for prolonged periods without progress towards 
resolution. In early 1989, a number of burning issues faced CIS and Advanced 
Technologies: 
• A significant morale problem which required attention from U S WEST 
senior management, calling attention to the corporation's values toward 
people 
• Employee fears about redeployment and job security due to constant 
cost-reduction efforts 
.. CIS employee concerns about possible pay and benefit cuts if 
transferred to an unregulated subsidiary 
• Regulator concerns about cross-subsidization between CIS and AT 
• Union leaders' concerns about pay, benefits, job security, and union 
representation of certain CIS employees 
• The lack of market unit understanding of the role of AT 
• The negative image of CIS in many parts of the corporation 
• Confusion between CIS and AT over roles and work: division, with 
resulting turf problems 
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Contention between the two organizations was app&"'ent for nearly a year, when 
action was finally taken to put them under one name, the Information Technologies Group. 
CIS has a number of organizational attributes which affect its ability to adopt new 
technologies. The most significant of these are the existence of well developed rules and 
procedures, limited knowledge of new technologies, immature technical skills assessment 
organizations, uncertain recruiting practices, and a focus on budget management as a 
primary activity. 
Rules and Procedures 
As with the corporation, CIS standard operating procedures were established in a 
different era. While documented procedures can be easily rewritten by staff groups, the 
actual practice takes much longer. In other cases, the unwritten rules have even greater 
effect. such as the mid-managers who are not comfortable with employee communications 
outsid~ of the chain of command and the programmers who are on such a tight leash that 
they mu;;~ ~\S1r ~ ssion to attend a two-hour meeting on a new technology. 
;.'1le strength in baving well-developed rules and procedures is that, in many cases, 
there are insertion points for new procedures within existing structures. The limited 
resources of a new technology effort prevents reinventing the wheel. It is not only 
attractive, but imperative that the new technology processes be integrated into the 
mainstream procedures. 
Limited Knowledge of New TechnolQgies 
The CIS organization's traditional operating environment can be generally 
characterized as mM or Amdahl mainframes wit.t~ most applications written in COBOL 
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using flat files or commercial database systems. With the large workloads imposed due to 
market unit needs. CIS staff works with existing tools because they simply do not have the 
time to learn about new technologies. So they are not in a position to detennine if or when 
a different approach would be beneficial. 
There are three groups of people that can be disguised for the purposes of technical 
preparedness: technical employees who directly perfonn technical IS tasks. manag~rs of 
the technical employees. and directors who manage groups of managers. 
The senior technical employees have made these observations on the capabilities of 
theses three groups to deal with new technology: 
• The technical employees who have an interest in new technologies 
simply do not have enough hours in the day to meet their existing job 
responsibilities and invest time in learning about the new 
• The managers of technical groups are concerned with their own loss of 
technical competence because their job responsibilities include many 
administrative tasks. In many cases. managers do not have any 
technical background 
• The directors have lost their technical knowledge in the same fashion as 
the managers. usually to a greater degree 
A major reason for knowledge loss at the manager and director levels is that the 
organization culture does not support or encourage technical literacy • leaving it to the choice 
of the individual. Some people in these groups have specifically chosen to leave the 
technical ranks because they were no longer interested in it. They do not accept technical 
leadership as their role. 
There is also an understandable reluctance to take on any new responsibilities 
because these people are very busy running their area of the business. A large part of their 
work concerns budget management. which is discussed below. 
It is also interesting to viev lle need for technical literacy from the CIS client 
perspective. The following passage captures the essence of this. 
Account managers are the peopie who represent the client interests to CIS: 
"I met with the Sea.."tle Account Management Team to talk about ways in 
which KSTP and the Account Managers might work together. 
To start off, they were unfamiliar with KSTP. After a brief introduction to 
KSTP, I suggested that we could be one more trick in their bag of tricks to 
serve their Accounts (Federal Services, Government and Education, Network 
Facilities-Services-Switching, Business Resources, and a large chunk of legal 
entity Pacific Northwest Bell (Treasury, Tax, Separations, Security, Legal). 
They have had a particular problem with CIS response to their client needs. 
For example, they will match a client infonnation need to an application area in 
CIS, then spend too much of their time getting the application area to commit 
resources to work on satisfying the client needs. Also, the application solution 
proposals are very narrow, in that they only consider tools and techniques 
familiar to the MOtS's, which may not address the client needs. 
I said that we too must work with gaining application area support for ES 
projects, so if they came to us with a client we could help each other. They 
agreed. I also said matching the technology and problem was part of our job, 
so they would not be stuck there either. 
I proposed that they use the "what are your three biggest information-related 
headaches" approach with clients and we would help apply the selection and 
filtering process. They agreed. 
The group manager agreed to take the information to her boss' staff meeting 
for dissemination throughout all CIS account manager locations. If warranted, 
they will meet with me in the future. 
One account manager was very enthusiastic and said she would call me within 
the week to follow-up on some ideas. 
Final note: The account managers are very interested in getting some training 
and want the training package from us as soon as possible." 
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From this very encouraging beginning with one small group, the overtones of CIS 
organizational probiems overshadow the potential benefits of trying a new technology. 
Because of this, nothing further developed with the account management group. 
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Technical Skills Assessment Organizations 
As the traditional data processing and engineering functions have progressed from 
the Bell System environment to the more demanding environment of today, a number of 
groups of managers and technical personnel have been formed to address technical skill 
rating and classification schemes. These groups are more like task forces rather than 
formal organizations, but when considered in total give an impression of a fairly substantial 
movement. The goals of one group provide a flavor for the 0 perspective: 
• Provide an emphasis for establishing and maintaining a professional 
organization which emphasizes technical proficiency and performance 
• Aid in retaining a skilled force essential for maintaining current systems 
and planning for and implementing future technology 
• Ensure uniform communication and admi..istration of the requirements 
to enter, advance through, and exit specific levels of technical 
proficiency 
• Achieve skill alignment among the various US WEST companies 
• Facilitate a means for rewarding individuals for technical expertise 
In addition to the large number of these groups addressing technical skills, nearly 
every report or study in business planning areas includes a section on improving skills, 
recruiting and retaining "superstars", and developing training programs for the future. 
In spite of the reorganization described previously, the Technical Career Structure 
(TCS)43 process has not been reviewed for possible application in Advanced 
Technologies. Not only are the technical people evaluated much differently, but group 
managers (Le., managers having only one layer of technical employees reporting to them) 
43Tcs is used for technical personnel assessment and development. It consists 
primarily of skill areas, ratings, and a periodic review process between the technical person 
and their manager. 
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are classified higher than equivalent jobs in CIS. The conflict in messages (work as one: 
get treated differently) is obvious. 
A significant problem with current skill definitions of the TCS is that they do not 
include future skill sets, relying on what was important instead of what is and what will be 
important This has implications for people working with new technologies which are by 
nature oriented towards the future. In this context, the TCS process is also used as pa..'1 of 
the promotion process for the technical levels. There are organizationally imposed 
limitations on the perceptions of promotion review committees as to what skill areas are 
important and how people are reviewed. 
In one instance of a promotion review committee getting its first non-traditional type 
of request for promotion, they (upon later admission) did not know how to deal with it. 
The request was initially denied, but one month later it was approved with the comment, 
"Some of the documentation and supporting interviews exceed the newly promoted to 
level." This low-key superlative indicated a significant shift in the committee's position, 
because it is clear that the employee did not gain significant new skills in one month. 
Indeed, a committee member explained, "It was nothing personal, it was simply a matter of 
t..he committee getting the first non-traditional type of application for reclassification and not 
knowing how to deal with it." 
The process was a learning experience for managers (plan ahead, "grease the skids" 
more), committee members (open your eyes), and technologists (stan work on promotion 
early, keep expectations under control, work towards productive results). 
The evaluations committee's role is difficult, with few black or white cases and 
many in varying shades of gray. The committee tries hard to understand job roles in new 
technology, but they cannot truly understand it because they have not experienced it. It is 
understandably biased from years of conditioning and the present job roles perfonned by 
its members. Therefore, the burden is on new technologists to plan in advance for 
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promotions, knowing that their contributions to the company, no matter how valuable, are 
will not initially be judged by appropriate measures. New technologists must be willing to 
take their lumps in the early stages. 
When changing jobs, most employees step into an existing position (or at least a 
well defined position), with well defined roles. Their job is to fit in and make modest 
changes as warranted. New technology employees step into newly created positions with 
no support structures, no defined roles, preliminarily defined tasks. Their job is to create a 
client base, market the technology, identify applications of the technology, select the 
projects, develop the projects (with clients), integrate the technology into existing 
organizations, and develop new talent. In CIS, there is little organizational accommodation 
for these differences, again pointing out the need to get the technology into the mainstream 
environment as soon as possible. 
""bile this demonstrates some of the complexities of working with new 
technologies, it is also very revealing about the strengths of the review committees to 
rethink, analyze, and adapt to such situations. This beneficial characteristic is illustrative of 
how committee process can work within CIS, providing an entry mechanism for new 
... __ L __ 1 __ _ 
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Recruiting 
The recruiting staff is primarily responsible for relations with colleges and 
universities as sources for prospective employees. There are three factors which have been 
significant in the effectiveness of recruiting programs. First is the competition for qualified 
graduates in high demand fields such as computer science and engineering. Second is the 
downsizing of the company which has reduced the need for employees, resulting in a 
cutback of recruiting presence on campus. Third is the practice of sending managers who 
are not conversant in the disciplines for which they are recruiting. 
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The intense competition for graduates would logically guide an organization to 
increase the quality and effort of the recruitment program. Accepting this premise, it seems 
that a campus recruiting presence must be maintained even in slow hiring periods in order 
to retain the good name and relationships that are needed in high demand periods. With the 
stature of the company dependent largely on the impact of the on-campus recruiters, it is 
imperative that the recruiters know the subject areas of the interviewees. Student groups 
form opinions about companies based on interview experiences that are handed down from 
graduating class to graduating class. These perceptions endure, much like interviewer 
opinions of schools providing quality graduates. While the company interviewers can 
make use of the track record of employees hired from various schools, college students 
depend much on grapevine company reputation, placing high value on the views of their 
peers. The company has not maintained a high profile because of recent lean business 
years, and this further aggravates its ability to comp~t~ for an already scarce resource. 
Furthermore, reduct' oj recruiting puts additional importance on the development of existing 
staff. 
Budget: management 
Yearly budget crises have caused budget management to become the primary 
activity of managers and directors. There are four major effects on new technology 
development: 
1. Productive time is lost dealing with budget issues 
2. Planning becomes a futile exercise 
3. Suboptimization is encouraged 
4. Accumulated experience is in dealing with budgets 
On the first point, current budget administration includes an annual budget crisis 
accompanied by across-the-board budget cuts. It is short-term focused but practiced for 
months at a time, usually from June, July, or August through December 31. During these 
periods, but especially near their beginning, making budget cuts is the primary work 
activity of managers, directors, and technical employees. Extensive effort is made to 
question every activity and justify its continuance. 
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KSTP was the subject of repeated questions including reducing staff, reducing 
expenses, delaying the project, and full cancellation. Every time it happened, effort was 
diverted from knowledge systems deployment to formulating response to questions. 
Interestingly, the questions are often asked only a few months apart, which causes 
significant work intenuption. 
Secondly, budget crises in mid-year cause a major disruption in the work flow 
underway. A work flow is the actualization of a work plan developed mid-way through the 
previous year. Continual budget problems naturally lead people to question why they 
should spend so much time planning and preparing a budget to execute that plan, when 
their resources will be cut anyhow. A manager in the budget process commented on one 
budget submittal by saying, 
"While I will forward your budget on for the '90 budget collection, you ought 
to be aware that it is pretty much meaningless because there will be no formal 
planning process for the budget." 
A serious side effect of budget chaos is that managers cannot be accountable for 
their work nor their expenditures because they lose controi of their resources, and work 
plans are greatly reduced. 
The third point, suboptimization, is a common systems phenomena which is 
aggravated in budget crises. Managers look to minimize their costs in any way possible, 
including shifting costs to other organizational units. This does nothing for the 
corporation, and wastes management time by playing the game. 'When managers are 
reluctant to step up to the problem, the issues are simply escalated to the next higher level in 
the hierarchy for another round of suboptimization, until someone finally makes a decision. 
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This phenomena also leads to the McNamara style of results reporting. Significant 
"savings" are reported as organizational successes which are of dubious value when 
examined closely. Examples are saving a half million dollars of staff time by cancelling a 
project (no real money saved, just time reallocated to other efforts), saving thousands of 
dollars by reducing logon wait times to centralized computers (calculated by annual hours 
of staff time not spent waiting), and using CIS employees instead of contractors to perform 
work (it saves the contractor fees, but what about the CIS salaries?). As was said when 
McNamara was at Ford, "There haven't been any honest answers around here because 
there haven't been any honest questions." 
The fourth issue is most serious. Over the years, CIS employees have spent a 
significant amount of time on budget issues. Not the issues that are necessary for 
managing and controlling expenditures, but time consuming churning that results in the 
previous three points. CIS is an organization that is building a high level of experience 
with budgets, to the neglect of its business of providing information service to the 
corporation. Time spent on these excessive budget crises is time taken away from project 
management, client and partner relationships, employee development, software 
development, new technology adoption, and all the other pieces so important to the 
information systems function. 
A picture of the state of CIS budgeting is given by a senior director: 
;:P~ople a.~ frustrated with the bL1dget process. There is th~ perception that it 
is bad to overrun, but when we underrun, the money just gets taken away 
anyhow (for both this year and next year). People are not clear on what sort of 
behavior the organization is trying to encourage." 
Summing up the CIS Organizational View 
Two things. First, is that CIS became ITS, or Information Technologies - Services 
in January of 1989. In addition to the new name, the change came with yet another 
organizational realignment This illustrates the change that has been ongoing since 
--------- -----------
'" 
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divestiture, change that has become so commonplace that it has diminishing importance to 
employees. In fact CIS 1988 results listed significant change as one item causing employee 
concern. Coupled with increasing customer expectations and severe limits on resources, 
employee concern about change casts an interesting li~'lt on how the introduction of new 
technologies might be received. 
Second is the quote below, from a senior technical professional: 
"One thing I think your group should do is decide on how to spread ES 
involvement in CIS when they're constantly harping about personnel shortages 
and not being able to break anyone away from the "critical" jobs to mess with as 
yet totally unproven (here) technologies. You know the mentality ... there is a 
built in failure if you cannot convince the operational staffs that you are doing 
"real work" .•. more than just playing. Until it becomes a part of every group's 
operating environment (like COBOL or C or methods writing) they will see it as 
a toy. The emphasis has to be on the people problem more than the technology 
problem. Visualize this ... some egghead \Vith a Ph.D. telling us how to put out 
bills HUMPH!! You get the point" 
THE KNOWLEDGE SYSTEMS TRANSFER PROJECf 
KSTP was fonned as a result of the findings of the Research Committee on Exper1; 
Systems.44 The committee found that Corporate Infonnation SelVices activities 
encompassed three types of groups: 
1. Those with a technology focus 
2. Those with an application focus 
3. Those providing access to consultation, training, and tools 
While these activities were being perfonned, only a few prototype expert systems 
had been built and no industrial strength, production systems had been fielded. This was 
seen as an incoherent organizational response to a promising technology. 
To remedy this, the committee considered three alternatives to providing support to 
the CIS organtzation's burgeoning demand for consultation, training, and tool evaluations. 
44Tbe text of the committee's report is in Appendix D. 
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Continuing in the current uncoordinated fashion would not have prevented CIS groups 
from adopting expert systems technology; but it would not have leveraged the expertise 
being developed across the region to the corporation's maximum advantage. In the worst 
case, it might have resulted in duplicate efforts or even costly mistakes in training or tool 
selection. A logical approach might have been for U S WEST Advanced Technologies to 
provide support activities in addition to its functions of project development and Carnegie 
services management. Two problems were seen with this approach. First, the AT staffs 
would potentially need to be enlarged to manage these functions in addition to their 
missions of developing systems for clients in the IDCs45 and the unregulated subsidiaries. 
Secondly, the AT staff consisted of very qualified technologists, largely hired from outside 
of the corporation; as such they were somewhat removed from many CIS issues and 
concerns. The third and recommended approach utilized existing CIS employees with 
expertise in expert systems development to supplement U S WEST AT's larger corporate 
mission with support tailored to the CIS organization and its clients in the IDCs. 
The operational charter of KSTP was to facilitate the transfer of expert systems 
technologies into CIS application, development, and maintenance groups. This would 
provide mainstream infonnation systems technicians and managers with the knowledge, 
skills, and tools which would enable them to apply expert systems technology when 
appropriate to their application development efforts. In its implementation, the KSTP 
provided the six functions shown in Figure 46. 
45Infonnation Distribution Companies, which included Mountain Bell, 
Northwestern Bell, and Pacific Northwest Bell 
------- ------ ----
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Knowledge Systems Transfer Project 
Mainframe 
Project Consulting 
Training 
Project 
Small Tool 
Project Marketing ) Development 
Figure 46. KSTP Subprojects. 
With this division of tasks, the KSTP became the primary expert systems 
development force within CIS. Each of these functional areas establish boundaries in 
which to examine the organizational interactions, both internal and external to U S WEST. 
Mainframe Project 
When KSTG was initiated, it was staffed by people with strong computer science 
and mathematics backgrounds, befitting the then current domain of artificial intelligence. 
The desired hardware platforms were Unix workstations and LISP machines, with 
$50,000 expert systems shells running on them. KSTP was aligned with this in its early 
equipment acquisitions. 
Soon after formation of the project, KSTP staffers went out into CIS to look for 
expert system opportunities. When they spoke of the hardware and software used for AI, 
" 
people in the CIS mainstream were not impressed. In fact they were not interested in 
buying into anything that cost as much as that, especially if it were unproven. 
They were interested in software that would run on their embedded hardware base, 
primarily mM and Amdahl mainframes and mM PC's. Their current projects used very 
large databases with very high on-line transaction volumes. This was where the real work 
was done, so even expert systems on stand-alone PC's were not to be taken seriously. 
------------------ -. ---~--. 
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In near parallel with this enlightenment, another group at U S WEST headquarters 
became interested in using a mainframe expert system tool in an executive decision support 
application. The tool they chose was not held in higb esteem by the expert system 
community, which prompted an AI Center evaluation of it specifically as a defensive 
maneuver. The evaluation pointed out the need for a mainframe tool that was robust 
enough for industrial strength applications and had enough features to satisfy diverse IS 
needs. 
Having the primary linkage with CIS, KSTP initiated aU S WEST task force for 
the purpose of evaluating, recommending, and acquiring a mainframe expert system tool. 
It was clear that this would provide a wide accessibility to CIS developers and would serve 
as a legitimizing action for expert systems technology: 
"As the salesman moved through the introduction to expert systems slides, the 
COBOL programmers noticeably lost interest, looking around the room, 
doodling, or trying to keep their eyes open. Then the salesman dialed into a 
mainframe computer, projecting a full screen image on the wall. He showed the 
expert system linkages to COBOL and they looked much like calls to a 
database. The COBOL programmers were attentive now, and actually started 
talking about where they could put such a tool to use." 
With the risk of acceptance or rejection of expert system tools by the mainstream 
CIS staff people, the U S WEST team decided that it would be necessary to make detailed 
evaluation of the mainframe tools, including installation and database interaction testing on 
U S WEST computers. 
From application programming areas, there were many volunteers to work on the 
trial. One group said they could put a mainframe tool to immediate use, if one were 
available. This enthusiasm endured until it was time for people to make specific work 
commitments. Only the billing organization was willing to participate. because they had 
experienced people who knew the potential of the technology. Other organizations had not 
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made the a priori investment that the billing people had, so lacked the understanding needed 
to commit. 
Other significant applications were identified dming the course of the tool 
evaluation. In one notable case, a project team was fonned, resources obtained, and 
timelines prepared for an effort that would have significant impact on company business. 
This effort was suddenly cancelled, for a multitude of reasons which are described in the 
cross-cuing section. For now, it is sufficient to observe that significant applications existed 
within the CIS environment. 
Consulting 
KSTP consulting activities provided extensive contact with a large number of 
organizational subunits. From a technology integration perspective, the intents were to: 
• Provide infonnation on expert systems technology 
o Assess the feasibility of applying the technology to specific applications 
areas 
o Provide the resources for the client to continue expert systems 
exploration. This included reading lists, books, journals, training 
recommendations and development alternatives 
• Discover high potential application areas that could be developed by the 
CIS analyst alone or in partnership with KSTP, the Expert Systems 
Development Group in Advanced Technologies, or the Carnegie 
Group46 
These consulting activities consumed a significant amount of KSTP resources 
through the actions of two infonnal groups whom are identified as lookers and as talkers. 
4tYrhese last two groups are described below. 
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The lookers only look at expert systems, not progressing to the point of talking 
seriously about using the technology. In some cases, lookers attended two hour 
demonstrations of a PC-based tool. They were usually motivated by curiosit"y and tI;e 
desire to gain a small amount of exposure to the technology. Time was the most valuable 
reSOUICe consumed from KSTP, which was reduced by scheduling group meetings. Even 
when working with individuals, the amount of time spent was small for each case, but the 
large number of cases had a significant impact on KSTP. Many of the lookers were 
intimidated by the technology. 
The talkers were more serious about the technology, but in varying degrees. Some 
described applications and did everything except start work on it Others actually started 
work and never finished, sometimes on a small scale and sometimes on a large scale. 
Small scale talkers used moderate amounts of consulting time while the extreme large scale 
talker consumed a half-person year. 
Training Project 
The Research Committee on Expert Systems recommended the development and 
delivery of expert systems courses by the staff of KSTP. Initially, the KSTP followed the 
recommendation set forth by the committee, but it soon became clear that the development 
and delivery of training courses was very resource intensive. U S WEST has had an 
Infonnation Systems training group for many years. They provided the bulk of training 
needs to the corporation in basic areas needed for the operations role of the company. In 
the new corporate environment, a key distinction is made between training and education, 
where the former provides the means for an employee to perfonn a specific job function 
and the latter provides general knowledge that an employee can apply in changing, diverse 
situations. These different intents have resulted in two different organizations to address 
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each aspect: one is a fonnal training group dedicated to providing on-the-job skills and the 
other is a coalition of advanced education proponents operating under the ATEp47 banner. 
A TEP students were not pursuing AI options, and would not be available within the 
two-year limitations ofKSTP. In order to provide fundamental training for the IS staff, the 
U S WEST training group was the best alternative. Two of the three major IS training 
groups told KSTP that there was no demand for courses in expen systems and therefore no 
plans to develop training. What ever demand might surface could be satisfied with vendor 
offered courses. 
The third center, however, was already at work developing two introductory 
courses, forecasting a demand of 500 to 600 students over three years. Forging the 
partnership between that center and KSTP evolved over an extended period of time, with a 
persistent effort by both parties. It resulted in an effective way to offei the high demand 
courses, with vendor offerings available for more in-depth topics. When demand was 
warranted, vendor courses were brought to U S WEST facilities. The coordination of 
these courses were managed by the training organization, reducing the resource demands 
on KSTP. 
A major problem working with the training organization was geographic separation. 
Many months of working via telephone, electronic mail, and physical mail transpired 
before the primary training people from the two organizations met for the first time. Until 
that meeting (and subsequent meetings) both parties were unsure of the strength of their 
working relationship and the basic temperament of each other. Both were less than 
satisfied with the communications limitations imposed by geographic separation. 
47Tbe Advanced Technical Education Program, which provides company 
sponsorship of fonna! technical education through on-site courses and partial and full 
fellowships. 
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Small Tool PrQject 
Many clients were attracted by the KSTP Loaner Tool Program. This program was 
developed to provide a low entry path for potential developers who were uncertain about 
either their domain or the technology. In either case, they did not want to invest money for 
contract work, hardware, or software. The tool ran on a PC and was rule-based. It 
provided the exploratory capabilities, and was capable of being used for fielding 
applications. 
To make the program effective, an agreement existed between KSTP and the 
developer.48 The limited amount of software available necessitated a screening process, 
which provided a rudimentary control point which encouraged developers to articulate their 
plans. 
By reducing the barrier to use the technology, both good and bad things happened. 
First, a larger number of people were willing to try the tool because they didn't need to 
make a financial investment However, by not making a financial investment, there was, in 
some cases, less commitment to developing a prototype. It was easy enough to articulate 
your needs and get a tool, without getting the management commitment to work on the 
project. 
Marketing 
All KSTP activities provided an opportunity to expose people to the technology and 
its appropriate uses, but there were specific activities designed to inform people. Many of 
the ideas were generated by the KSTP staff and the entire marketing plan was reviewed 
with corporate public relations to ensure effective coverage. 
One of the most important was The Standard Presentation, which ...::onsisted of a one 
to three hour briefing which covered such topics as: 
48See Appendix E. 
• A Description of Expert Systems Technology 
• How Expert Systems Help People Work 
• Examples of Working Systems 
o Current Projects within U S WEST 
• Tools to Build Expert Systems 
o Services and Support in U S WEST 
• What to Do Next 
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The goals were to provide a simple background to the technology, ideas on using it, 
how expert systems are built, and what action could be taken. These presentations were 
delivered upon request or by KSTP offering to application group staff meetings. Publicity 
materials were handed out including guideline handouts, demonstration software, KSTP 
calendars, and, in certain meetings, hardbound expert system books. 
A second major mechanism was to write articles for publication in company and 
departmental newspapers. A much larger audience was reached and the editorial staff were 
instrumental in setting the correct technical level for such articles. 
An early variant of using the prin~ medium for publicity was a document called "The 
Epistemological Flyer," which contained "all the news that can fit on a page." The events 
that transpired around this document are illustrative of the constraints of a large company. 
The first issue of controversy was the name of the document. Mixed reactions 
ranged from "It's great" to "I ca.'1't even say it, let alone what it is." It had the potential to 
alienate many people, but that turned out to be a small matter compared to what was 
brewing. This is shown by this excerpt from the KSTP Contact Log: 
"Sally Smith called with some questions (initially) about the Flyer. Sally 
works for Regional Public Relations, and has CIS as one of her clients. Sally 
and I spoke 3 times today about this matter. This entry will capture all 3 
conversations. 
Her initial questions were about details of the distribution of the Flyer: how 
many copies, and at what cost. I replied 3800 copies and that I didn't have a 
cost figure. 
She told me that there is a policy that internal company organizations are not 
to distribute newsletters, except for the single exception U S WEST Today. 
Employee communications are supposed to be in memo fonnat 
The policy originated with U S WEST Inc., and Sally stressed that Jim Hicks 
supports it strongly. 
I responded that I would talk about the matter with Sid and give her a call 
back. Sid and I agreed to ask Sally 3 questions: 
(1) how can we work with Sally to get our message out? 
(2) what distinguishes memo format from a newsletter? 
(3) could we send Flyers inside U S WEST Today? 
Sally's responses: 
(1) Sally would be happy to work with us to produce a better memo. She 
objected to several attributes of the Flyer: the title, inaccessible language, no 
clear motivation for the information, no call back number (I put my e-mail 
address). 
(2) A newsletter has a masthead. A memo does not (she saw right thru me 
when I asked about multiple fonts or multiple columns). More below .•.. 
(3) We could be featured in a special U S WEST Today Bulletin, but the 
content would be in Sally's control, and this could only happen once. 
The goal of the policy is to cut back on junk mail in in-baskets. 
The last point stimulated my third call with this question: if the goal is cutting 
back on junk mail, why write a policy about the fonnat of communications? 
Sally agreed that the target is somewhat off the mark of the real target. But 
there are no facilities for generating specialized mass mailings. Sally 
recommends: specialized mailings to those who "want and need to know", or 
using e-mail heavier. 
Sally promised to send me a copy of the guidelines as soon as a CIS version 
is completed. 
Sally ended, by waffling a bit She pointed out that the policy is a guideline, 
that no one would get "their paycheck taken away" by publishing a newsletter. 
(See entry for George Swanson for follow up on that point)." 
The following quote captures the related conversation with George Swanson, 
Director of Employee Communications: 
----------------------------------_ ... 
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He was very cordial, said he recognized that my group had some information 
to disseminate, but that he had gotten complaints about the Flyer from the VP of 
PRo Did I know about the policy on newsletters. 
I discussed the two problems I have had with the Flyer: its improper 
distribution by CDC and the variance with the guideline. George was glad to 
hear that I had already been in contact with Sally Smith. and said he would 
report that fact to the VP. 
I stated to him that the Flyer would not go out to all managers in the future, 
that its fonnat would probably undergo some change, and that the first issue 
was still in the process of going out (to eastern and central regions) in the 
original format. 
I made reference to Sally's statement that the guideline was just that, and he 
corrected me, using statements like "firm policy" and "Tim Moore doesn't like 
newsletters." I reassured him that Sid would check out the matter with Hicks 
and that we would work with Sally for the next edition." 
Next came the official word about the memorandum versus newsletter incident, 
coming through the formal chain of command: 
''FROM: Bill 
SUBJECI': Epistemological Flyer 
I underestimated the impact the flyer would have. It would seem there is 
some type of ban on newsletters and this looks like a newsletter. Someone 
gigged Hicks for allowing it and he reminded Medina that we should not be 
issuing newsletters. Please prepare a memo (be sure it looks like a memo) 
explaining ta'le pU£"ose and audience that these go to and why we are using 
paper rather than E-Mail or another form. I would like to send that back in 
response to the issue. Also, please hold up on the next issue until we get this 
resolved. Thanks" 
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By now, the KSTP staff figured that this was considered a very important matter by 
some people. Here is the KSTP response: 
"The purpose of the newsletter is to provide broad advertisement of the KSTP 
mission targeted to our entire client base, CIS managers and MTSs. The kind 
of information to be conveyed is entry-level for that intended audience. The 
newsletter, a technology transfer medium with a marketing flavor, sits at one 
extreme of the continuum of KSTP's suite of client identification initiatives. 
Other initiatives on that continuum range from broad to narrow in focus: 
TI Satellite Symposium sponsorship 
Expert System Interest Group meetings 
USWEST AI Team activity 
Presentations at staff meetings 
Contact with targeted individual managers and MTSs 
The decision to use a paper-based medium for distributing the newsletter's 
message was based on two factors. First, due to the marketing focus of the 
information, our intent was to stimulate interest with graphics and an interesting 
fonnat, rather than just convey infonnation dryly. Secondly, coverage of all 
CIS management employees requires maili"lg labels, but the mechanism to 
generate labels is limited to broad categories of employees, not to indiviJuals, 
and certainly not to CIS employees except those served bye-mail." 
Development 
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Once a potential application matures past the consulting phase, prototyping and 
development services were offered. Because KSTP's mission was to transfer the 
technology into the CIS organization, sponsorship and development resources were to be 
provided by the application group which proposed the work. It was found that a rare 
individual is needed in the application group in order for development to proceed 
unassisted. In most cases, the strongest arrangement was a partnership between the KSTP 
staff and the application staff. This provided the synergy of technology and domain 
knowledge. and was particularly effective if the application staff had been through at least 
knowledge acquisition and knowledge engineering training. 
After a certain point in the development process, it was necessary to obtain formal 
funding and sponsorship. This satisfied the commitment deficiency described previously 
and the projects went successfully on to the next stages. 
A significant factor is the role of organizational non-participants. The issues of 
how to manage new technology within the application work group are difficult and were 
not adequately addressed: Training? Support? Time in project schedule? Managers said it 
was difficult to step back examine requirements, scope, and feasibility of new iechnologies 
because they have ajob to get done. It is made more difficult because no one provides this 
service for them nor is any training offered to help. The managers want training set-up for 
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them and plans made so they can effectively implement the plans within their group. They 
said that their jobs were much too complex for them to take on new, ill-deImed 
responsibilities. 
Other KSTP Organizational Issues 
An unusual aspect of KSTP was the reporting structure and reSQurce providers as 
reported in the T-perspective. Having three organizational sponsors had the benefit of 
providing protection from suboptimization. In the cases when a sponsor wanted to reclaim 
their resources from KSTP because other priorities came up, they had to receive 
concurrence from the other two sponsors. When budget money was not available from one 
SOUICe, it was always found in another. This had a powerfully positive effect on the 
technology transfer process, allowing it to survive many more potential disruptions than 
would have been possible under 004 straight-line organizational structure. A very real 
negative aspect of this was the perception in other CIS organizations that KSTP wa~ not 
held to budget cuts like everyone else. They were, of course, unaware of the periodic 
management challenges to the project. 
In order to effectively use three organizational sponsors, it was necessary to w( h<... 
with the entire command chains in each of them, to keep them infonned. This require"_. 
extra effort, but resulted in the previously mentioned benefits. A more time consuming 
burden was the three separate budgeting processes that were managed, although they were 
often rendered irrelevant by budget crises. Also, for personnel issues including salaries 
and bonuses, three organizational relationships were required. 
THE ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE CENTER 
111 late 1985, the Advanced Technologies organization identified and prioritized 
leading technologies which had strategic importance to U S WEST. Artificial intelligence 
was one of the key technologies, which led to the development of an AI Center concept. 
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This concept was not specifically tied to one organization, no! was it a formally unified 
organization itself. The primary organizational components of the center concept were one 
group from advanced systems research and another from expert systems development. 
This arrangement provided for numerous technology entry points into U S WEST, from 
both the early scientific stage through the applied development stage. The center concept 
was intended to provide specific products and services: 
., Product assessment and recommendations regarding existing AI 
systems and offerings. 
• Application analysis and development of AI systems, concentrating on 
expert systems requested by U S WEST companies. 
• Technology transfer, including the management of strategic alliances 
with leads in the field of AI, the acquisition of AI expertise, and the 
development of in-house expertise. 
• Applied research in knowledge-based systems, speech processing, and 
natural language processing, including liaisons with universities and 
industry. 
• U S WEST-wide consultation and coordination of AI projects to ensure 
that strategic goals are met 
The relationships among these various organizations and activities is shown in 
Figure 47, centered around the AI Center concept 
U S WEST ADVANCED TECHNOLOGIES 
Universii:ies 
& 
Applied 
Research 
Consultationl 
Coordh-':~~ion Services 
Figure 47. The AI center concept activities and relationships 
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An early role of the Expert Systems Development Group (ESDG) was to provide 
training for other U S WEST employees, as part of its technology transfer objective. In 
1988, they arranged vendor courses which were taught at U S WEST locations and they 
announced p13...118 for other training classes, with detailed course infonnation and schedules 
to be available by February 1. Much work was put into course development, but the 
course offerings never reached the anticipated ~evels because of an executive decision that 
Advanced Technologies was not going to be in the training business. 
The ESDG filled a primary role of working independently and with liaison 
organizations to find expert systems applications throughout U S WEST and develop the 
most promising systems. In late 1988, a major part of the selection criteria was if the client 
organization was willing to commit to specific funding of the development work. Staffing 
levels in the ESDG were defined as a function of the specific funding dollars available for 
salary and overhead support. This put additional emphasis on the activities required to 
attract clients, especially for large development projects. 
BElLCO~CATIONSRESEARCH 
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In recognition of the R&D needs of the nation's operating companies at divestiture, 
part of Bell Labs and part of AT&T were combined to form a new organization, Bell 
Communications Research (Bellcore). Prior to divestiture, AT&T owned the 21 operating 
companies, Bell Labs, and Western Electric. As an integrated top-down corporation, the 
goals and conduct of these corporations were orchestrated by central management. But 
when the courts created Bellcore, this central R&D corporation was owned by the regional 
Baby Bells, each with a one-seventh share. 
Bellcore has a Expert Systems Development District which was created to work 
with the seven regional companies in developing prototype and advance expert systems. 
The district is also concerned with enhancing and maintaining existing expert systems, 
primarily in the areas of telecommunications systems support. 
Relative to the Knowledge Systems Transfer Project, Bellcore did 110t playa 
significant role. KSTP staff members met with members of the Expert Systems 
Development District on two occasions and shared ideas, but a substantive working 
relationship was not established. 
VENDORS 
Because most of the external organizations affecting KSTP are vendors, there is a 
tendency to categorize them by easily identifiable technical criteria such as hardware 
platform or tool capabilities. But to do so in a rote fashion would be misleading because of 
additional organizational issues of each vendor. To guard against oversimplification, the 
vendors are classified according to their impact on the technology transfer process. 
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The Carnegi.e GrouP 
The Carnegie Group and U S WEST formed a strategic partnership which 
influenced KSTP. In essence, this agreement provided for U S WEST to receive systems 
and technology, while Carnegie was provided a fertile domain for system development In 
this way, both companies would benefit. The primary interest of KSTP was to provide 
knowledge systems capability to the IS organization. 
Carnegie had created a high performance development environment which operated 
on LISP workstations, and eventually Unix-based workstations. The company also had 
outstanding technical people, resulting from direct relationships with academic departments 
at Carnegie-Mellon University. 
In addition, their business development staff, which identified candidate projects, 
were of exemplary qualifications. They knew (as KSTP knew) that their historical 
strengths were not addressing mainstream IS needs because of the mainframe/PC 
orientation. One instance of this was a workforce scheduling system which was needed by 
the telephone operator division. A U S WEST account manager reported that Carnegie was 
.' -
interested only in the AI engine of such a scheduler. This left the delivery system issues 
open, i.e. networks, large scale implementation, etc. Even though the financials of this 
project were also against Carnegie development, the episode pointed to the need for system 
solutions instead of just one part. In another situation, the lesson learned was well 
demonstrated. A fully functional expert system was developed on a workstation, which 
was an unacceptable delivery environment for the client Carnegie (with U S WEST 
funding) ported the system to the Macintosh TM environment and developed a HyperCard™ 
interface. This system became a showcase of the value of the partnership arrangement to 
mainstream knowledge systems. 
Internally to Carnegie, there was honest recognition that they were not where they 
needed to be to serve mainstream markets. When attending a training class in Pittsburg, 
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one student observed, "The tool actually looks pretty interesting, although very pricey. It 
is a diagnosis shell, very well suited to the mechanization of failure trees. The interface is a 
bit funky, but this is no surprise once you realized that this product is built on top of their 
other tool. Parts of the new tool can be ported to a PC, but their inexperience showed 
when the instructors could barely find their way around DOS. They said they were just 
learning about PC's and knew they had a long way to go. No matter, they were sharp and 
amazingly dedicated." 
This inexperience with PC's combined with little experience in mainframes meant 
that KSTP could not directly use Carnegie's talents to address the knowledge systems 
issues of the IS organization. 
mM is another vendor with an unusual relationship with U S WEST. mM has 
been the primary supplier of IS hardware and system software for many years and has built 
strong organizational ties. Because they service and maintain so many of the CIS systems, 
they have staff on U S WEST premises with fairly unrestricted access to CIS employees. 
_ This closeness helps them serve CIS as a customer and also allows them insight into 
current operational problems. 
There are occasions when a system performance problem turns into a marketing 
opportunity. mM is very good at this and they have done this well with expert systems, as 
the following scenario indicates. 
A particular perfonnance problem existed on aU S WEST production system. A 
job was taking four hours to process, which exceeded the alloted time. mM was called in 
to look at tuning the underlying relational database and found that the database records were 
actually in rule format. They suggested receding the application into a rule-based expert 
system, using one of their software tools. 
------------ ----
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The character of the mM organization came into view when they contacted KSTP 
to tell what was being considered. mM kn~w that KSTP was the CIS expert systems 
group and thus followed pro!O\;ol by contacting them. 
The perfonnarlce problem was finally resolved, at least temporarily, by the 
purchase of more hardware. But the salient point is one of mM discovering customer 
needs by maintaining a constant, helpful presence. 
mM also established a Customer Advisory Board, which brings a number of large 
mM customers together to discuss mM tools and what the customers would like to see. 
The participating companies are from around the world and provide mM with a view of the 
market In an unusual move, mM invited U S WEST to participate on this board. U S 
WEST did not use any mainframe expert systems tools, let alone a tool developed and sold 
by mM. This was a particularly smart move because it provide a chance for mM to hear 
why a large customer of theirs did not have an expert system tool installed on a mainframe, 
instead of hearing only from those who did. 
The characteristic of mM as a legitimizing force can be seen in their marketing 
efforts. A number of CIS meetings on expert systems were only moderately attended, even 
though there had been extensive pUblicity. By contrast, when mM scheduled an 
introductory meeting on one of its expert systems tools, the session was well attended 
through mostly word of mouth advertising. The message to one observer was clear: if 
mM is doing it, then it must be for real: 
"Here was big blue talking to customers about a technology/product that they 
used internally, were excited about, and supported. They can hardly be accused 
of living on the leading edge. To my mind. the presentation symbolized the fact 
that rule-based systems are only a step away from being mainstream." 
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Other Mainframe Tool vendors 
The other vendors offering mainframe tools which were considered included 
Intellicorp, AlCorp, and AlON. All of these org!1I1izations lack the infiltrative capabilities 
of mM, but offered some technical benefits. 
Intellicorp offered their development environment, KEE, for mM mainframes 
through a joint marketing agreement with ffiM. KEE was regarded by KSTP as one of the 
best tools available on its original workstation platform, but was questionable in the 
mainframe world. Indeed the workstation version of KEE which resided with KSTP had 
been relegated to disuse for two primary reasons: 1) KSTP clients did not want workstation 
based tools and 2) KEE was a direct competitor of the Carnegie Group workstation 
product. 
AlON and AICorp products were both strong technical performers, having been 
formed and developed by ex-ffiM employees. But as one U S V,,'EST employee said, "I'm 
r -
concerned about their even being in business a couple years from now. We can't affOrd to 
be left with marginally supported tools once we get them integrated into our production 
systems." In spite of those concerns, the performance of the tools and the willingness of 
the companies to provide access to their products for testing were an important part of the 
KSTP mainframe tool project. 
OTHER GROUPS 
A number of other groups had an effect on the technology integration effort. either 
through their active role or by their absence. 
The Media 
As with all other segments of the general population, CIS staff has been exposed to 
significant numbers of the popular press articles discussing the "wonder" of AI. "thinking 
---------------------------- -
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machines", seemingly magic solutions, and the ability to displace workers. Many of these 
articles are intended to grab the readers attention, which sells newspapers and magazines. 
But whHe doing so, these articles prey on the misbeliefs about machine intelligence, as was 
discussed in Chapter ill. 
In a media example specifically concerning U S WEST, one commercial report 
covering AI in telecommunications told about its expectations of "the company to be one of 
the top two [regional companies] in the area of internally deployed systems." The report 
talks of work-in-progress and describe expert systems applications as "actual or soon-to-
be-actual," at a time when almost all applications were in the latter category. U S WEST 
internal media representation of work also reflected this optimism. Company publications 
were very good at taking raw material provided by the knowledge systems groups, 
transfonning it into a consumable fonn, and effectively delivering it to U S WEST 
employees. 
AI Teams 
About every six months, either the KSTP or the ESDG sponsored a U S WEST AI 
Team conference, which took the form of two days of panel discussions, presentations, 
and demonstrations. The intent of the conferences was to provide infonnation sharing on 
tools, applications, techniques, and such things as sponsor support. By all measures, the 
conferences met or exceeded the expectations of the attendees. 
However, the AI Team conferences did not have the organizational impact that was 
possible. The attendance at these meetings were about 30 to 40 people for a company of 
65,000 employees. Contrast this with Boeing conferences which have attendance of 600 
for an employee body of about 140,000, which is about 10 times the attendance. The 
reasons for some of this disparity will become clear in the cross-cuing analysis. 
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Lookers and Talkers 
Recall the effect of these two groups on KSTP consulting activities, which hinted. 
about the large effect these groups had on the technology integration process. The lookers 
consisted of people who repeatedly inquired about the technology but did not proceed past 
this point. For the technology integration staff (KSTP in this case), these people were 
required to have been viewed as legitimate potential users of knowledge systems. As such 
they were given the consultations, training, reading material, etc. that they might need. It 
was only after extended resource expenditure by KSTP that these people were seen for 
what they were: lookers. 
Talkers were one step better. They were often, but not always, people who had 
passed through the looker behavior class. These people proposed some type of prototype 
and acquired the tools and training to begin work. In some cases, the work did not begin, 
with the person always having something else higher on the work priority stack. It was 
common to hear, "My boss won't let me get to it." In other cases, prototype development 
did commence, but follow through was lacking. The causes for both types of talkers were 
often the work priority issue, but occasionally were issues of training and lacking of 
fundamental understanding of the technology. When any delay situation occurred. with the 
talkers, the minimum impact on KSTP was resource diversion for monitoring the prototype 
effort. More frequently, the impact was more severe, including direct consultation on 
knowledge representation, tool features, knowledge acquisition, and project management. 
In both the looker and talker situations, the common point was KSTP resource 
consumption which produced no benefit for the CIS or U S WEST organizations. 
TechnQpromoters, Blue-Skyers, Turf Protectors 
A technopromoter is not a particularly helpful person because of the focus on the 
technology, rather than the contributions to the business. This behavior is often 
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characterized as "a technology looking for a problem." Technopromoters a..--e very 
interested in the technology, and therefore tend to imbalance the technology-push, market-
pull process with all push, no pull. 
Closely related to the technopromorers are the blue-skyers. The major difference is 
that the blue-skyers are much more oriented towards science fiction applications of the 
technology, and do not do anything toward actually working with their ideas. Recalling Ed 
Roberts' critical functions staffing model, it is clear that an idea generator is an essential 
part of the technology integration process, which is a role that could be played by the blue-
skyers. However, there must be a link with the entrepreneur in order for the idea to have 
some benefit. Blue-skYers do not even attempt to make this link. The bottom line is that 
their relationship with the technology is viewed by others as "hot air" and superficial. This 
can damage the reputation of the technology. 
Turf-protectors react to a new technology in the same fashion as any other threat to 
their turf, doing anything they can to minimize the danger. 
Interestingly, there were very few members of any of these groups found during 
the course of the technology integration project. This was a very positive aspect for KSTP, 
CIS, and U S WEST. 
CHAPTER 7 
THE PERSONAL PERSPECITVE 
The personal (P) perspective is the most difficult perspective to obtain. A major 
question an investigator faces is the distinction between a person making a statement that 
reflects either the organizational or the personal view. How does one know which is 
which? Personal motivations and aspirations playa major part of the P-perspective. 
Elusive qualities such as leadership, charisma, personality, power, and strength come into 
play. 
P-perspective actors shape the use of new technology to a great degree. What does 
this offer to the total analysis? First, is that it can serve as a precursor to the organizational 
perspective, in that organizations are composed of individuals. Second, some individuals 
exhibit such strong behavior that they dominate a situation, dwarfing the role of the 
T-perspective and the O-perspective. Third, the communication of complex issues may be 
more effective from the P-perspective, such as brief stories or quotes. Finally, at a 
minimum, the personal actors are participants in the adoption of new technology and can 
therefore add to the understanding of the entire process. 
Each of the individuals who were identified as key figures in the technology 
integration process had their distinct impact on KSTP. The following list provides some 
examples of what was looked for: 
o The degree of personal stake in the project or the technology 
• How much power the person had over the project 
• The effect of the project or technology on one's career 
• The change in a person's work due to the project or technology, e.g. 
was it made harder/easier 
• What changes occured in the way decisions were made 
• Did the person take a visible stand on the project or technology 
• How was a person's career objectives affected 
o What personality traits influenced the project 
• A person's risk inclinations 
o Type of time discounting profIle 
• How much was the person affected by sunk costs 
• A person's vulnerability to influence from others 
• The use of decision avoidance strategies, if any 
These factors, and perhaps others, contribute to the attempt to understand key 
behaviors and elusive qualities such as leadership ability, charisma, and intuition. 
IDENTIFYING THE PLAYERS 
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A logical place to look for individuals to investigate for the P-perspective is the 
organization chart. Figures 39 and 40 (Chapter V) provide the names and organizational 
positions of 6 executives who had important roles in the KSTP process. They are: 
o Louis Schroder, Department Head of Computing & Communications 
• Alan Medina, Director of Application Support Services 
• Doug Gunter, Director of Marketing Applications 
o Donald Malek, Department Head of Application Services 
o Jim Hicks, Vice-President of CIS 
• Tony Pearch, Department Head of Planning 
While these people were easy to identify due to their formal position, there were a 
number of people who emerged over time from less obvious formal positions. Their 
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emergence was due to other critical roles they played, in situations that greatly affected the 
technology integration process for better or for worse. These people included: 
• Bob Habennan, Vice-President of Advanced Technologies 
• John Fitzpatrick, industrial external consultant 
• Bill Hoyt, Training Director 
• Kathy Dobbs, Director of Billing Applications 
• Ron Garcia, Manager of the Information Systems Technology Group 
• Glen Dillon, Head of the Expert Systems Development Group 
• Alvin Vail, also Head of the Expert Systems Development Group 
• Sid Thompson, Head of the Knowledge Systems Transfer Project 
• Mike Janzen, Training Instructor 
• Mark Tyson, a knowledge engineer 
• Gary Ashley, CIS programmer/analyst 
• Andy Shuler, an mM marketing person 
Each of these individuals had a significant impact on the technology integration 
process within CIS, either through their actions or lack of them. The items described have 
been selected to provide the basis for examining the dynamics of KSTP in the cross-cuing 
analysis that follows in Chapter vm. 
Louis Schroder. Dcgpartment Head of Computing & Communications 
Louis was, in the U S WEST environment, a very unusual person because he did 
his day-to-day job and wa~ also a very forward, long-term thinker. 
He was a strong supporter of KSTP from the idea stage, thus had a high degree of 
personal stake in its success. This didn't prevent him from making good business 
decisions, such as in the case of one major project that had wavering support from those 
who would benefit most: 
"Louis was most interested in the project, whether we were going to go 
forward with it. He was unaware of the project management problems and the 
lukewann interest from the client, but did know some decisions had to be made 
about future work on it. We agreed that if Young et al, didn't want to do it we 
were not going to waste our time and money on it. Instead, he found the other 
projects very interesting. seemed quite pleased that we are finding such 
diversity in application of the technology." 
Of course in the project in question, a significant amount of money had already 
been spent, but the sunk costs did not affect Louis from making the prudent decision. 
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As one of the original formal sponsors, Louis had a large amount of power over the 
project, but always used it in support of making the project successful. A number of times, 
KSTP was challenged by executives needing money and personnel. Louis would say, 
"What would they do with such highly trained people'?" He became the hidden executive 
champion for KSTP, the one who was privy to all of the major issues throughout the 
process. 
When project decisions needed to be made he let the project staff make them, then 
backt:d them up. He was able to do this because he made efforts to get to know the people 
on the project. By doing this, he had personal confidence in what they were doing. He 
also believed in allowing people to use their own judgement, and accepting the 
responsibility and the consequences that resulted. 
Being towards the end of his career, he did not have to concern himself with the 
effect of the project on his future. This situation also made it possible for him to perceive 
KSTP and the technology as having little impact on his workload; it was simply another 
facet of his job that needed the same type of attention he gave to other facets. So his 
decision style remained constant for the duration of the project. 
He had the years of experience to skillfully balance short-Mid-long term needs and 
was not afraid to take risks. These traits were most unusual because of the existing 
corporate culture and the fact that Louis had ne3Jl"ly 40 years of Bell System experience. 
Most managers become assimilated into the risk averse, short-term, conservative roles 
encouraged by years of regulated business. Somehow, Louis bucked this phenomena. 
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With his strong sense of how to do business, it follows quite logically that Louis 
was invulnerable to outside influences on the course of KSTP. He had his own monitoring 
capabilities and was fully prepared to hold his position when necessary. With great 
knowledge of the CIS organization, he did not need to avoid decisions. When KSTP 
status reports were issued periodically, he was the only executive who, on his own 
initiative, sent a response saying, "Leave me on the distribution list I want to know about 
KSTP status." 
Alan Medina. Director of Awlication SUlWOrt Services 
Another of KSTP founding sponsors, Alan was rather removed from the issues, 
not seeming to understand the technology nor the issues about the technology integration. 
He was most comfortable in the old management style and retreated to Bell System 
style SOP's in most situations, or relied on a fellow executive to lead the way. In this 
mode, he was willing to listen to employee concerns and pass the~ up the rank. 
He had a fair amount of power over the project in a formal sense, but did not 
exercise it any further than letting KSTP function independently. 
When decisions had to be made, he relied entirely on information provided to him 
in direct response to a request He did not have the general monitoring skills to learn about 
the organization, did not practice MBW A, and was not technically proficient 
He was a proponent of the project primarily as one who already had software tool 
support in his organization, so this was a reasonable fit In the face of budget cuts, 
however, he did not have the personal understanding of the project to take his own stand. 
Instead, he relied on subordinates to prepare background data and tell him what his position 
was. 
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Without personal understanding, he was risk averse in almost all situations. When 
strategic decisions had to be made, he displayed uncomfortable behavior, but would say to 
himself out loud, "We just can't go on cutting out the future forever." Lack of 
understanding also made him very receptive to influence from others. One manager gave 
the advice. "Go tell Schroder what you need, ask him to tell Medina, and Medina will do it, 
just because Schroder said so." 
Alan retired 16 months into the project so he had no personal stake or career effects 
from the degree of success of KSTP. 
Doug Gunter. Director of Marketing Applications 
Doug was a founding sponsor of KSTP, but was the most difficult to arrange 
meetings with. A clue to his modus operandi can be found in that he was one of the few 
executives who maintained control of their meeting calendar. He liked to be in control of 
things. 
His positive effect on KSTP was minimal and most of the significant effect was 
negative, as a result of resource issues. 
Doug provided one technical employee (including salary) to the project All 
sponsors supposedly agreed to funding the expenses of their sponsored employees, but 
Doug said he wasn't going to, that it wasn't what he'd agreed to. Budget contention for 
these expenses lasted throughout the project, which was yet another drain on KSTP 
resources in both time spent and expenses covered from other budget sources. At one 
point, Doug agreed to 1989 expense funding for the st1..4f person, but this was not 
communicated down the chain of command. 
There was speculation from the beginning that people in Gunter's organization were 
miffed because KSTP did not reside in their organization. The problems were so extensive 
that Gunter was asked if this was an issue. He denied that it was. Indeed, on all issues 
other than personnel and budgets, Doug was very helpful and a source of many good 
ideas. 
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KSTP issues did not have an effect on Doug's career. He retired 14 months into 
the project. 
Donald Malek. Department Head of Application Services 
Don Malek was hired from mM just before KSTP was initiated. He was a very 
outgoing person, sincerely interested and eager to help people achieve. 
Concerned about the lack of use of new technologies in his organization, he saw 
knowledge systems as an important one. From this angle, he had a personal interest in its 
success. He took a visible stand advocating not only the use of knowledge systems, but 
development of the infrastructure to support the technology. 
Don had formal budget contr~l over part of the project but deferred to his 
subordinates for project control. He actually exerted more influence by asking traditional 
IS project teams to consider the use of knowledge systems as part of their project. 
He viewed his subordinates' successes as his successes, so he worked to help 
people attain goals. It was in this way that the project had an effect on his career. He took 
the professional evolution of his organization, and the individuals within it, as a top priority 
objective. As such, his career was dependent on the degree of evolutionary success. 
Knowledge systems was one small part of his responsibilities and as such, contributed to 
the attainment of his personal career objectives. 
His job had been made a little harder by the technology integration process due to 
issues on which he had to make decisions and the time it took for him to understand those 
issues. To manage this, he trusted his subordinates to make many decisions. In situations 
where significant financial or organizational issues had to be decided, the subordinates 
provided him with the alternatives and he made clear-cut decisions in a timely fashion. 
-.------
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He was willing to take risks because he saw risk as a way to make progress. His 
willingness was greatest in people and technical areas, but was constrained in financial 
areas by corporate budget churning. This affected his time discounting profile because he 
was short-Mid-long range balanced on his own, but forced towards the short term by short 
term corporate finance problems. 
Other than such large impacts, Don was fairly invulnerable to influence from others 
on issues that he has good command. This is not to be confused with stubbornness or 
other negative characteristics. If he knows what he's doing, he'll do it. If he needs input 
from others, he'll get it He does not avoid decisions unless he sees benefit in letting more 
information come in as time passes, if he sees a half-baked situation, or if there is no 
compelling reason for a quick decision. 
Jim Hicks. Vice-President of CIS 
Jim Hicks rose up from the IS ranks to assume the vice-presidency. His behavior 
is very pleasant and non-confrontive, so KSTP interactions with him were enjoyable but 
not always beneficial. 
As manager of a large organization that has experienced much tunnoil (see Chapter 
Vl), Jim was very overloaded and had developed a support staff and coping strategies to 
deal with the extreme dynamics of CIS. 
One strategy is management by consensus, which was a difficult task given the 
amalgamation of companies that had been forced into one by divestiture. At times it 
appeared that CIS just needed some tough decisions to be made, to end the warring 
factions. Sometimes the search for consensus was viewed as a decision-avoidance 
strategy. 
It was within the context of this extremely busy executive that KSlP was 
operating, but it was a satisfactory relationship because Jim was very supportive whenever 
support was requested. However, he had little personal initiative to fmd out how the 
project was progressing, unless there were occasions when a vendor or other company 
executives wanted to know what CIS was doing with expert systems. 
180 
He did not practice "management by wandering around," and therefore did not 
receive the infonnal infonnation that he could have. But in the context of KSTP, this did 
not matter because he had little personal stake in the project or the technology, specifically. 
Generally, though, he wanted to see people succeed and, of course, his organization 
perform well, so he did care about both the people and the project. 
He had little power over the project due to non-involvement. His major 
contribution to the project was to encourage relationships with other companies, primarily 
telephone companies. 'What are the other regionals doing?" he would ask. He perceived 
the telephone companies to have much to share because of the common aspects of our 
business. 
KSTP nor knowledge systems were perceived by Hicks to have an impact on his 
work, due to his short time horizon, dealing with operational issues. He couldn't see the 
long range impact of knowledge systems, because of the level of detail that was required to 
understand the technology. But even without knowing this, his intuition told him that the 
technology was important and we had to have some effort underway to put expert systems 
to work in CIS. Even without specific understanding, he had the ability to see when 
something just seemed right, provided he was given a sufficient amount of information. 
Without the infonnation, he appeared risk averse, especially in technological areas, 
less so in financial areas. He did not have assistants with technological strengths, but had 
good support in the :fmancial areas, which promoted his involvement in the that arena. 
Tony Pearch. Department Head of Planning 
Tony Pearch was interviewed only once for this research and did not have a formal 
role that was directly relevant to KSTP. In that one interview, however, he articulated 
some very insightful personal views. 
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The first was that he was pleased that CIS was integrating a news technology in 
such a coherent, organized manner. He felt that all too often, the organization dabbles in 
new technology with no plan and no goals. 
Second was the two year time limit in the KSTP charter. He stated that two years is 
plenty of time to fmd out if a technology has applications in our organization. 
Third and last was his strong, emphasized statement that CIS is nothing more that a 
production system, like a factory, mat has a difficult job to do to meet its production goals. 
With this model of the business, he said there was no time for dawdling with anything. 
We must identify a new technology, plan how to test it, decide what to do with it, then d.:~ 
it. 
These were some of the most precise views on what CIS did and how it should be 
done that was reported by any executives. He had his convictions on how things should be 
run and they were well-reasoned. 
Bob Haberman. Vice-President of Advanced Technologies 
As VP of Advanced Technologies, Bob's effect on KSTP were indirect, primarily 
through the views he communicated throughout other organizations (including CIS) and the 
Expert Systems Development Group which was within his span of control. 
In a presentation to a large group of m~nagers, he listed his choices for strategic 
technologies for U S WEST, emphasizing that they were his opinion. He listed: 
o Relational, object-oriented, and semantic model databases 
• Database machines 
o Distributed processing 
o Voice response systems 
• Network management technology 
When someone asked him where expert systems came in, he somewhat grudgingly 
said, 
"Yeah, I guess should have mentioned that. It has been so isolated, but now 
it is being integrated. This is good for distributed processing." 
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Conversations with the ESDG staff told of their feeling of lack of support for the 
technology from Haberman. So they invited him to a staff meeting to see where he stood, 
and he told them he was not a strong supporter of the work they were trying to do. 
It is curious that he was able to list any te~hnologies because of his views on how 
CIS was helping U S WEST to compete in the telecommunications industry: 
"All RBOC's49 are copying each other and we are not competitive for most 
revenue streams. We differentiate ourselves on cost control, not product 
difference. We are more concerned with existence than with revenues." 
This view immediately reduces the attraction to new technologies because of the 
short-term costs involved.50 
John Fitmatrick. Industrial External Consultant 
John Fitzpatrick played an interesting role in KSTP because he served as a 
consultant to US WEST while employed in industry. His consulting role was to help CIS 
define their strategy to develop expert systems. As he was working with the CIS Research 
Committee on Expert Systems (RCES), U S WEST was considering hiring John to lead 
what eventually was called KSTP. 
Due to this situation, he had a high degree of personal stake in both the technology 
and the early phases of the project. As an external consultant with experience in expert 
systems development, he also had influence on the recommendations made by the RCES. 
And if employment negotiations would have worked out, the prqject would have been 
critical to John's career. 
His industrial experience was within a huge organization where work was 
distributed among various subunits. which resulted in local organizational support for AI. 
49Regional Bell Operating Companies 
5DMonths later. Haberman had reversed his position, but this was to too late to 
affect KSTP. 
In his opinion, there was lots of replication of work and little coordinatiQq of activities. 
The various groups competed for money for startup and research funding. 
John was very high on his company's training program, saying that it was so 
strong that they had large contracts with other major companies to provide AI technical 
training services. 
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John's company also had experience with a training program in which an employee 
would come from another department with an AI problem to work on, do six months of 
course work and then six months of work on their project. They would return to their 
home office and complete the project There turned out to be problems with this approach -
to use John's borrowed phrase - "seeds need nurturing." When a person got back to their 
job with a prototype written in a high-priced shell which ran on a high-priced workstation. 
they found that few organizations were likely to spend the money needed to acquire such an 
environment. With litde home department support for the trainees, many projects did not 
proceed into production. 
So if John had total control of an expert systems organization he would use: 
1. A small research group, to collect useful things in the literature, do 
experiments, explore. 
2. A support group, to do tool evaluation, identify directions, and take 
needs to vendors. 
3. A project support group, to identify successful candidate applications 
for development, get projects started, possibly do some development, 
and facilitate integration with existing software. 
One of John's major issues was that it was extremely important for these groups to 
fit in with existing groups and organizations, so that people would know where to go for 
the services they needed and so that turf issues were minimized. 
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Bill Hoyt. Training Director 
The CIS training organizations were located in the cities of Omaha, Nebraska, 
Denver, Colorado, and Bellevue, Washington, corresponding to the old Northwestern 
Bell, Mountain Bell, and Pacific Northwest Bell telephone companies. When the 
consolidation moves came, the transformation for the training groups was more significant 
than for most groups. The groups were excised from CIS, placed in another U S WEST 
organization called Learning Systems, which provided technical and non-technical training 
for all U S WEST departments. 
Bill Hoyt was the director of the Bellevue training group and was selected to lead 
the entire computer-related training organization for Learning Systems. 
He was a manager in the tradition of the Bell System, excellent at controlling costs, 
but occasionally at a superficial level. This was sometimes at the expense of important 
work and sometimes at the expense of employee morale. On one occasion, an instructor 
was scheduled to teach a number of courses in another city over a two week period. She 
decided to stay over the weekend because flying half-way across the country (with hub 
stops) would take too much time. Bill told her if she wanted to do that, she would have to 
pay for the weekend's hotel bills out of her own pocket. Never mind the fact that two 
nights of hotel was less tha.'1 the cost of an additional round-trip air fare. There was 
speculation that the "misunderstanding" about the travel options was because the instructor 
was from a city different that Hoyt. Therefore, he didn't know her, didn't know her boss, 
and didn't have the personal basis on which to make a decision. 
Bill was very loyal to those with whom he had rapport and were loyal to him. For 
these people, he would see to it that there needs were satisfied. He knew that they could be 
trusted because they had earned his trust. 
He operated heavily on personal relationships because he did not have a good 
understanding of the technology about which his organization was training. Years ago, he 
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very seriously asked Sid Thompson, "What does math have to do with computers anyhow? 
It seems like people just try to get fancy with what there doing, and make problems harder 
than they really are." 
Bill's stake in knowledge systems technology was very low. He knew he had to 
provide the training seIVices needed, but to him it was just another part of t.~e training 
regimen. He knew the capabilities and role of his organization and offered to provide all of 
the infrastructure needed to deliver internal training courses and to work with external 
training vendors. 
He did not have any career aspirations tied to knowledge systems nor to any other 
technOlogy, organization, or person. This was made obvious by his retirement 15 months 
into the project. 
Kathy Dobbs. Director of Billing Awlications 
Kathy Dobbs had spent a number of years in non-technical management positions 
with a number of Bell System companies. In early 1988, she returned to a Director 
position in CIS and had responsibility for certain telephone bill operations which showed 
great potential for the application of expert system technology. 
The significant effect Kathy had on KSTP was sincere enthusiasm for working 
with any technology or procedure that would help her organization perform better. The 
first hint of her behavior is captured in this email note to Sid Thompson, after he had given 
an overview of expert systems and KSTP to Kathy'S staff managers: 
"You were great! Thank-you for the presentation and the support. Folks are 
already preparing their ideas and forms. I hope you're ready for this group. We 
would also like to stay close to the work you are doing for [other operations 
groups] since our [operations group] is comparable." 
Shortly after this, another KSTP staff member had this obseIVation about Kathy's 
aggressive ideas: 
"Kathy is very excited about building an ES application that will actually 
mechanize some part of their duties. She is not interested in merely some 
sort of advisor or help-desk kind of application. They see that as merely 
documentation. " 
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She was one of the few directors who saw the value of the technology and followed 
through with it She ensured that her staff made time to talk \\tith KSTP knowledge 
engineers. When one of her technical employees created a prototype of a very important 
system, two KSTP staff members met with her. Further applications in her group were 
discussed and she asked a question that had never been asked by any other client of KSTP. 
"With all that you are doing for us, what can we do to help you succeed in your mission?" 
The KSTP staffers were shocked and pleased at the same time, and responded that the best 
way was to make sure her people had the time and priority to develop a production system. 
She agreed and within two months, that prototype was in production. 
Ron Garcia. Mana&er of the Infonnation Systems Technology Group 
Ron Garcia was one of the original visionaries behind the Knowledge Systems 
Transfer Project. He was manager of a new technology group whose mission was to 
identify and exercise new technologies, then spin off sub-groups or individual people into 
other organizations for further technology integration. He had a high degree of personal 
stake in the project because expert systems work had been perfonned in his group, and was 
being spun off. 
Because he was managing the people who were using expert systems, he was in a 
powerful position to influence the course the technology was to take. Fer example, it was 
primarily Ron who tried to lure John Fitzpatrick into U S WEST and Ron was the focal 
point on the Research Committee on Expert Systems. 
His influence was not limited to the early stages because, as a spin-off from his 
group, the degree of success of KSTP would have some impact on his career. It was his 
responsibility to spin off a technology when he felt it was ready and to provide the 
organizational setting for the spin-off that would help its likelihood of success. 
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In the planning stages, expert systems were clearly an additional burden to Ron's 
workload, but he realized that a successful spin off would reduce his workload and 
increase the chances of expert system deployment in CIS. Driven by both personal and 
professional desire to perfonn well. he spent much of his time creating a strong 
organizational coalition that would nurture the technology integration process. The charter 
and its multiple sponsor structure (Appendix C) is the result of his effor..s, and showed his 
keen understanding of organizational dynamics and his practical sense about what would 
and wouldn't work. 
A final key point about Ron Garcia was his predisposition towards significant 
fonnal education. He held a doctorate, which led many people to believe that his bias 
originated from his own accomplishments. Deeper inspection showed this not to be true. 
His own fonnal education simply raised his awareness about the benefits of having a solid 
understanding of computer scieklce disciplines. With a strong foundation, the changing 
technologies manifested in vendor products are much more coherent and better choices can 
be made for CIS. So while Ron was biased towards fonnal education. it was rooted in his 
belief in the functional benefit of having knowledge. He was able to promote formal 
education in his role of administrator of U S WEST's Advanced Technical Education 
Program. 
Glen Dillon. Head of the Expert Systems DevelQPment Group 
The AI Center concept discussed in Chapter VI included the Expert: Systems 
Development Group as a major component. Glen was head of this group during the first 
part of KSTP's existence and had a major role in the partnership between the two groups. 
In the initial charter of KSTP, Glen was one of the founding sponsors, in which he 
agreed to contribute expense dollars, head count. and/or equipment. Also, the 
Memorandum of Agreement (Appendix C) stated that Glen's group was to provide strategic 
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direction. This did not occur. When asked about his funding of worthy tasks in CIS, his 
response was, "The emphasis is on worthy." 
Glen had the opportunity to provide guidance to KSTP in its early stages because 
ESDG had been operating for over a year, giving him a fairly good base of experience. 
When explicitly asked for ideas, none were offered. Why was this? 
The first clues surfaced at a large industry conference in August, 1988. Twice 
members of the KSTP staff crossed paths with Glen, with no other people in sight. He did 
not even acknowledge their presence. 
Suddenly, in August, he began questioning what KSTP's measurements and 
deliverables were .. In response to his inquiry about this, he was asked by KSTP to provide 
some guidance: 
"We'd welcome input from ESTG's measurements and deliverables to make 
our's compatible and complementarily effective. Let's send each other copies 
of ours, look them over, and see if we are light-years apart. We like the idea of 
helping each other out." 
No response, but Glen agreed to meet in September to discuss the issues. Prior to 
meeting, Glen's behavior was very icy, so he was asked if something was wrong: 
"Glen also admitted that he is bugged about something, and was somewhat 
surprised that it was showing in his email. However he said he didn't want to 
talk about it until he had a chance to think about it, fearing that he would give an 
incorrect impression of his concerns. He agreed to call today or tomorrow." 
He never called. Concern over this prompted discussions in CIS on what should 
be done and how strong the relationship between the two groups should be: 
"Continuing problems communicating with Glen. He does not answer direct 
email questions, has not returned phone calls, and, when confronted, says 
something is bothering him, but he's not ready to talk about it This has gone 
on since the second week in August. We scheduled a meeting on Sept 26 to 
talk about goals, success factors, etc. but this does not address the behavior of 
late. Or maybe the substantive issues ARE the problem. 
At any rate, not talking about these problems is causing problems for ESTG, 
thus indirectly KSTP. However, we are charging ahead full speed with our 
work so we are not directly suffering. 
We're hoping Glen will open up before 9/26 so we can get this distraction 
behind us and make some headway in t.lte meeting. 
Bill did SPECULATE that possible problems could be 1) viewing KSTP as 
competition,2) inferiority perceptions, 3) unknown (to us) top-down directives 
within AT, 4) uncomfortable with relaxed management style, 5) desire for more 
control. This is just general speculation about what would cause someone to 
behave as such, and Bill emphasized that he doesn't know what's going on 
either. 
On the control issue, Bill specifically stated that KSTP is an autonomous CIS 
project and will remain so. Glen's role is advisory at most." 
1 QO 
.Lv ..... 
When the meeting finally occurred, the issues were rather trivial and were resolved 
within two hours. One issue was an expert system client who had told Glen that they 
didn't like the service they had received from KSTP. Interestingly enough, this same client 
had asked KSTP for help, saying they >.vere dissatisfied with the service t.ltey had received 
fonn ESTG. The major point with this was that the issue was small, but the way it was 
handle was detrimental to both ESTG and KSTP. To loosen up, Sid Thompson, head of 
KSTP, suggested they go play golf. While waiting in the clubhouse to tee off, Sid frankly 
told Glen thal~ if such issues arose in the future, just pick up the phone and air them, for all 
of our benefill:. Glen did not respond and would not make eye contact. 
Some: month later, one of the ESTG staff members was chatting with the KSTP 
staff and rev(~a1ed some startling insight into Glen's role as leader of ESTG. She said he 
was so insec\1Ire with expert systems that he spent his first few months in the job learning 
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the technology instead of fulfilling his management role. She felt that the group lost its 
momentum and languished for these months, suffering lost leadership and a delay from 
which it would never recover. Further investigation resulted in comments of this tone: 
"He is the sort of guy that you can't really get to know because he doesn't 
open up to you. He is certainly not easy and comfortable to talk with." 
"Glen was a charlatan. It was clear to me that he never new what was going 
on but was able to create the fa~ade of being knowledgeable. When he was put 
in the position of having to perform, he didn't have the real knowledge to pull it 
off." 
''He may have technical abilities, but I would never be able to respect him as a 
manager." 
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With these underlying currents, it wasn't long until an ESTG staff person contacted 
KSTP and told of Glen's imminent departure. Sid Thompson was understandably upset. 
Here was a leadership cha.1!ge in the partner group and he was totalIy unaware of it, let 
alone having any input into a successor. Numerous calls to Glen and attempts to set up a 
lunch meeting fell on deaf ears. Electronic mail exchange was all that happened, and it is 
interesting to see in the following email the overoptimism relating to Haberman (recall he 
wasn't enamored with expert systems), CGI (they were having a tough time figuring out U 
S WEST), and the EPX project (it did not go forward): 
"Glen, 
Congrats on your new job! Sounds like a good opportunity and hopefully 
more realistic working conditions. 
What are your thoughts on the status of ESTG with the specific funding 
constraints? What's the future'? 
I think we (KSTP) can feed ESTG clients. We've got too many right now 
and growing, so some relief would be good. I'll pursue this with your 
successor. 
Also, I've met with all KSTP sponsors and Malek. and got great support. I 
talked with Don about support for ESTG projects at maintenance time, 
especially about DDAS. 
That was one of the meetings I had in Denver, too bad we didn't connect. 
Could you jot down your thoughts on the good and bad things that happened 
with ESTG during and before your tenure? It would sure help me figure out 
some of our future directions. Thanks much. 
********* 
>From Glen Mon Feb 27 18:25 PST 1989 remote from uswest To: Sid 
Subject: Who's Next? 
Date: 02/27/89 Time: 18:23:32 PST 
*** Reply to note of 02/24/89 12: 11 
From: Glen Dillon 
Subject: Who's Next? 
I got the funding problem resolved. ESTG is in no danger for the rest of 89. 
We have high level visible support from Haberman right now. It is due 
primarily to the success of the COl relationship and the success of the EPX, 
both of which are being presented to [the U S WEST president and chainnan] in 
the near future. 
If you have too much work talk to Chuck. He is acting group leader until they 
find a replacement for me. I don't really believe there are that many clients 
with viable system ideas and money but if there is we would like to help. I 
think even more important is to find a good application for CGI within ITS. 
The CGI relationship is making news at high levels. It would be a good deal all 
the way around if you could get something going with them in ITS. 
I don't really understand the question about good and bad things with ESTG. 
How about restating the question? 
At some point I want to give you my impressions about how well KSlP has 
worked out the first year (even though they are unsolicited). Maybe we can get 
together or something sometime. " 
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An interesting footnote to Olen's involvement with expert systems happened when 
he moved on to his next job. He and one of his co-workers saw a potential expert systems 
application in his new domain and contacted KSlP to participate in the Loaner Program, 
indicating that Glen still saw some potential in the technology. However the KSTP analyst 
in charge of the Loaner Program noted: 
"Given the fact that I have tools idle right now and Glen should have picked 
up enough during his stay with ESDG to have some sort of idea of whether or 
not the technology is appropriate, I am sending them a tool. But my 
expectations are fairly low that anything will really come of it" 
Four months later, nothing had. 
Alvin Vail. Head of the Expert Systems DevelQPrnent Group 
Alvin Vail was the originator of the AI Center idea at U S WEST and both preceded 
and followed Olen Dillon as the head of the ESTG. He was also the architect of t..he 
agreement with the Carnegie Group, and relations with them were his primary 
responsibility during the time he was not head of ESTG. 
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He gave cursory advice during the foonation of KSTP but was not deeply 
involved. Once KSTP was fonn~ he paid very little attention to the group. When Sid 
Thompson asked Glen Dillon why Alvin did not respond to phone calls or email, Glen 
replied, "I don't think he takes you guys very seriously." Alvin appeared to be focussed 
only on the Carnegie Group and large U S WEST issues, which was understandable given 
the superb credentials of the Carnegie Group. 
At one point, when KSTP was (unsuccessfully) trying to work through Alvin to 
contact the Carnegie Group, Brent Larson in KSTP contacted the Carnegie Group's 
principal U S WEST account manager directly. After the conversation with the manager, 
Lamar Jones, Brent reported: 
"I feel that Lamar is a valuable resource to us in that I can pick up the phone 
and get help Jl answers in regard to CGI and their activities, something that 
was not really available from you know who (nickname /dev/null51). Lamar 
was aware of the problem to which I allude above." 
/dev/null was Alvin Vail and it was interesting to see that people at the Carnegie 
Group had similar impressions. As Brent put it, "At least we know it wasn't just us!" 
Putting this in perspective, Alvin had a lot at stake for his career, both in managing 
the Carnegie relations and in managing the ESTG. He was very helpful and sincere, if you 
could get his attention. He frequently said he would do things and then would not. 
Initially, this caused problems for KSTP work flow, until the unresponsive pattern became 
clear. Then. after waiting a short while, the KSTP staff would contact someone else in 
ESTG who should have been working on the issue. Which they would have been, except 
they had never heard of it! 
In addition to personal style, much was revealed at a meeting when Alvin divulged 
his feelings about pushing expert systems technology: 
51/dev/null is the pathname for the null device in Unix™ systems, also known as 
"the bit bucket" and "a black hole." Nothing ever comes out of it. 
"1 can't totally commit myself to plans anymore, and push for what I think 
should happen. I used to and thought it would payoff, but it doesn't, not only 
in what I've worked on but everything else I've seen. So I'll pull things 
together, submit my plan, and see what they want me to do. It just takes too 
much out of me to devote myself to this." 
Sid Thompson. Head of KSIf 
Sid Thompson had a fairly high degree of personal stake in KSTP, due to his 
formal position as leader of KSTP. His leadership position came about in an unusual 
fashion, in that he was, at best, second choice for the role. The first choice was John 
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Fitzpatrick, and when negotiations with him broke down, the architects of KSTP (lead by 
Ron Garcia), were put in a pressing situation. The entire project team had already been 
assembled, executive support had been attained, and computing resources had been 
acquired. All that was needed was someone to lead the project team. It was in this urgent 
context that Sid was selected. 
Most of the project's structure and all of its tasks had been defmed by the time Sid 
began work on KSTP. On the surface, it appeared as though there would be little chance to 
deviate from previous decisions. However, Sid asked for and received complete decision-
making and budget control. This proved to be the flexibility factor that allowed later 
changes in KSTP directions. 
One of the first things Sid realized was that there was a lot of work to be done on 
many facets of the technology integration process, and he had a small staff and small 
budget to work with. This made necessary the prudent selection of tasks and the extent to 
which these tasks could be carried out 
On ta'le subject matter of knowledge systems, Sid could not have bP..en more 
pleased. In previous years, he had proposed AI applications within the company and the 
ideas had not been acted upon for a number of reasonable company, personal, and 
maturity-of-technology reasons. The opportunity to lead a significant knowledge systems 
project for a major corporation was very appealing. 
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As such, he took his job very seriousiy and worked hard to plan and execute the 
technology integration process. In doing so, his work was made harder, but because he 
felt the work was so important, the burden was not great. In fact, he perceived the work as 
easier because it was contributing to technological growth in such a big way. 
One of the more difficult tasks for Sid was to ask the technicians in KSTP to hit the 
road and sell knowledge systems concepts to CIS employees. The technicians were 
technical experts by career choice and by formal education. Giving presentations, 
popularizing knowledge systems was not what they wanted to do. In fact. one technician 
declined to participate in this phase of the project. It put stress on them, which in turn, put 
stress on Sid. They all knew the PR -type tasks had to be done, and Sid knew they were 
not the right people to be doing it. 
He looked to his partner group, ESTG, for help in this area and found great 
willingness to share the responsibilities. He looked to vendors to give controlled52 
presentations, and they were obviously willing, even though a few of them got out of 
control. He took much of the burden of the PR-type tasks himself, in order to free the 
technicians to do the tasks for which they were better. 
This resourcefulness was a trait that resurfaced time and time a.gain. He was 
constantly looking for a better way to accomplish a task, looking for opportunities and 
being prepared to use them. On his desk hung a quote from Julius Erving, the legendary 
Dr. J of basketball fame: 
"You play to daylight. Sometimes its there and you take it." 
Sid believed in a low key approach that characterizes long term, consistent 
progress. 
"You don't always make the big splash or spend your resources preparing to. 
You keep your mind open, ready to seize the chance, because in a moment, the 
door slams shut." 
52Meaning high knowledge systems content, low sales pitch. 
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As an independent thinker, Sid always had ideas on how things should have been 
done. On occasion, he had to force himself to ask for input to decisions because he knew 
what he wanted to do. While he tried to keep in mind that it was important to build 
consensus on cenain decisions, he was also bull-headed enough to keep it to himself at 
times, which undoubtedly caused some communication problems. 
Sid was inclined to take large risks when he knew he had good people and solid 
t~hnology on his side. The IS organization was the most uncertcin part, and he would 
require a significant advantage before pitting risky situations against the entrenched 
bureaucracy. 
He understood technological maturity phases, which enabled him to view 
knowledge systems with a long time horizon. He knew it would take time for the 
technology to mature, and it would take longer yet for U S WEST to fully integrate it. As 
such, he advocated strict adherence to the two year role ofKSTP, believing that a 
specialized task-oriented, transient organization must have a limited existence. Driving the 
technology into the mainstream was paramount. 
Mike Janzen. Training Instructor 
Mike Janzen was one of the training instructors who developed the internal U S 
WE~T expert systems training courses. He was selected for study due to his personal 
dynamics which had a significant effect on the integration of expert systems technology. 
To set up the exchange that follows, Mike worked in Omaha, a city that suffered 
from its own economic and image problems. Contributing to this was CIS force reduction 
and consolidation activities which removed all new IS development from Omaha. 
Employees in that city were rightfully feeling downtrodden, wondering when their job 
would be eliminated. CIS executive efforts to lessen the impacts did not calm the 
employees. 
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Knowing the sensitivity of Omaha employees, Sid Thompson took extra 
precautions before his first meeting with Mike and other instructors. He told them he 
wanted to make sure that they understood the teamwork needed to integrate expert systems 
technology, that the instructors were an essential part of the team, and that he was not 
coming to Omaha to impose anything on them. Mike responded: 
"On your note ofOee 1: I don't view you as coming in to mess up our thing. 
On the contrary, I feel that unless the people we have given the intro to are 
encouraged by your organization then we are wasting our time. The majority of 
the people have been interested and seem to feel there is potential, but are 
unsure as to how or where to proceed. 
We do not do on-line support Personal interest makes it enticing, but that is 
not our charge. We would love to provide additional training, but on-going 
consultation is not feasible. 
I perceive no need to talk prior to Thurs, however many thanks for your 
concern. 
See you soon." 
The meeting went well for all parties and no further KSTP and training interaction 
took place for six weeks. At that time, the KSTP training coordinator and Mike agreed to 
co-sign a memo on training, to be sent to all CIS directors. In the meantime, the KSTP 
training coordinator issued a memo to all CIS employees about current KSTP activities. In 
it he described training availabilities: 
"MTS's, managers, and directors seeking limited knowledge of tenninology 
and concepts can meet those needs via an overview course. Omaha is the only 
U S WEST city with in-house courses, a half day AI Overview and a two day 
Introduction to Expen Systems. Employees in other cities interested in an 
overview must use courses from outside vendors, until equivalent courses are 
available locally." 
The intent was to give positive exposure to the Omaha training staff, while pointing 
out the inaction of Denver and Bellewe staffs. Mike did not read it this way: 
"TO: Loren Sanderson, KSTP training coordinator 
FROM: Mike Janzen 
RE: Training memo of 1-25-89 
I sure hope this is not the memo we were supposed to be co-authoring, as I 
am very upset and disappointed by the implications of it I thought we had an 
honest, working relationship, but now I'm not so sure. 
In a nutshell, the wording and sequencing used in the memo presents an 
attitude that says, "Omaha has a couple of courses which are okay for THEM, 
but if YOU want something, call an outside vendor or contact me. If we can't 
work out something else, I'll set up the Omaha class for you. ". 
Computer Technology Education of Learning Systems is, by contract, the 
vendor of first choice for US WEST CIS (now ITS). I believe it has been made 
perfectly clear from the beginning that we are willing to travel to all locations in 
order to deliver the courses. Re-issuing your memo to clarify this would be 
best. 
Mary and I are both professional educators and hold Masters degrees in 
mathematics, plus further course work in other fields. In evaluating, courses 
and intended audience, we are both full-time, objective, qualified professionals. 
We believe the courses developed in the Eastern Region are of equal or better 
quality than anything on the market 
We have tried to be team players in helping to support AI and expert system 
technologies within US WEST. The technology has a great future in the world, 
but if we spend all of our time playing political games, it has no future here. 
We looked to KSTP for the leadership that was inherent in its charge. It was 
not forthcoming. On the contrary, with regard to training, we feel we have 
been leading the way. 
We, as the training group, are going-to go ahead through our training 
organizations and schedule the classes in all applicable locations. I intend to 
send a memo to all training group managers and personnel responsible for 
registrations relative to this scheduling." 
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Mike proceeded to send the following memo to all of the training coordinators and 
directors across U S WEST: 
"TO: All U S WEST Training Managers 
FROM: Mike Janzen 
RE: KSTP training memo of Jan 25, 1989 
The KSTP training memo that was issued conveys some inaccurate ideas 
about avai!abili11J 'Of AI and expert systems training. 
The memo says that non-Omaha personnel must go to outside vendors to get 
this training. This is incorrect. We have repeatedly stated that we are willing to 
deliver the courses where needed. This is still true. 
We held off on scheduling the courses outside of Omaha because we wished 
to be team players and not infringe upon KSTP's role. 
The memo also states that anyone who wants expert systems training needs to 
contact Loren Sanderson. While this is a viable aV'-'llue, it is not the only one 
that can be followed. Computer Technology Education/Leaming Systems is an 
organization that is also capable of providing options on all phases of expert 
systems training, including delivery. 
As Computer Technology Education, we are the CIS vendor of first choice by 
contractual agreement. However, we are not the only vendor to choose from, 
thus we intend to start offering CTE's AI and expert systems courses 
throughout the entire region. 
If you have any questions or comments please call me." 
In an effort to defuse the situation, Sid Thompson sent email to Mike: 
''Loren showed me your note to him about the latest E-memo and I'm 
concerned about your perception. The note just doesn't seem like it was written 
by the Mike I've worked with. We have been portraying your efforts as 
exemplary for all of the CTE centers. This includes prominent mention in our 
formal presentations in all cities. to director groups, and in my meetings with 
KSTP executive sponsors. 
You folks are the leaders and we consider you strong partners. 
Your reaction certainly caught us by surprise and we are eager to get to the 
bottom of this. I know Loren has a call in to you, but if I can be of help, call 
me." 
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Loren did talk with Mike and they cleared up the misunderstanding. KSTP was 
completely caught by surprise by Mike's reaction, but it did provide a good outcome: Mike 
was so maddened by his thoughts that CIS employees in other cities would go to external 
vendors, that he scheduled his own courses in those cities for the fIrst time. KSTP had 
been trying to get him to do it for months, but was always turned down because they didn't 
have travel money. 
This remarkable sequence of events, predicated on self-perceptions of inferiority, 
resulted in the teaching of expert systems courses across U S WEST and a very strong 
relationship between KSTP and the training group in Omaha. 
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Mark Iyson. Knowledge Engineer 
A critical part of the technology integration process is to have demonstrated success 
in the application of the technology. With KSTP, there were two individuals who played 
these important roles. 
First is Mark Tyson, a knowledge engineer in an application programming group. 
Mark developed a major prototype on a PC platfonn and followed through to developing 
another on a mainframe test system. It was his follow through that separated his efforts 
from many other expert systems practitioners. 
One reason he succeeded with his projects is that he truly enjoyed his work, simply 
for the challenge of taking this promising technology and really putting it to work. He did 
not seem to have significant fear-of-failure thoughts and did not appear to be particularly 
concerned about the impact of his work on his career. 
In his practice of the technology, Mark was really a functional part of KSTP, and in 
this sense, he had a significant impact on the course of the project. Sid Thompson had no 
formal authority over Mark's work and this independence allowed Mark to do the work as 
he saw necessary. This was very beneficial to the technology integration process because it 
was the application of expert systems in mainstream IS that KSTP needed 
Fortunately, Mark was very good at his work. His mainframe expert system 
prototype was used as a benchmark with which to test other mainframe tools. It was also 
noteworthy that this prototype located an eITOr in a production database, the first time it was 
tested. This eITOr had gone undetected by the human experts for over a year. 
Gmy Ashley. CIS Programmer/Analyst 
Gary Ashley is the second key person who put expert systems technology to work. 
His story is very simple because he is a rather quiet person, preferring to get down to work 
instead of a lot of talk and planning. 
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This personal bias is what made Gary successful in the use of the Loaner Program 
PC tool. The tool gave Gary independence from the trap of complexity and bureaucratic 
overhead. He applied for the tool loan and quietly went to work. Brent Larson was the 
KSTP consultant working with Gary, and after two months of work, Brent reported: 
"Gary and I met today, as we had scheduled about a week and a half ago. 
When we last spoke, Gary had not had enough time to look at the tool yet, and 
had only gathered rough documentation about the process. The last time we 
met, I pointed him to an example of rule control by way of the set of rules that I 
had earlier written for Sandi Roberts. He seemed to be mostly following it, but 
I was a bit disappointed then with how litde time he had managed to make for 
the project. 
I went into the meeting today with Gary sort of expecting to see more of the 
same that I have been getting from folks. "Well, I am really excited about it, 
but I just haven't been able to find the time to do anything." My general plan 
was to get directly involved with Gary in this project, perhaps doing almost all 
of the work. 
What I did see was a pleasant surprise. Gary had put together some rules as a 
cross between a demo and a prototype. He used as a case the situation that 
occurred last December. I guess that some rework had be~n necessary, and 
some expensive and time consuming mistakes were made. Gary's demo asked 
the user a few questions up front, while printing a report of advice to the 
printer. Some of the printed infonnation would be printed every time. and 
some was specific to the answers that were given during the consultation. 
I was impressed with how quickly Gary had caught on to the rule based 
paradigm. In the first several hours he was using rules that accessed external 
text fIles and dumped info to the user, based on the flow of 3J."'iSWers. He was 
also taking advantage of backward chaining to get things done, which I have 
found to typically take a person a while to catch on to. All and all, Gary's initial 
work is excellent, and it is encouraging to me to see it happen. 
I told Gary that Sid and I would be meeting with Kathy Dobbs later that day, 
and Gary said that he would try to get a hold of Kathy before that and show her 
his demo. He said that if he was not able to show her before the meeting, we 
should feel free to come grab him during our meeting and he would show her 
then." 
A month later Gary's systems was finished and put into production. His 
contribution to the project was unique because of his independent work to develop the 
application for his work group. 
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Andy Shuler. mM Marketing Person 
In Chapter VI, ffiM was described as an impottant organizational actor in 
technology integration. Within the ffiM workforce, Andy Shuler was one individual who 
contributed to KSTP through hard work and persistence. 
Quite clearly, Andy was motivated by making sales for ffiM, and as a part of that 
company, he had fairly unrestricted access to certain CIS offices. He used this access to 
look for opportunities for knowledge systems application within U S WEST, and when he 
found them, he heavily promoted ffiM solutions. 
For one knowledge system prototype, he incessantly was pulling pieces of the 
project together, getting help from his research labs, talking to the project team, trying ffiM 
tools, and presenting the project to senior CIS management. 
For a U S WEST trial of one of mM's knowledge systems tools, Andy was 
actively involved in resolving everything from contractual issues to product support issues. 
His helpfulness was to the degree that he would sometimes be perceived as a useful 
resource for KSTP, instead of a vendor trying to sell something. 
Then ffiM was setting up an international advisory board for its knowledge systems 
products, and was selecting major customers who currently used at least one mM 
mainframe knowledge systems tool. Andy fought long and hard within mM to get U S 
WEST a seat on the board, even though U S WEST did not own any ffiM knowledge 
systems tools and had no immediate plans to acquire any. Andy's work was clearly to 
ffiM's benefit because what better source is there for product improvement ideas, than a 
major customer who has substantive reasons for not buying into one of your product lines? 
Now all of this can simJ)ly be attributed to marketing tactics and dismissed. Or it can be 
seen as an important part of the technology integration process, in which a marketing 
employee of a vendor becomes an active agent in advancing the use of the technology. In 
Andy's case, it is the latter, even to the extent ofta1cing on his own company in order to 
make u~gs happen. 
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CHAPTER VIII 
INTEGRATION AND CROSS-CUING 
Each of the technical, organizational, and personal perspectives provide infonnation 
about the integration of knowledge systems technology into CIS. 'While a reader might 
recall an occasional T-perspective item when reading the P-perspective, the complexity of 
the study makes it difficult to recognize and retain connections between the various 
perspectives. 
While the capability of the human mind to store and recall disjoint pieces of 
infonnation sometimes limits understanding, it is precisely through such mental processes 
that one gains understanding of a system such as KSTP. This chapter focuses on the 
integration of the three perspectives in order to explicitly document major interactions. The 
cross-cuing relationships are sometimes reinforcing and sometimes inhibiting, but always 
provide enlightening insights into the technology integration process that would have been 
otherwise unobtainable. 
By documenting the major interactions in a graphical fonn, the full system view can 
be attained. Supporting the graphical view with narrative explanation provides the detail 
necessaIY for understanding. Finally, summarizing the detail with a list of conclusions 
provides a concise view of the major points. 
CROSS-CUE CHART OF TIlE KNOWLEDGE SYSTEMS TRANSFER PROJECT 
In the technical, organizational, and personal perspective chapters, effort was made 
to investigate each dimension independently. This separation was intended to facilitate 
thorough investigation of each perspective and to pennit clear presentation of the fmdings. 
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Cross-cuing these perspectives into a meaningful whole must not be mistaken as being a 
simplification of KSTP into a coltUllon denominator, which would greatly limit the utility 
of multiple perspectives. Instead, cross-cuing shows how certain parts of the different 
views conflict or support other views, thus conveying a deeper understanding of the 
research topic. Such activity routinely takes place in certain areas of society [Linstone, p. 
82]: 
"Consider a corporate executive faced with a complex sociotechnical decision. 
He obtains a T perspective from his engineers and systems analysts, an 0 
perspective from his department heads, and a P perspective from workers and 
staff whom he infonnally queries. He may receive conflicting input as well as 
reinforcement Similarly, the various witnesses at a trial provide different 
perspectives to the jury. The process of integration is not merely one of 
assembling a composite picture from jigsaw puzzle pieces, nor ironing out 
contradictions by some rules of thumb, nor arranging the infonnation 
hierarchically. Integration resembles the task of concep~ualizing a three-
dimensional object from a series of one-dimensional descriptions and two-
dimensional drawings." 
Cross-cuing is the culmination of the study, where reasons for results are revealed 
and a foundation for progress through understanding is laid. 
Instructions for Using Cross-cuing. Analysis. and Conclusions 
To begin the process, Figure 48 shows the cross-cuing of Lite three perspectives. 
All of the T elements are in one band, as are the 0 and P elements. For cohesion, most of 
the element labels map to corresponding sections or subsections in the T, 0, and P 
chapters. The cross-cuing explanations following Figure 48 describe the dynamics of their 
interactions. The time scale shows the temporal relations, within certain approximations 
which are described in the cross-cuing analysis follO\\'ing the chart All items lined up at 
the beginning of the time scale existed before the Knowledge Systems Transfer Project was 
initiated. Some of these were relatively recent, such as the Advanced Technical Education 
Program which began in 1985. Others, such as Computer Opera,ting Environments, have 
been evolving over many years. Where cross-cuing lines intersect and it is not clear which 
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path an arrow follows, one or more of the arrows have been shaded to make the paths 
easier to distinguish. The ~ symbols serve as flow chart connectors from page to page. 
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Figure 48. Cross-cue chart. 
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Figure 48. Cross-cue chart (continued). 
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Figure 48. Cross-cue chart (continued). 
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In the description of the cross-cuing chart which follows, the element labels are 
distinguished by italics and w"lderline, such as Computer Qperatinr Environment which will 
enable the reader to follow the diagram discussion. At the end of the analysis, the 
conclusions are listed with 1) the primary perspective which enabled the conclusion to be 
made and 2) the page number in the discussion which can be referenced for detail. Funher 
detail can be obtained by reading Chapters V, VI, and vn under the heading corresponding 
with the element label, as shown in Figure 49. 
LESS 
MORE 
LABEL 
REFERENCES 
CROSS-CUEING 
CHART + NARRATIVE 
T -o-p DETAILS 
CHAPTERS V. VI. VII 
Figure 49. Navigating the conclusions, cross-cuing, and T -o-p detail. 
Using this diagram, the conclusions can be traced back to an intennediate level of 
detail in the cross-cuing narrative using page number references. In the text, conclusions 
are noted in parentheses, e.g. (4) corresponds to conclusion number 4. The cross-cuing 
chart and narrative can be traced back to the great amount of detail in the T-O-P chapters via 
the label references used in the chart and in the chapter headings. 
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Description of the Cross-Cue Chart 
The Computer Qperating Environment (3) of U S WEST infonnation systems, as 
described from a technical perspective, was primarily composed oflarge scale mM or 
compatible mainframes. A growing number of PC's were primarily used for personal 
productivity, not corporate information processing. A review of the technology of 
knowledge systems shows that large, industrial strength expert system shells had existed 
primarily on high-performance workstation machines. This technical gap had a direct 
impact on System DevelQDment in a way which was not anticipated during the planning 
stages of KSTP (12). 
Development of production systems53 was seen as a very important part of KS1P 
from its inception, primarily because it was clear that successful implementation of a new 
technology required that someone had done something useful with it 
The disparity between the environment of successful expert systems in 1986-88 and 
the Computer Operating Environments ofU S WEST inhibited System Development. 
Although Overstq(fing was a problem that had existed for many years in U S 
WEST and, prior to that, the Bell System, one would be hard-pressed to prove it using 
historical data. Some of the recent data from the T perspective shows U S WEST relative 
to the other seven regional companies, but this does not give an indication of IS staff sizes 
relative to other industries. Even within the seven regionals, the data shows that U S 
WEST had about 1600 more people on its IS staff than one would expect (using the 
number of access lines for the core telecommunications business as the measure). Debate 
raged over the reasons for this excess or whether this was really an excess at all. 
53 A production system is defined as a software which is used in perfonning 
activities supporting U S WEST business activities. 
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Part of the Overstq[fing was because U S WESTs origin was much different than 
the other seven companies. Some regionals were composed of exactly the telephone 
companies which existed prior to divestiture (e.g. Pacific Bell -7 Pacific Telesis; 
Southwestern Bell -7 Southwestern Bell) and others had fairly similar companies, 
culturally and geographically, joined together (e.g. Southern Bell + South Central Bell -7 
BellSouth; lliinois Bell + Michigan Bell + Indiana Bell + Ohio Bell + Wisconsin Bell -7 
Ameritech). U S WEST was composed of three companies, Mountain Bell, Northwestern 
Bell, and Pacific Northwest Bell, each of which had very different cultures and great 
geographic diversity, stretching across 14 states from the Pacific Ocean to the Great Lakes 
and from Canada to Mexico (8). The IS organizations differed in that Northwestern had 
much Honeywell mainframe equipment, while Mountain and Pacific Northwest were 
mostlyffiM. 
Accepting this "great diversity" argument as a reason for more staff than other 
regional companies is plausible, but it would be difficult to rationalize 1600 more. Some 
have even argued that the quality of information provided to the market units was much 
better than the quality in other regionals, but there has been no work to substantiate that. 
The effect of Overstgffing on the integration of new technology is great because 
there are too many people competing for too little work. At first this doesn't make sense, 
because it would seem that there are "extra" people who can be devoted to the new 
technology. However, all of these people are committed to existing work which is very 
much aligned along the old company boundaries (8). When examined at a group level, 
these functions indeed appear to be necessary, but looking at it from the company 
organization level, 1600 "excess" people are seen. 
This dilemma leaves organizations and people working hard at their job, knowing 
that the cleaver is hovering, uncertain as to where it may fall. To ensure survival, the safe 
route is to be as productive as possible within the existing performance boundaries. 
Organizational churning prevented people from taking risks. 
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Just after divestiture, the Advanced Technical Education Program (ATEP) was 
started with the primary goal of upgrading the technical capabilities of CIS staff (4). 
Oearly knowledge-based systems was an important area in which to invest in 1985 and 
1986, but little was done until 1987, when the first person in IS went to graduate school to 
specialize in the technology. Looking at the timeline, one can see that this is not 
particularly odd because there was very little serious movement towards strategic use of 
knowledge systems. 
What was hoped for, and what is a traditional Bell System approach, is to reshape 
high performers with the skills that are needed. Reduced levels of recruiting also put an 
additional importance on the development of existing staff. The reshaping approach 
worked well during the pre-divestiture days when nearly all new technology was provided 
by Bell Labs, Western Electric, or major external vendors such as ffiM. The shallow skill 
set was easily changed and the depth was provided by the technology source through their 
support organizations. 
Post-divestiture, nearly everyone in the remnants of the Bell System were uncertain 
about the work that should be done. This was evident at the juncture of new IS 
applications and knowledge systems technology: none were delivered. In the past, IS 
applications were delivered in run-time fonn so the receiving company simply installed the 
software. 
With the depth of technology expertise residing primarily at Bellcore and the drive 
for independence at US WEST, ATEP was an idea whose time had come. A review of 
Figure 32 shows the position of artificial intelligence as part of the post-divestiture technical 
needs. The data from Chapter V shows that CIS did not have a strong base on which to 
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build, in that a majority of the staff did not have a college degree and less that 1 in 10 had a 
degree in computer science. 
At the time of KIE.f.'s beginning and prior to the inception ofKSTP, artificial 
intelligence topics were primarily in the graduate student curricula. But here it is seen that 
the educational foundation of existing CIS staff is largely inadequate for technical graduate 
work, and that the actual matriculation of a graduate student in AI did not occur until 1987. 
GeogrqQhic Distribution, a result of the immense U S WEST regulated territory, 
would have been a negative influence on the integration of knowledge systems even in 
company that had a stable culture (5). From a simple geographic separation view, it is 
difficult to work as a team with people who do not know each other (8). Travel expenses 
are high because of the distance between the major cities listed in Figure 41. The studies of 
Allen document the severe impact of geographic separation on communications (6). Once 
two people are separated by more than 100 meters, they have a .03 probability of 
communicating at least once a week. Within U S WEST, explicit pleas and directives to 
work creatively, use alternate methods of communications such as electronic mail, 
telephones, fax, and conference calls all ignore the research data that has been compiled. 
The effect of the geographic separation on the Anificiallnteiiigence Center was 
much the same. The result has been knowledge systems practitioners that have no 
particular alliance with one another, making it very difficult to build a critical mass of 
people to support and encourage further use of the technology. This underscores the need 
for good communications facilities between disjoint groups and individuals for effective 
changes to occur. 
Pan of the inherited US WEST culture said that new projects would be done on a 
large scale, or they wouldn't be done at all. The plans for the AI Center, which indicated 
that it was really a loose association of work groups active in artificial intelligence 
subdisciplines, were on a large scale. At the time of its proposal, it was forecasted to have 
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a total staff of 48 people dedicated to knowledge systems work by 1989 when in fact it had 
8, or just a few more counting its associates in other work areas. The environment of !l..£ 
~ had much to do with this, lacking the strong commitment to the AI Center concept. 
One person's view of the US WEST impact on the ability to engage in 
technological development (9): 
''The organization is staffed by a group of senior managers in the Bell System 
mold, primarily Northwestern Bell and Bell Labs. They don't know how to 
run a research organization. Every year they point to what dollar value they 
returned to the company when they really haven't been in business long enough 
to have results. Specific funding from clients for technology development 
efforts doesn't make sense. Glen Dillon was in the crunch with the rest of 
them, how could anything get done in such an environment. Good work sat on 
people's desk because they feared letting people know about it, just in case it 
was not politically acceptable for them to be doing that type of work." 
Part of this was caused by inadequate role definitions and the resulting competition 
for desirable work, often as related to the needs of the market units. 
One of the facts established by the Research Committee on Expert Systems was that 
there was a market-driven need to take advantage of the technology in order to drive expert 
knowledge down to lower levels of a company. From aU S WEST company view, this is 
a desirable action. But from the view of the excess staff personnel, their knowledge is 
what makes them valuable to the corporation. With too many people and a residual culture 
that values life-time employment, there is very little incentive to encourage the use of 
technology that reduces dependence upon personal knowledge. 
U S WEST has had a large number of changes to make in order to adjust to the 
competitive arena. 
One of the most significant areas of change was towards market orientation. In the 
past, telephone companies served customers by offering limited services, take it or leave it. 
In the new era, there is a concerted effort to practice the "excellence" principles of being 
close to the customer, listening, and providing customized service to meet customer needs. 
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At the same time the evidence clearly shows the need for increased technical 
capabilities to deliver the needed products and services. The question is, can an 
organization make such large, fundamental shifts simultaneously (8)? And if not, which 
one should come first? 
It appears that the answer at US WEST was market orientation, which would be 
the precursor to driving demand for technological solutions. This is the classic case of 
technology-push or market-pull. 
Another severe impact on the development of knowledge systems was the method 
for funding new technological development. General funding works well in some 
companies. Few customers question it because they don't see it. They simply pay the 
price for whatever you are selling. if they perceive it- to be a reasonable buy. For example, 
when buying a car, few purchasers care how much the manufacturer spends on R&D. 
They only care if the cost is acceptable for what they are buying. 
However, within one large centralized company, other subsidiaries or departments 
know what gets diverted to R&D projects and either won't pay for it or does everything 
possible to put a stop to the projects. Prior to KSTP, this is precisely what happened with 
knowledge systems technology in CIS, causing organizational rifts. This was partly 
responsible for the decision to establish the Knowledge Systems Transfer Project. 
As a long established organization, CIS Rules and Procedures had evolved over 
many years. The existence of standard rules and procedures are sometimes inhibiting to 
progress, especially if they are imposed prematurely. On the other hand, standards allow 
rapid processing of routine work so time and effort can be applied to tasks outside of 
standard areas (11). 
In the case of KSTP, it was the beneficial use of existing standards that was most 
noteworthy. The rules and procednres provided convenient insertion points for the 
technology into guidelines which were already being used. As with most bureaucratic 
organizations, CIS had a full complement of standards. No one, save the truly 
incorrigible, would ask for more, so it was clear that the AI Teams would not be able to 
push the technology as something different and special which needed its own rules. 
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The key to successful integration was to adapt the technologically based methods 
and procedures into existing CIS Rules and Procedures. An example of this was the 
standard development methodology for all information systems projects. The KSTP staff 
decided, with Donald Malek's encouragement, to insert knowledge-systems-specific 
information into appropriate places of the standard methodology. 
The logic of this was clear. In a work environment which was already overloaded 
with change and information (often data, making the distinction of meaning versus no 
meaning, respectively), no one needed yet another document saying how they should do 
something. 
Actual implementation of this was nearly another ~ocument, but packaging it as part 
of the standard methodology made it more palatable. 
As the creative force behind the Arlinciallntelligence Center, Alvin Vail developed 
a strong vision of the future of AI within U S WEST (13). Because KSTP was not in 
existence in 1986, Vail's effect on the project was indirect, through his work on the AI 
Center. Recall that Vail then became head of the Expert Systems Development Group, was 
replaced by Glen Dillon, and then replaced Dillon in 1989. During Dillon's tenure, Vail 
was the primary liaison with the Carnegie Group. In this role, Vail had tremendous 
opportunity to involve the mainstream of U S WEST Corporate Information Services 
through active involvement with KSTP. He chose not to take such a path, which reduced 
KSTP access to the consulting skills of the Carnegie Group. 
Part of the reason can be seen in Dillon's comment that Vail did not take KSTP very 
seriously. The Carnegie Group's reputation was so high that it took precedent over all. 
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Examining this in the context of the Computer Operatine Environments provides a 
bit more infonnation. The Carnegie Group was a traditional AI vendor with much invested 
into academic-type AI, with software that ran on the workstations. There experience with 
commercial infonnation systems, mainfnunes, and PC's was minimal, so they had very 
little to offer. It seemed more reasonable, at the time. for them to pursue applications 
within their hardware and software comfort zone, in spite of their tairly strong general 
knowledge systems skills. 
Vail, a product of Mountain Bell infonnation systems, had clearly decided to move 
U S WEST into the AI forefront with a radical departure from the entrenched infonnation 
systems. 
A point from Chapter VII worth repeating is Vail's failure to communicate. As the 
resea..rch of Allen has shown, communication is vital to the technology integration process 
(6). 
While temporally disjoint at this point, please note the reappearance of Vail at the 
end of the timeline. His feelings about pushinq; expert systems technology: 
"I can't totally commit myself to plans anymore, and push for what I think 
should happen. I used to and thought it would payoff, but it doesn't, not only 
in what I've worked on but everything else I've seen. So I'll pull things 
together, submit my plan, and see what they want me to do. It just takes too 
much out of me to devote myself to this." 
The Artjficiallntelligence Center provided a focal point for knowledge systems 
work in ali of U S WEST. During the time of its inception, a fair amount of excitement 
was generated, and its eventual acceptance would have led one to conclude that AI would 
inevitably be thoroughly applied within U S WEST. 
As part of the AI Center umbrella, the Expert Systems Development Group (ESnG) 
played a central role in development efforts. One of their projects became a joint venture 
with ESnG and KSTP, which was also the first significant project for KSTP in April 
1988. ESnG h~.d hired a number of people to develop knowledge systems within iheir 
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own group, which should have been a warning to those who participated in the planning of 
KSTP. The Research Committee on Expert Systems found that to be successful "formal 
expert systems groups should not centralize development, but act as a point of technical 
transfer." 
By chance, both leaders of ESnG did not communicate well with KSTP, which 
compromised the potential of the AI Center (6). Regardless of the individuals involved, the 
head of the AI Center (even if it was just an umbrella organization) had important 
responsibilities as direction setters. Because the AI Center lacked this leadership from the 
beginning and through the end of KSTP, it was not able to provide the cohesiveness to 
company-wide efforts. In addition to lack of guidance, the KSTP staff had to reinvent 
measurements, processes, and procedures, which impacted their effectiveness. The ESDG 
staff also asked to be designated as the group to set U S WEST knowledge systems tool 
standards, in spite of having a work orientation which was not aligned with mainstream I,' . 
Members of the AI Center staff also participated in the planning meetings leading to 
the establishment of KSTP. Alvin Vail was one of the major contributors, through his role 
in the AI Center. 
Stepping back from what can be seen at this point reveals a cross-cuing precursor to 
events to come: 
• The mainframe-PC information systems environment 
• Alvin Vail's involvement with the Carnegie Group 
• The Carnegie Group's expertise in academic AI 
• Vail's central role in setting AI directions at U S WEST 
From these facts it is clear that the main thrust of U S WEST efforts in AI were 
away from its information systems base. It was within this IS base that KSTP was to 
focus its efforts. So it is rather obvious why the AI Center did little to support the 
mainstream use of knowledge systems technology. 
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In mid-1987 there began a major effort to formalize the Technical Skills Assessment 
processes. The major impact of this was the reaffinnation, from yet another perspective, 
that there was Limited Knowledge ojNew TechnoloeY (4) which severely impacted the 
use of knowledge systems. 
One part of the skills assessment required general knowledge of AI for certain 
technical levels. This stimulated demand for rudimentary courses in AI (such as one or two 
day overviews) but nothing further, indicating the interest was in fulfilling the skill 
requirement, not in learning about and applying the technology. So Technical Skills 
Assessment did not have a positive impact in the efforts to apply knowledge systems. 
On another dimension, those people working with knowledge systems encountered 
barriers to well-deserved promotions because people and organizations were not prepared 
to deal with new technologies. 
Most new employees step into an existing position (or at least a well defined 
position), with well defined roles. Their job is to fit in and make modest changes as 
wammted. New technology employees step into newly created positions with no support 
structures, no defined roles, preliminarily defined tasks. Their job is to create a client base, 
market the technology, identify applications of the technology, select the projects, develop 
the projects (with clients), integrate the technology into existing organizations, and develop 
new talent (5). In CIS, their is little organizational accommodation for these differences, 
again pointing out the need to get the technology into the mainstream environment as soon 
as possible. 
Also in mid-1987, the early stages ofKSTPplanning were underway. Ron Garcia 
was the manager of a work group that was responsible for knowledge systems prior to 
KSTP. There were three major impacts Garcia had on KSTP. 
First, he \\a5 determined to push knowledge systems into its own existence. The 
Research Committee on Expert Systems and the organizational maneuvering to build strong 
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support for KSTP were instrumental for the success of the project. A testimonial to this 
was the ability of KSTP to exist intact throughout its entire planned existence. 
Second, he had responsibility for m£" which affected the EtlucatiQTlIlI Statistics 
(4) within CIS. He was dedicated to improving the quality of the educational foundation 
through formal advanced schooling. Recall from Chapter vn his belief that with a strong 
knowledge of technology fundamentals, the changing technologies in vendor products and 
U S WEST development would be much easier to manage. 
Third, Garcia searched for the best person he could fmd to head the KSTP. His 
choice was John Fitmatrick, a consultant who was a technical instructor as well as a full-
time worker on industrial knowledge systems. Recognizing the importance of knowledge 
systems training, Garcia felt that Fitzpatrick's teaching experience and technical knowledge 
would be invaluable for building a knowledge systems training curriculum. Here again, 
company recruiting practices had significant impact on KSTP. 
Garcia decided that it would greatly benefit U S WEST knowledge systems 
development to have Fitzpatrick on the staff. Since Fitzpatrick was a highly educated and 
experienced professional, Garcia attempted to offer Fitzpatrick an inducement package 
commensurate with Fitzpatrick's abilities. However when the human resources department 
got involved, they imposed standard recruiting procedures which, in this case, meant a 
woefully inadequate offer. Negotiations ca..tried on for three months, and fmally human 
resources came close to what the original offer should have been. By this time, Fitzpatrick 
was hesitant about working for a company with such personnel procedures and he finally 
declined the offer (4). 
T'nese events permanently changed the course of KSTP's training programs and 
development efforts. 
In late 1987, the fU'St meeting of the U S WEST AI Team meeting was held. The 
AI Team concept was similar to that of the AI Center because it was composed of a number 
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of organizationally independent groups and interested individuals without organizational 
sponsorship. The primary linkage among these entities were conferences which were held 
about once every six months. 
AI Team conferences did not have the organizational impact that was possible. The 
attendance at these meetings were about 30 to 40 people for a company of 65,000 
employees. Contrast this with Boeing conferences which have attendance of 600 for an 
employee body of about 140,000, which is about 8 to 10 times the attendance for 
equivalent workforce sizes. Why the disparity? 
First is the limited charter of KSTP as focussed on the Corporate Information 
Services organization (9). CIS is the information provider to most ofU S WEST and the 
belief was that integrating the technology into the IS organization would make it available to 
most of the company. So the target audience for team meetings was much smaller. 
Second, the limited interpretation of the charter of the AI Center was cause for a 
reduced audience for the technology (9). Primarily this was the search for large-scale, 
high-payoff System Development which required a narrow concentrated publicity program. 
Third, the workforce ofU S WEST, as described previously, was not highly 
educated in technological areas (4, 9). The beginning phases of the use of new 
technologies are inherently high in technical content, and U S WEST did not have the 
population characteristics to capitalize on this. Exacerbating this was the early hype about 
AI which has characterized the technology as complex and difficult to apply. Even with the 
introduction of easier-to-use tools, the initial impressions held fast. 
The last major factor relates directly to the geographic separation of the major work 
centers. It is simply too costly and logistically difficult to get a large number of employees 
to a single site for such a forum. The mechanism chosen by KSTP and ESDG was to 
rotate the site among major cities, but this still had a significant impact on the formation of a 
large user community. Without this ongoing sharing of experiences with knowledge 
acquisition, knowledge representation, tools, project management, etc., System 
Deyelopment was also impacted. In specific cases, users of the same tools reinvented 
cenain problem solving techniques and in other cases ideas among people in the same 
domains were not communicated. 
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What is revealed by these cross-cues is the large void in the extent of U S WEST's 
knowledge systems efforts (9). Neither KSTP nor ESDG had a .l.arge breadth of coverage, 
so it is understandable that few people would be interested in the AI Team meeting. The 
demographic data would also indicate limited interest in what was viewed as a highly 
technical area. In fact the name "AI Team" itself could have been a negative factor in that it 
is technologically rather than business problem oriented, thus alienating more people. 
Even though he did not come to work at U S WEST, John Fitzpatrick had a large 
impact on the course of the Knowledge Systems Transfer Project through his role as 
consultant to the Research Committee on Expert Systems (7). He contributed a conceptual 
" 
structure around which he thought the knowledge systems effort should have been 
organized: the small research group, the support group, and the project group described in 
ChapterVn. 
Connecting his thoughts to the structure of the AI Center explains part of the fmal 
form of KSTP (KSTP Established>. The AI Center concept contained the small research 
group and a project group, but not the support group. It was primarily the latter role that 
KSTP played, complemented by project-related activities specific to the information 
systems organization. 
The rapid increase in Training Costs was a motivator for the establishment of KSTP 
(10). As part of the Research Committee on Expert Systems work, it was decided that 
internal course development would be beneficial because such training costs were only 
going to increase (7). In a formal sense, this increased the Resowce Allocation to 
Knowledge Systems by specifically designating money and people to the training tasks. 
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Overall to the CIS organization, t.1!ere was the potential for a reduction in resource 
allocation to expert systems because the distributed (and therefore untnlcked) expenditures 
on training could be decreased. It was Donald Maleik's hope that the distributed training 
costs could be reduced to near zero and he pushed for the training initiative in KSTP. 
In April of 1988, KSTP was fonnally established (KSTP Established). As can be 
seen on the chart, a number of technical, organizational, and personal factors were in play 
at this point. 
The AI Center was was not designed to deal with the integration of knowledge 
systems technology into a department as large as CIS, nor was it appropriate for them to 
undertake the integration activities. It became clear to existing CIS knowledge systems 
developers, led by Ron Garcia, that there was a need to establish a group to implement the 
recommendations of the research committee, the ideas of John Fit?]Jatrick, and the 
experiences of the AI Center. 
Over time, a key to the CIS organizational acceptance of the KSTP concept was 
Multiple CIS Sponsorship (2). Many believed that no one subunit of CIS had the 
resources to support the technology. Furthennore, it was not appropriate for any single 
organization to have control of the project because the technology was capable of being 
applied across all parts of CIS. The idea of multiple sponsorship had appeal from both a 
resource perspective and a technology application perspective. 
With the current CIS knowledge systems developers in Garcia's group, their 
management chain was most knowledgeable about the technology and therefore supportive 
of its integration into CIS. 
Louis Schroder (2) was Garcia's superior and was strongly in favor of the 
formation of KSTP. He was unusual among U S WEST managers because he had a 
healthy concern about investments in the future of the company and was willing and able to 
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make resource allocation decisions to back up his beliefs. It was through his influence that 
KSTP was fonned, and sustained through various budget and organizational crises. 
The second sponsor of KSTP was Alan Medina ( 2) who played an obedient role in 
the fonnation of KSTP. A piece of advice given to Sid Thompson was, "If you want Alan 
to do something, tell Lou Schroder to mention it to Alan, and it will happen." On the other 
hand, if Alan got suggestions or advice from other sources, he would be as easily 
influenced by them as he would be Schroder. So Medina was not a champion of KSTP's 
fonnation but he was a willing sponsor. 
DQug Gunter ( 2) was the third sponsor and the circumstance of KSTP's planning 
seemed to leave him somewhat dissatisfied (although he personally denied it). His attitUde 
about KSTP was invisible acceptance, sometimes leaning towards withdrawal of support. 
This was first demonstrated by the "misunderstanding" about expense money support for 
KSTP, which, out of 5 people in a meeting, was only misunderstood by Gunter. 
Looking at these three sponsors (Schroder, Medina, Gunter) together provides 
insight into the strength of the KSTP organizational alignment. With three sponsors, no 
one could unilaterally change the support or charter of KSTP unless the other two agreed. 
There was nothing in the original agreement that specifically stated iliat there must have 
been unanimous agreement on changes, but the political battles that would have been 
necessary were sufficient to protect KSTP. Twice Doug Gunter's organization tried to stop 
supporting KSTP, and both times Sid Thompson was able to resist, reminding them that 
they would have to discuss it with all stakeholders before changes could be made. In each 
case, Thompson notified Schroder when the trouble first surfaced so Schroder could be 
prepared for the issues. The unwavering support of Schroder was enough to convince 
Gunter that the challenge to KSTP was futile. 
It was shortly after KSTP was established that Sid Thompson realized that they 
were terribly out of synch with their client base. The KSTP staff and the staff of the' AI 
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Center were both products of the state of AI technology, the workstations and expensive 
software (12). 
Through the Marketing and Consulting activities of KSTP, the KSTP staff learned 
that the CIS client base was not interested in special purpose hardware and software, 
especially when it was disjoint from their nonnal work environments. Tney wanted 
mainframe software, with a small amount of interest in PC software (1). 
Since Thompson was very sensitive to the importance of client feedback, the early 
Marketing findings became the seeds of the Small Tool Project and the Mair(rame Project 
(6). 
It was also in these early days ofKSTP that the internal training issue was being 
examined. The original charter had described KSTP developed training and discussions 
with the traditional CIS training organizations indicated that development of a course was 
very expensive in both time and resources. Looking at the work ahead for KSTP, 
Thompson decided that KSTP could not afford to spend so much on building courses. He 
suggested to his staff that the training people develop introductory courses and then 
recommend outside training for advanced courses. This would effectively increase the size 
of KSTP by leveraging the training organization to do part of KSTP's charter. As the 
official training body, they had anticipated the rising demand for expert systems courses 
and eagerly joined in partnership with KSTP. 
Directly and indirectly, the Training Project was subject to a number of forces over 
the duration of KSTP. Recall that the negotiations for John Fitzpatrick's services were 
made difficult by human resource practices, eventually leading to his refusal of U S 
WEST's offer for employment. One of the major reasons Ron Garcia wanted Fitzpatrick 
was because Fitzpatrick had extensive training development experience. Without 
Fitzpatrick, the course of KSTP was destined to change, but perhaps nowhere as 
dra-1'!1atically as in this training area. 
It would be inconceivable that delegation of training course development would 
have occurred under Fitzpatrick. Thus KSTP Resowce Allocation would have been 
directed toward training, and the other major subprojects would have been reduced 
accordingly. 
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As it turned out, the ESDG method of internal development and the KSTP method 
of distributed development had the potential of a very strong combination. Between the 
two groups, all development platforms from PC's through workstations to mainframes 
were covered (9, 12). The difficulty with this was the breadth of n-aining which was 
required for these environments. Internal classes could not cover so much so the needs 
were satisfied through vendor courses. 
The relationship between new and current IS technology is captured most succinctly 
by the views of Bob Haberman. As an executive who had responsibility for the AI Center, 
he did not seriously support the development of expert systems because they were so 
isolated from U S WESTs mainstream computing (9). His financial views showed that he 
clearly was not willing to support a new technology until it could help with significant 
portions of the business. In his view, stand-alone expert systems could not. 
Habennan's views had powerful implications about the AI Center, the Carnegie 
Group, and the directions ofKSTP. The AI Center and the Carnegie Group both operated 
in the specialized environments, what would be called the new technology area. This 
technology did not easily mesh with U S WEST current technology. Furthermore, other 
industrial efforts to integrate workstation-based expert systems with traditional information 
systems54 were complex and risky. With a Bell System background and working within 
tight budget constraints, Haberman was not about to endorse such work. His views were 
partially responsible for the reduced enthusiasm of Alvin Vail, as evidenced by his "it takes 
too much out of me to devote myself' statement. 
54Such as the American Express Authorizer's Assistant 
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The implication is that a bridging strategy was necessary for the mainstream success 
of knowledge systems, a strategy that could work until the more sophisticated expert 
systems could show results. This is the route that the KSTP staff chose as a result of their 
client feedback. 
Because Donald Malek ( 2) was a new employee ofU S WEST, he did not 
participate in the planning for KSTP. However, had he been on the staff he would have 
been an important figure in KSTP's formation. In recognition of this, Sid Thompson gave 
Malek a briefing on KSTP in June, 1988. During that meeting, Malek showed deep 
interest in the application of new technologies, but clearly lacked the organizational 
knowledge to participate in guiding the project. Nevertheless, he offered his support to 
whatever needed to be done to help the project. 
Because of his broad offer of support, Malek grew into one of the most dependable 
allies of the project. Unlike most senior executives, he seemed to understand the 
technology of knowledge systems and need for us to apply it effectively. 
His actions affected most parts of the project. For example, he encouraged his staff 
to think creatively on how to use knowledge systems and in one case, actually sent a major 
IS project back to the mid-level managers with the explicit instruction to reconsider the 
project and its potential use of knowledge-based systems technology. 
On the training project, Sid Thompson asked him to sponsor mandatory training for 
at least one person in every functional work group and Malek immediately agreed 
The relationship between Thompson and Malek was such that everything 
Thompson requested, Malek granted, resulting in a supportive environment for the 
integration of the technology. 
Previous discussion has covered the gap between the new technologies and the 
current CIS technologies (9). When looking at the Software Tools, a variety are listed as 
acceptable products (Chapter V). Looking at these and their usage by the KSTP would 
find 
• Three PC based tools (Personal Consultant™, EXSYSTM, and 
VPEXpertTM) 
• One large, specialized hardware PC tool (Goldworks™) 
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While KnowledgeCraft™ was once installed on the KSTP workstation, it was not 
used for any development This was foreseeable because KSTP already had been using 
KEETM, and had discontinued those development efforts when Client Feedbac.k showed 
that their client base did not have such interests. 
While the Client Feedback drove the decision, the ability to make the decision was 
facilitated by the use of the KSTP Contact Log (6). Nearly all KSTP communications with 
clients and associates were recorded in a database from which data could be analyzed 
giving rise to decision making information. This drove the Softrilare Tools decisions 
which resulted in the establishment of the Small Tool Project and the Mainframe Project 
(12). 
Also related to the preceding scenario, but involved with the entire project, was the 
Spreadsheet Analysis. This was the central project tracking mechanism, which was created 
from project goals and KSTP staff input Specific items in t.lte measurements varied as 
functions of changing project demands, the completio& of certain work functions, and the 
adoption of certain tasks by traditional IS organizations. An example of this was the goal 
to have a certain percentage of all knowledge systems training taken under the control of 
KSTP. Once the traditional training organization began teaching their courses and KSTP 
became known as the source of advice on advanced training, it was clear that nearly 100% 
of the training was naturally being controlled by KSTP. As these training sources became 
institutionalized, the measurement was relaxed with confidence that control had been 
achieved. 
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Early in the project, KSTP staff was establishing its goals and measurements and 
there was a clear Lack ofM Center Support to KSTP (6). It was a period of time when the 
assistance of the AI Center staff would have been most helpful. Stepping back from the 
cross-cuing analysis, a number of factors can be seen which explain the lack of support. 
• The tool platfonns were not in synch with each other 
• The client bases were much different 
• Carnegie Group influence was away from mainstream infonnation 
systems processing 
• Alvin Vail's attitude of not taking KSTP very seriously 
• Glen Dillon's poor communications skills and lack of confidence in his 
capabilities 
o Geographic separation 
• Bob Habennan's concerns about the value of the technology put great 
pressure on the AI Center to show some success 
Strangely, Glen Dillon made a concerted effort to get measurements from KSTP 
(Chapter VTI). According to Sid Thompson, when they were handed to Dillon, Dillon was 
visibly taken aback, softly saying that he would get his to Thompson soon. They were 
never delivered. It was clear to Thompson that no help was forthcoming. 
An important piece of the cross-cuing that has been left until this point is the 
political storm surrounding the Carnegie Group. The technical gaps have already been 
established, but there were other issues. 
Louis Schroder was opposed to The Carnegie Group relationship. Given his 
unwavering support for KSTP, he was surely not against the technology of knowledge 
systems. His objection was to the funding mechanism for Carnegie Group work. 
In 1987, the Carnegie Group was one of the premier AI tool and consulting fIrms in 
the United States and perhaps the world. In spite of the fact that these specialized 
companies were fading fast55, and Alvin Vail's admission that they were not his first 
choice, a business arrangement was consummated calling for U S WEST to become a 
significant equity partner56 in the Carnegie Group and to commit to many millions of 
dollars in consulting over a five year period. 
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What bothered Schroder about this was that this arrangement was going to cost his 
department a certain amount in overhead coverage and he was going to have to pay 
additional amounts for specific development projects. On top of this, no one had asked 
people in CIS about the wisdom57 of the Ca.1'J1egie agreement, let alone the funding 
mechanisms (10). 
During marketing ~d c2nsulting engagements, people would ask Sid Thompson 
what U S WEST was getting from the money invested in Carnegie. Thompson always 
hedged, saying things about the good work in progress because he was not given hard 
infonnation by the AI Center. The result of this was a perception among employees that AI 
was still all smoke, look at how much was being dumped into the technology and nothing 
of value was coming out. KSTP had to battle this perception without the help of the AI 
Center. Thompson didn't think they were intentionally withholding information, but they 
did not realize the damage they were causing and the power of KSTP to dispel the negative 
image. 
The absence of TechnQpromoters, Blue-Skyers, or Turf Protectors was a large part 
of KSTP success. Untargeted technology-pushing, science-fiction dreaming, or protecting 
turf can all cause significant damage to the integration of a new technology. Because none 
55Industry newsletters were predicting their short remaining time, national news 
magazines were asking the question "Can the AI giants survive, and some vendors were 
droppinJ their tool products and turning to pure consulting (e.g. Teknowledge). 
6U S WEST was in good company, with Texas Instruments, Boeing, Ford and 
DEC also equity partners in the Carnegie Group. 
57 And it can be revealed here that very few were please with the Carnegie 
arrangement, especially because people in Ron Garcia's group had ranked 
KnowledgeCraft™ as a very distant last when they decided to buy KEE. TM 
of these were present to damage KSTP, their absence is noteworthy. Since they didn't 
exist there is no specific cross-cuing. Their absence helped all phases of the project 
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The effects of Budget Management (1,10) had a significant impact in all aspects of 
the Knowledge Systems Transfer Project. With each periodic budget crisis, Sid Thompson 
had to defend KSTP from loss of money and/or personnel. Secondary effects included the 
following: 
• The CIS technical staff and managers were preoccupied with budget 
issues and had no time to consider anything new, not just knowledge 
systems 
• If CIS technical staff and managers had had the time, there was no 
money for tools, training, or travel to other U S WEST locations 
o CIS leadership, most critically the three KSTP sponsors and Donald 
Milk! and Jim Hicks could not behave proactively (2). They could only 
react when Thompson asked for something 
• No runtime software of the small tool could be purchased 
o The acquisition of a mainframe tool was delayed for months 
• Travel restrictions impacted the KSTP mission of integrating the 
technology into all of CIS 
• The Media as used internally by KSTP was rendered ineffective at a 
direct level. Exposure of successful expert systems through company 
publications did not stimulate additional substantive interest in the 
technology 
Even with KSTP and the AI Center offering a full spectrum of development 
avenues (from do-it-yourself to co-development to contract development, and many 
gradations of these), it was difficult for mainstream development staffs to initiate and 
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sustain a project. There is a significant number of projects which were initiated but became 
inactive due to no organizational support and follow-through (5). 
Within the AI Center, their own budget crises required specific project funding for 
development work (10). But since the rest of the corporation was undergoing similar 
budget crises, very few had money to spend. General funding for support and 
investigation activities were very limited, forcing the elimination of training, tool testing 
and evaluation, and extensive consulting services. The burden of these activities were 
passed to KSTP. 
IBM and Amtv Shuler (13) played important vendor roles in the technology 
integration process. IBM's role as a legitimizing agent for knowledge systems technology 
cannot be underestimated. Because many computing innovations (which are later adopted 
by IBM) come from small innovative companies, many of the AI personnel were biased 
against IBM and saw them as irrelevant to their work. 
In fact IBM's knowledge systems tools have not compared well to other vendors in 
many analyses, including that ofU S WEST. However because of the great importance of 
the mainstream Computer Operating Environments, IBM was able to access and influence 
CIS personnel at all levels of the organization, in a way not possible by. the KSTP staff. 
So an interplay between the Mainframe Project and IBM occurred. with Sid Thompson 
encouraging the cultivation of a good mM relationship for the sake of their marketing 
power. 
Given the predisposition of the AI personnel, it would have been conceivable for 
them to promptly dismiss IBM's products from any serious acquisition decisions. This is 
precisely where Andy Shuler had his greatest impact on KSTP, by arranging for the use of 
IBM software on U S WEST mainframes at no direct cost to U S WEST and including 
training and technical support. The result was additional valuable knowledge for the U S 
WEST Mainframe Project Team, at the cost of a few months of time and effort. 
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As events transpired, it became more evident that Lookers and Talkers represented 
much of the dynamics of the technology integration process (11). 
First, start with the understanding that a number of stand-alone expert systems had 
been successful, both in the AI Center and with KSTP. However, there had been no great 
movement towards mainstream use of the technology. A number of factors can be cited 
that point to possible causes: 
• Deemphasis of mainstream computing environments by the AI Center 
and the Carnegie Group 
• Difficulty in building a knowledge systems community, partly due to 
geographic separation 
• Bob Habennan's concerns regarding the weaknesses of stand-alone 
systems 
• Devotion of managers to the more pressing demands of budget 
management and market unit pressure 
• The inability of CIS leadership to address technology issues, also 
because of budget and market unit demands 
• Lack of a mainframe tool, primarily due to budget constraints 
With these factors, the behaviors of the lookers and talkers become understandable, 
because they lacked infrastructure support for continuing their work (11). The AI Center, 
to whom many look to for technological guidallce, had not addressed their needs and they 
were isolated from potential compatriots. When the lookers and talkers were personally 
motivated to embark on a knowledge systems project, they received litde support from their 
management, not because management did not want to pursue the work but because there 
were more pressing issues which took priority. 
A number of lookers and talkers were also constrained by the absence of a 
mainframe tool (Mainframe Project). Their work environment was an instantiation of the 
Computer Operating Environment (3) previously described and the corporate data they 
manipulated was accessible on the mainframe computers. 
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A minor cross-cue is the effect of the T echnicaI Skills Assessment on Lookers and 
Talkers. With the technical skills requirement of at least a general understanding of AI, it is 
certain that some technicians toyed with the technology enough to gain subject matter 
certification and no more. Because this was their only intent, their failure to proceed does 
not fall into the infrastructure problem category. However, it does indicate that the 
Technical Skills Assessment should be reviewed to examine the effect of the skill 
requirements on the integration of knowledge systems technology. 
Bill Hoyt and Mike J4r"1.zen were critical players in the knowledge systems training 
area (13). The transfer of responsibility of the training function from KSTP to the training 
department was greatly affected by the interactions of these two men with Sid Thompson 
and the KSTP staff. 
In late 1988, when the training department was beginning to assume responsibility 
for knowledge systems training, they were also going tilrough major organizational 
Cha!lges. Prior to divestiture and up until late 1988, each of the three U S WEST Bell 
companies had their own training departments. The transition to one U S WEST 
department meant major organizational changes, turf battles, and the accompanying trauma. 
Janzen was the primary developer of the knowledge systems courses and, as related 
in Chapter VII, was quite sensitive about his work. After the KSTP staff had worked so 
well with Janzen, the irate memo incident threatened to undermine the working 
relationships and severely impact the ability of KSTP to attain its goals. 
Copies of the irate memos were sent by Janzen to Bill Hoyt, who had recently been 
named the training director as a result of the training reorganization. Hoyt's appointment 
was not good news for Janzen because Hoyt was based in Seattle and no one in Omaha 
knew him very well. 
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Hoyt's appointment was greeted with enthusiasm by Sid Thompson, because he 
had worked with Hoyt years before and Thompson felt they had good rapport. With the 
training alliance in jeopardy, Thompson decided to visit Hoyt and resolve the training 
issues. When they met, Hoyt only briefly mentioned the irate memos, chuckling as he 
spoke. He understood the sensitivity of the issue and assured Thompson that not only 
would everything be fine, but he was willing to have his training organization take full 
responsibility for the entire knowledge systems training program. 
ToW' Pearch was one of the executives who received periodic briefings from Sid 
Thompson, in which Thompson explained the mission of KSTP and its two year charter. 
Thompson believed strongly in the time limit on the charter because he felt that a new 
organization cannot be created every time a new technology is identified for adoption (13). 
When Thompson met with Tony Pearch, Pearch made three statements about 
KSTP: 
1. He was pleased that CIS was integrating a new technology in a coherent 
organized manner 
2. He believed that two years was sufficient time to trial a new technology 
3. He felt that CIS was a factory and production goais must be met 
His views emphasized the appropriateness of the client-based approach that KSTP 
was taking and convinced Thompson to continue driving towards mainstream integration of 
the technology. 
Kathy Dobbs and Gary Ashley are illustrative of the power of a mutually supportive 
professional relationship (13). Kathy Dobbs had the sincere enthusiasm for improving her 
organization and the formal position from which to ....ilocate resources and influence people. 
In spite of (or perhaps because of) her non-technical background, she was not intimidated 
by knowledge systems technology, but was motivated by what the technology might do for 
her work area. 
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Simultaneously but independently from Sid Thompson's conversations with 
Dobbs, Gary Ashley applied for the use of a PC-based tool through the KSTP Small Tool 
Proiect. Ashley's personal inclination towards deeds instead of words enabled him to see a 
problem in his work: unit, recognize the value of a knowledge-based approach, get a tool, 
and build a prototype. 
It was the combination of Dobb's dedication and Ashley's determined work that 
enabled Ashley's prototype to be developed into production-quality software. Either one 
alone would have been insufficient for this to have happened. Even deeper, without the 
easy access to a PC tool, Ashley would not have been likely to undertake his work. The 
existence of KSTP and the Small Tool Project provided the organizational legitimization of 
knowledge systems technology. 
Near the end of the Mainframe Project, a retrospective view showed the importance 
of Mark Tyson's work to the overall integration effort (13). Because a critical part of 
technology integration is to have demonstrated success with the technology, Tyson was an 
important factor. Asking him about his success in the application of the technology, he 
would modestly say that he contributed little. However, he was an instrumental person on 
the mainframe project 
It was through Tyson that most of the mainframe tool features were tested, using 
real applications. His involvement as an extended member of KSTP demonstrated the 
importance of having a technology proficient person in the mainstream domains instead of 
in a specialized AI group. 
Most importantly, Sid Thompson had no authority over Tyson nor Tyson's work, 
so what he accomplished is a case in point of the power of the individual. 
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CONCLUSIONS FROM CROSS-CUING 
From the cross-cuing analysis, a number of conclusions are stated in Figure 50. 
For each of them, the primary perspectives which enabled the conclusion to be reached are 
listed in the left column. The conclusions are a result of distilling the cross-cue section into 
a small number of items. The sources for the conclusions are listed in the right hand 
column. The Labels found on the page references can be used to find full detail in the T -0-
P Chapters V, VI, and VIT. Conclusions that may have general applicability beyond the 
KSTP case study (for practitioners in other settings) m-e noted by the statement (general 
applicability) • 
... ,..~ Conclusion Page Reference 
0 1. The extent to which knowledge systems will be used is dependent 226.232 
upon establishing an operational level infrastructure (general 
a1212licabilitv). 
P 2. The extent to which knowledge systems will be used is dependent 224. 225. 228. 232 
upon executive leadership (general applicability). 
T-O-P 3. Technology integration requires time for the process to mature in 211.235 
a dynamic environment due to moving targets. It also takes a long 
time in a static environment due to lack of incentives to innovate. 
particularly when the organization is overstaffed and the new 
technology has the potential to reduce staff needs (general 
applicability). 
T-O-P 4. An uneducated workforce is not capable of rapidly assimimting 213.220.221.222 
knowledge-based systems (general applicability). 
O-P 5. Persistence is essential for the technology integration team. 214.220.232 
There are many challenges to new work methods. from those who 
think: it to be unnecessary and those who would allocate resources to 
other areas (general applicability). 
Figure 50. Conclusions from cross-cuing. 
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T-O-P Conclusion Page Ref.;;:ence 
T-O-P 6. High quality communications is essential for the effective use of 214.218.219,226.229 
new technology. Similar groups in a compaa'y must freely and 
onenlv share their e~ences (general aoolicability). 
0 7. The Research Committee on Expert Systems obtained world 223 
views on how to set up an expert systems group. but did not obtain 
and utilize the vast litmlture on technology integration. This was a 
comoonent of early KSTP difficulty (specific to U S WESn. 
T-O 8. U S WEST does not have a cohesive culture because of lack of 212.214.216 
1) common experiences and 2) group learning. Pushing three very 
diverse companies together resulted in the need for different 
technology integration techniques in all three company areas. This 
tripled the burden on KSTP (specific to US WESTI. 
T-O-P 9. A continuous program of technology evolution needs to be 215.222.223.227.228 
planned and implemented (general applicability). One of the single 
biggest challenges to U S WEST's ability to transition to new 
technology is in the current investment in software. This would 
require technical skills evolution for the technical staff. both through 
retraining existing staff and hiring new staff with the necessary skills 
(example is specific to U S WEST>. 
T-O-P 10. Budget crises must be managed. Prioritization of funding must 223.231.232 
and should be planned well in advance of ''budget crunches." Plans 
should be ready to be activated when new budget consttaints are 
imminent, with associated risks well understood prior to the budget 
exercise (general applicability). Requests for immediate or short 
term budget analysis during crisis-mode compounded the crisis. 
increased the risk, and demoralized the KSTP project team (example 
is specific to U S WESTI. 
O-P 11. The infrastructure is obvious but can be neglected. If no one 216.234 
takes the system view of technology integration, then only a part is 
delivered (general applicability). This was seen in the executive 
mandate from Bob Haberman that the AI Center not engaged in 
training, a function which is necessary for widespread technology 
integration (example is specific to U S WESTI. 
T 12. Changes in supporting or underlying technologies drive changes 211,226.227.229 
in the use and delivery of a new technology (general applicability)~ 
P 13. Specific individuals make significant contributions to 217,232,235.236.237 
technology integration, both in making the technology accessible 
and in puttiDl! the technology to use (general applicability). 
Figure 50. Conclusions from cross-cuing (continueci;, 
240 
At this point the cross-cuing has provided a view of KSTP with more insight than 
any of the perspectives taken alone. A major question can be asked of the validity of this 
analysis. 
The results of the T perspective can be readily verified and validated. The data can 
be re-evaluated using different collection and analytical techniques, then compared to the 
current data. The 0 and P perspectives are more difficult to repeat and verify in the quest 
for reproducibility. Two possibilities are to 1) review the 0 and P data, looking for 
additional factors and 2) conduct independent data gathering including repeat interviews. 
What has been presented in the T-O-P chapters and the preceding cross-cuing 
analysis is one investigator's interpretation of the evidence which has been collected. This 
interpretation is definitely subjective. There is no claim made to observer objectivity, nor 
can the subjective weightings used in analysis be documented for use by another 
investigator. 
The only certain part of this investigation is the data as reported in the various 
sections. The organizational impacts which are described were those found during the 
research process. The perceptions of individuals were volunteered by them during 
interviews, and in many cases substantiated by other individuals. The remaining analysis, 
the cross-cuing chart, and the cross-cuing narrative is the interpretation of the investigator. 
The strength of this research method lies in the ability of reviewers to evaluate the 
analysis and perform their own interpretation based on the available data. 
For the purposes of this investigation, t."te Knowledge Systems Transfer Project is a 
case study to be used with the technology transfer literature to construct a first cut 
technology integration model. This model is presented in the next section. 
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A 1ECHNOLOGY INTEGRATION MODEL 
One of the objectives of the research was to develop a technology integration 
model, based upon the literature review aIld the case study. The following technology 
integration model (Figure 51) assumes characteristics similar to those ofKSTP, primarily 
that the technology assessment has been completed (with a "proceed" decision), that there 
are sufficient potential resources, and there exists an acceptable level of demand for the 
technology. 
This Technology Integration Model (TIM) proved to be useful for the Knowledge 
Systems Transfer Project because it included the process phases of Awareness, Motivation, 
and Functioning Capability (the AMF Process) [Mahler] supported by understanding of the 
domain infrastructure via multiple perspectives. Explanation of the features of the model 
follows Figure 51. 
In the figure, the central part is the AMF Process which will be described in detail. 
It is dependent upon the Goal Definition for the technology integration effort and the 
Infrastructure in which the integration process will operate. This infrastructure is an 
amalgamation of the Technology, Organizations, and People and is analogous to the 
complexity of cross-cuing and the T-O-P perspectives. The AMF Process support by the 
Goal Definition and Infrastructure is the Technology Integration Model (TIM). 
Technical 
Goal 
Definition 
AMF Process 
(Awareness, 
Motivation, 
Functioning Capability) 
Infrastructure 
Organizational Personal 
Figure 51. A technology integration model. 
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The Goal Definition requires the elucidation of the desired results of the technology 
integration process, which are a function of organizational and personal values. Such goals 
could take a number of forms. Among the many possibilities, a few examples are: 
• A small number of large payoff applications of the technology 
w A large number of smaller payoff applications 
o Integration of the technology into the Illainstream 
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• Development of a technology specialist group 
Commitment to the desired goal provide~ the context for understanding the 
integration situation to be addressed by specific programs in the TIM. If the technology is 
to be restricted to one or few user sites with few users, then it is possible (and easily 
practiced) for customized design of programs, a low level of preparedness. and face-to-face 
infoxmal training. 
However if the technology is to be used at many user sites and by many users with 
varied levels of expertise, then broader program design, a high level of preparedness, 
foxma1 training courses, and product level documentation are important 
In most technology integration processes, and certainly in the case of KS1P, there 
is plenty of infonnation available for using the technology but weak methods for delivering 
the infoxmation for effective use. Suggestions for improving this are part of the TIM. 
KSTP was established with a pre-existing goal definition, so this part of the model 
was not used. I have included it because it is a required part of the TIM, and will be 
perfoxmed either implicitly (it just happens) or explicitly (the goal definition process is 
managed). I suggest that the multiple perspectives methodology would be an effective way 
to arrive at a goal definition. By examining the T-O-P dimensions and performing the 
cross-cuing, a good understanding of the goal of technology integration could be obtained. 
Moving to the lower pa.rt of Figure 51, the Infrastructure is dependent upon the 
supporting parts for the interactions which would enable a person to characterize the 
environment in which the technology integration process is to occur. As discussed in the 
Cross-Cuing section, t..'1e specifics of this are a function of the the specific T-O-P 
perspectives. Given this situational dependence, a number of representative factors are 
listed with examples. Future use of this model would require a multiple perspective 
analysis specific to the situation of interest. 
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The Technical part of the model includes the obvious factors of the technology 
itself, the hardware and software, technical environmental factors (such as the mainframe 
configurations in the KSTP case). Perhaps less obvious are the analytical views of staff 
characteristics, budget mechanisms, and program measurements. It is clear that these items 
provide a context for execution of the TIM:. Consideration must be given to the effect of 
these factors on the technology integration process. 
In the KSTP case, for example, lack of knowledge about the workforce 
characteristics would lead a technology integrator in the wrong direction. As previously 
analyzed, the status of knowledge systems when KSTP began was marked by the 
workstation, high-performance AI software, and an academic tone of working on "real" 
AI. Continuing with this view would have been certain failure, given the demographics 
obtained through employee data analysis. 
The Organizational part of the model includes the operating procedures, consulting, 
training, staffmg, budget, and measurements. Each of these are the organizational 
perspective of factors which may also be represented in other perspectives. For example 
t.1te Technical perspective will include part of the measurement tools and techniques which 
will be used and evaluated from an organizational (and personal) perspective. 
Measurement of results span the perspectives because of the diversity of what must be 
measured and how it is interpreted: quality, productivity, customer satisfaction, payback, 
and so on. It is also through the 0 and P perspectives that the ability to take corrective 
action in these areas surfaces, in line with the goals. 
The time commitment to KSTP was about 2 years, which was consistent with its 
goals. In other goal or infrastructure situations, a very different time frame may be used. 
In some organizations, a perception of pennanence is necessary for success, so an 
institutional arrangement may be preferred. Organizations have implicit assumptions about 
the relative importance of the past, present, and future. The time units for tasks are also 
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assumed, with some organizations using weeks or months and other organizations using 
quarters or years. The particulars of these vary from organization to organization, but very 
short units or very long units may inhibit the integration process. Using a time horizon of 
the near future, it is conceivable that technology usage could increase as the organization 
reaches for the "dangling C3lTOL" Short horizons may not allow time for the use of the 
technology to develop and long horizons may make measurement of progress difficult. 
The issues of decentralized or centralized technology integration groups will have 
an impact on the integration process, depending on the geographic, budgetary, and cultural 
factors of the target organization. If the goal is to produce a group of specialists or to 
integrate the technology into one work group, then a case for centralization is possible. 
Diffusion th.rough maIlY orgaa,izations and to many non-specialists may be more effectively 
achieved with a decentralized approach. 
Funding philosophy for integrating new technologies are organizationally 
dependent Some view such funding as strategic corporate investments while others 
budget on a case by case basis, no different than any other tools. There are deeper issues 
to be aware of because an organization can budget for R&D, to accept the costs of new 
technology, but this keeps it outside of the mainstream. In the case of KSTP, the 
mainstream is where the technology needed to be. 
For the Personal part, the most critical role is that of leadership. The KSTP case 
demonstrates the great value of a strong sponsor (Louis Schroder) and the neutral effect of 
a weak sponsor (Jim Hicks). A very valuable idea is seen in strength of multiple sponsors, 
which protected KSTP from a number of challenges. But this does not eliminate the need 
for an individual to stand out as executive sponsor. 
The specific people chosen to participate in the technology integration process 
greatly affect the success level. This can be seen within specific areas as communications 
abilities where Glen Dillon and Alvin Vail reduced technology integration effectiveness by 
neglecting essential communications. An equally strong but positive action was Sid 
Thompson's frequent status reports, sent to a large number of interested employees and 
executive sponsors. 
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The selection of KSTP individuals from experienced IS professionals enabled 
KSTP to quicldy become tuned to the IS organization and the technical challenges of the 
mainframe and PC computing environment Staff selection from outside of the U S WEST 
IS organization would have significantly delayed the project 
While the IS staff was effective, there could be additional value in utilizing people-
networks to select individuals from functional areas that do not overlap. This brings 
together a broad influence base and different viewpoints from which to evaluate the 
technology. 
I must also point out that the requirements of the TIM will change over time becuase 
of changes in the technology, the organization, and the people. An example will serve to 
demonstrate this time element. 
When KSTP was established, the knowledge systems computing environment was 
primarly high-perfonnance workstations and software (often based on LISP). In the two 
years of KSTP's existence this changed, flrst to PC's with extra memory and fast 
processors, then to standard PC's, and also to the maturation of mainframe software tools. 
The model must incorporate these changes over time. Even if the technology is somewhat 
stable, organizations and people often change. It seems very unlikely that a technology 
integration effort would be undertaken in an environment with stable technology, 
organizations, and people. 
A significant strength of the AMF Process is its flexibility which enables it to be 
applied to various situations depending upon the goal definition. To explain the model, the 
matrix headings will first be described using Figure 52, then the contents of the cells will 
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be described using Figure 53, and finally two specific knowledge systems projects will be 
briefly examined to show the model utility. 
In Figure 52, the y-axis lists the human agents having essential roles in the 
technology integration process and the x-axis lists the major phases through which an agent 
will progress. The agents are defined as: 
• Target - the individual(s) with the problem 
• Sponsor - the individual(s) who can supply resources to solve the 
problem 
• Stakeholder - individual(s) who will be affected by changes 
• ExJX.'lt - the source(s) of knowledge to be applied to the problem 
• Change agent - individual(s) leading the change process 
Consistent with Roberts' Critical Functions Staffmg model, these roles do not have 
to be filled by at least five different people. The sponsor may also be a change agent, and it 
could be argued that all people involved with a technology integration process are 
stakeholders. However, the role distinction is made because of the many potential 
stakeholders who are not actively involved with the process. 
The major column headings are arranged in a progressive manner, from the very 
beginnings of exposure to a technology to the application of the technology. The 
definitions of these phases are: 
• Awareness - Introduction to the technology and a basic understanding of 
its uses 
o Motivation - A matching between the technology and domain problems 
to which the technology can be applied, resulting in understanding and 
belief that the work can be done 
• Functioning Capability - Assimilation of the skills, tools, and 
methodologies needed to successfully apply the technology 
all 
target 
sponsor 
stake 
holder 
expert 
change 
agent 
Functioning 
Awareness Motivation Capability 
when how when how when how 
Figure 52. Awareness, motivation, and functioning capability 
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In the Awareness phase it is important to present the technology at a level which is 
comfortable to the audience. In the case of knowledge systems, for example, awareness 
activities with a traditional IS staff should not emphasize the academic underpinnings of AI 
and awareness activities with management should focus on benefits to the business. Great 
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care must be taken to present the technology in a non-threatening manner in the context and 
language of the audience. The criticality of this stage cannot be understated because if an 
audience is alienated at this time, severe delays in the integration process will occur. 
Tailoring of the process continues into the Motivation phase because motivations 
differ for all players. Motivation is highly dependent on many of the infrastructure factors, 
such as reward systems for taking risk, leadership handling of innovative activity, and the 
, perceived value of working with emerging technologies. 
In the Functioning Capability phase, it is important that there are deliverables to 
demonstrate the capability. These can take the form of concept papers, work plans, 
prototypes, etc. As the demands of production and widespread usage are much greater 
than previous phases, it is most essential to have a good understanding of the infrastructure 
and to augment that structure as appropriate. 
Two subheadings are atop of each column in Figure 52. The "When" indicates the 
time point within the phase that a specific activity should occur and the ''How'' describes 
those specific activities. 
Figure 53 shows the completed cells for the Knowledge Systems Transfer Project. 
The contents are self-explanatory with a few exceptions: 
all 
target 
sponsor 
stake 
holder 
expert 
change 
agent 
Awareness Motivation 
Functioning 
Capability 
when how when how when how 
early Presentations early Support application early Legitimization of 
ID & selection the technology 
mixed Print 
mixed Mgt interest & late Sustaining the 
commitment, motivators 
Speetrumof 
development 
options, Corporate 
payoff, Personal 
reward 
early Presentations, mixed LoanerPgm 
Into the Mainstream 
early Presentations, mixed LoanerPgm, early Technology watch, 
Print US WEST Training 
"Strategic 
mixed Into the Mainstream Technology", 
Tools 
early Presentations early LoanerPgm early Technology watch 
mixed Print, 
Into the Mainstream 
early Presentations, mixed LoanerPgm 
Print 
mixed Into the 
Mainstream 
early Into the Mainstream mixed LoanerPgm, mixed Training 
US WEST 
mixed Presentations, "Strategic 
, Print Technology", Tools 
Figure 53.. Matrix details in the TIM model 
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1. Under the ''When'' columns, mixed means the corresponding "How" 
was conducted at any time phase (early, mid, late) 
2. The specific ''How'' activities are described in Chapter VI in the section 
devoted to the Knowledge Systems Transfer Project 
3. The U S WEST "Strategic Technology" item at the Sponsor-Motivation 
cell means that knowledge systems had been identified by corporate 
technology planners as a strategic technology for the future of the 
company 
4. Legitimization of the technology included the use of the technology by 
key work groups, the corporate endorsement implied by the existence of 
work groups (such as KSTP) devoted to the technology, the trend to 
use PC's and mainframes, and using well-respected external agents, 
such as mM, to further the cause 
5. Technology watch includes not only the technology but where the 
technology and applications converge or diverge. This can avoid being 
blindsided by systems dynamics, such as a change in telephone 
marketing eliminating the need for a planned knowledge system 
Additionally, some general comments are in order: 
• When in the Awareness phase, one must recall the point made by 
Leonard-Barton, that an appropriate amount of technology promotion 
must be used so the promotional activities are not perceived as hype 
• The supreme importance of moving the technology into the mainstream 
of the organization. This is a realization that the organization will 
seldom change to match a new technology and the sooner it is in place in 
the "usual" places, the sooner it will be accepted 
• Effective communications facilitate all phases and help all parties 
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• People who are not knowledge systems specialists are productive using 
a TIM approach, but at some point may need more depth 
• System development must be viewed as a cradle to grave process, 
taking into account the need to build maintainable systems 
• Simultaneous efforts must be made to provide for short-tenn, low cost 
tools and methodology while pursuing longer-tenn, higher cost tools 
and methodology 
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Two cases of knowledge system application are shown in Figure 54 and Figure 55. 
The check mark "GI" means the "How" item was completed for the case and the x mark 
"K" means it was not. 
Many of ways of comparing the two cases are possible. At a gross level, simply 
counting the number of ;t's shows 16 for Case 4 and 4 for Case 5. 
all 
target 
sponsor 
stake 
holder 
expert 
change 
agent 
Awareness 
when how 
early tlPresentations 
mixed tlPrint 
early "Presentations, 
"Into the 
Mainstream 
early "Presentations, 
"Print 
mixed tlInto the 
Mainstream 
early KPresentations 
mixed KPrint, 
"Into the 
Mainstream 
early KPresentations, 
KPrint 
mixed "Into the 
Mainstream 
early tlInto the 
Mainstream 
mixed 
tlPresentations, 
tlPrint 
Case 4 
Motivation 
Functioning 
Capability 
when how when how 
early tlSupport early tlLegitimization of 
application ID & the tcchnology 
selection 
mixoo late tlSustaining the 
"Mgt interest & motivators 
commitment 
"Spectrum of devel-
opment options 
tlCorporate payoff 
"Personal reward 
mixed ~aner Pgm 
mixed v'Loaner Pgm, early XTechnology watch 
tlUS WEST XTraining 
"Strategic 
Technology" 
XTools 
early V'Loaner Pgm early XTechnology watch 
mixed V'Loaner Pgm 
mixed V'Loaner Pgm mixed tlTraining 
"'US WEST 
"Strategic 
Technology" 
V'Tools 
Figure 54. Completed matrix for a failed application project. 
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all 
target 
sponsor 
stake 
holder 
expert 
change 
agent 
Awareness 
when how 
early "Presentations 
mixed "Print 
early "Presentations, 
"Into the 
Mainstream 
early V"Presentations, 
V"Print 
mixed "Into the 
Mainstream 
early KPresentations 
mixed KPrint, 
V'Into the 
Mainstream 
early III'Presentations, 
"Print 
mixed "'Into the 
Mainstream 
early V"Into the 
Mainstream 
mixed 
"'Presentations, 
tl'Print 
Case 5 
Motivation 
when how 
early "'Support 
application ID & 
selection 
mixed 
"'Mgt interest & 
commitment 
"'Specturm of 
development 
options 
"Corporate payoff 
lPersonal reward 
mixed "'Loaner Pgm 
mixed tl'Loaner Pgm, 
"'US WEST 
"Strategic 
Technology" 
tl'Toois 
early V'Loaner Pgm 
mixed III'LoanerPgm 
mixed III'LoanerPgm 
V"U S WEST 
"'Strategic 
Technology" 
"'Tools 
Functioning 
Capability 
when how 
early tl'Legitimization of 
the tcchnology 
latc tl'Sustaining the 
motivators 
early erfechnology watch 
XTraining 
early XTechnology watch I 
mixed "'Training 
Figure 55. Completed matrix for a successful application project. 
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These cases are representative of the large number of cases, but obviously were 
selected to make a point. Case 4 was in progress just as KSTP was forming. It did not 
have the benefit of a well-organized technology integration process. It failed. Case 5 was 
undertaken under the guidance and support of KSTP, taking advantage of the technology 
integration process. It was a success. As a matter of interest, the major reason for failure 
versus success was identified as the "management interest and commitment" item in the All-
Mo:ivation cell. One can speculate that in Case 4, the many missing parts in the Awareness 
phase contributed to the lack of management support. 
From a systems view, perhaps the most significant features of the TIM are its 
breadth and flexibility. Any system involving humans is highly complex and the TIM 
provides features to deal with the inherent complexity of the technology integration 
process. 
The breadth and flexibility enables a number of technology integration paths which 
can be independently or dependently followed. For example, a particular development 
effort may utilize Path A exclusively while another development effort may utilize Path B 
exclusively. But in another development effort Path A may be the predecessor to Path B in 
a complementary fashion, i.e. the work done in Path A supports the work in Path B. 
By having multiple paths, failure in one path does not lead to total failure of the 
technology integration process. Complexity is reduced by keeping the development efforts 
as small as possible58 and controlling interactions in a cooperative, peer manner. 
Breadth and flexibility also anticipate failure in a robust manner. Chaos theory has 
demonstrated unpredictability in non-linear systems. to the extent that dramatic system 
changes can occur when they are not expected. Such events are not foreseeable in a 
concrete way, but can be anticipated in that they may happen at any time. In these 
5SIn some cases the size still may be quite large, but size is purposely controlled to 
remain small relative to the task. 
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situations, a single-course technology integration process is highly vulnerable to 
catastrophic failure. In the case of KSTP, its breadth and flexibility enabled it to progress 
through multi-company cultural conflict and impactive budget limits. 
CHAPTER IX 
CONCLUSIONS 
In this chapter, I would like to present my conclusions about the four objectives of 
the research and my observations about the research process. The former will enable you 
to assess the usefulness of the techniques I have usoo and the latter will give you some 
insight into what was required to do the research. I have also included some items which 
may be helpful to someone contemplating a similar research project 
ABOUT TIlE OBJECTIVES 
Recall that this research intended to examine the appropriateness of using the 
multiple perspectives methodology to examine events as they occur, in order to guide the 
technology integration process. The information gained over time could then be used in 
retrospect to facilitate the development of an int"gratil 1'l model. My work was divided into 
academic and industrial objectives: 
Academic Objectives: 
1. Use multiple perspectives in real-time (for input to decisions as events 
unfold) 
2. Focus on a multiple perspectives view of technology integration into an 
organization 
Industrial Objectives: 
1. Improve project effectiveness by increasing understanding of the 
technology integration process 
2. Establish a model for the integration of a new technology into an 
organization 
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The following discussions of each objective will be limited to examinations of each 
objective in the context of the preceding T -O-P investigation, cross-cuing analysis, and 
model presentation. 
Academic Objectiyes 
1. Use multiple perspectives in real-time (for input to decisions as events unfold): 
The search for relevant data in any of the T -O-P domains is usually performed with 
adequate time for assessment of the breadth and depth of data obtained. As the time from 
data gathering to cross-cuing and conclusion-making is reduced, the ability to make this 
assessment is also reduced. Driving the MP methodology to the limits of real-time 
processing dramaticall.1 decreased the confidence I had in the quality of data gathering. 
However, it does not follow that MP is unusable in real-time situations. Repeated 
exercising of MP thought processes is required for such use; in a word, practice. Over 
time, this training enables the investigator to become increasingly proficient at seeking out 
the many types of infonnation, quickly cross-cuing, and arriving at some conclusions. The 
reasonableness of the conclusions are useful determinants for deciding if another iteration 
of data gathering is appropriate. 
Testing the validity of MP thought processes in support of decision making is one 
potential area for further research on the MP methodology. 
2. Focus on a multiple perspectives view of technology integration into an 
organization: Multiple perspective analysis of the technology integration process proved to 
be extremely valuable. Tne dimensions of using a new technology include the technical, 
organizational, and personal perspectives as discussed in the literature review (Chapter In) 
and the T-O-P sections (Chapters V, VI, and VII). The information in each of these 
I 
chapters provides very rich descriptions in detail. The key interactions as described in 
cross-cuing (Chapter VITI) provide a higher level, inter-related view of the infonnation. 
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Multiple perspectives analysis can provide conclusions from any single perspective, 
or from the cross-cuing among two or all three perspectives. The number of conclusions 
derived from the individual perspectives or combinations thereof are as follows: 
T 
'r" ~ I P T-O o-p T-P T-O-P i 1 2 1 2 0 5 
Figure 56. Number of conclusions from the various perspectives. 
Methodical examination of each of the individual perspectives yielded five (1 +2+2) 
conclusions. Cross-cuing among the perspectives yielded eight (1 +2+0+5), some of 
which would not have been obtained without the fonnal methodology provided by multiple 
perspectives. A quick review of the conclusions in Chapter vm shows that each of the 
cross-cued conclusions state specific areas ""Stich should be addressed during the 
technology integration process. These include: 
• Organizational infrastructure in the technology integration target area 
• Executive leadership to visibly and actively advocate the adoption of th,e 
new technology 
• Timing of the integration effort, to be in harmony with personal and 
organizational needs 
• Workforce capability for assimilation of the new technology, including 
appropriate education, resources, and infrastructure support 
• Persistence, on the part of the technology integrators, to continue with 
needed work in the face of adversity 
.. Communications programs to ensure that the target audience can be 
effectively infonned through the awareness, motivation, and functioning 
capability phases 
.. A program of planned technology evolution which describes what will 
be deployed, by whom, when, and what it will cost 
.. Budget management which will manage the impact of resource 
competition on the technology integration team 
.. Dependencies on related technologies to ensure that changes in the 
supporting base does not adversely impact technology integration work 
in progress 
.. Individual champions, who will work through the preceding issues 
because they are motivated to use the new technology 
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Multiple perspectives analysis enabled me to reach these conclusions and I believe 
that similar studies would be beneficial for comparable projects. 
Industrial OQjectives 
1. Improve project effectiveness by increasing understanding of the technology 
integration process: Portions of the conclusions drawn in Chapter VIII were fonned at 
various stages of the technology integration process. Multiple perspectives did make 
information availatile which had the potential of improving project effectiveness. 
'Whether that potential was realized or not depended on the specifics of the situation. 
For example. Conclusion 6 "High quality communications is essential to the effective use 
of new technology" was largely realized by installing mechanisms to facilitate the 
commupications process. Many of these mechanisms are in the Awareness part of the TIM 
model. In the case of Conclusion 10 "Budget crises must be managed," the control was far 
beyond the domain of KSTP. So while the conclusion was reached, there was no direct 
avenue for resolution of budget crises; thus increased budget understanding did not 
improve project effectiveness. 
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This points out an interesting problem. When the power of MP reveals situations 
that cannot be resolved, a negative impact can result. For KSTP, continued budget 
pressure reduced team enthusiasm which reduced project effectiveness. 
The result is that MP provides the means to learn about the topic of interest. What 
is learned is not unifonnIy helpful (nor uniformly harmful) to the goals of the study. So 
the research goal of improving project effectiveness was only partially achieved. What was 
achieved was an understanding of the project and its domain of operation. In retrospect, 
attaining such understanding would have been a more realistic goal, rather than assuming 
that greater understanding would result in greater effectiveness. Some things are better left 
unknown, but you never know which ones until you find out about them. 
2. Establish a model for the integration of a new technology into an organization: 
This objective was achieved with the TIM model. In addition to defining the model, it was 
exercised against a number of U S WEST projects, two of which were presented in 
Chapter Vill. Working through the Awareness, Motivation, and Functioning Capability 
processes with the different types of organizations andlor individuals is most beneficial in 
concert with infonnation provided by the multiple perspective analysis. 
The two examples in Chapter VITI showed how specific differences in projects 
could be the difference between failure and success. The TIM model was used to improve 
specific projects tested and the model itself was modified as a result of its use. Future 
research would be appropriate to test the validity of this model on a broad range of 
technology integration projects in a broad range of technologies and organizations. 
Finally, the organization of the study may be helpful to other multiple perspective 
practitioners. The conclusions listed with page number references provides easy access to 
the cross-cuing narrative as shown in Figure 48. The use of clear labels in the cross-cue 
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narrative and the cross-cue chart enables the reader to reference the great detail of the T -0-P 
chapters. Taken together, these features provide a means for tracing through the analysis. 
OBSERVATIONS ABOUT THE RESEARCH PROCESS 
If you look at the case study conclusions in Chapter vm, you can see that the 
success of a technology integration effort is dependent upon organi7..ational infrastructure, 
executive leadership, timing, workforce capability for assimilation, persistence, 
communications, a program of planned technology evolution, budget management, 
dependencies on related technologies, and individual champions. 
This is a rather long list of diverse areas that must be assimilated and I have found 
that the use of multiple perspectives, as described for the Technology Integration Model, is 
an effective framework in which to learn about the infrastructure. 
To help you get a feeling for what multiple perspectives involves, I would like to 
describe what I experienced during this process. 
Data collection was very time consuming. Total elapsed time was 18 months, and I 
estimate that about 250 hours was spent on each of the 3 perspectives. I attribute this to a 
number of things: 
• The multiple perspectives methodology does not tell you exactly what to 
look for nor does it tell you when you have found what you need. You 
have to know your domain to make these decisions. Skills required to 
peIfonn this type of research are much like those of an investigative 
reporter, who must have a sharp sense of what is relevant and what is 
irrelevant to a given case. 
• Access to a large amount of data was important because I did not know 
precisely what I was looking for. 
• It helped tremendously to be working inside the organization in order to 
gain access to information. Some information simply would have been 
unobtainable to an outsider attempting to do such a study. 
• Finding the data which can be used to realistically portray the study area 
was sometimes a matter of chance. While exploring one area, I would 
unintentionally discover other data that appeared relevant. 
• Determination of relevance was made during the cross-cuing process, 
when I was able to see if specific data added value to the understanding 
of the case study. A lot of data was placed in the inactive file during 
cross-cuing. 
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I should also point out that data collection for the three perspectives did not occur 
sequentially, that is I did not go out and gather all of the T data, then all of the 0 data. then 
all of the P data. The collection took place simultaneously over the 18 month period, which 
allowed me to change my own investigative filter and validate the data as it was collected. 
This was particularly important for the P perspective. I interviewed some of the 
people a number of times over a period of months. I observed tIlat their personal views 
seemed fairly stable over time, while their organizational views varied with what was 
currently in vogue. I believe this enabled me to separate their P views from their 0 views. 
I used multiple interviews as a separating device but have no proof of the validity. In a 
genera1 case, I suspect that the time between interviews must exceed the time between 
organizational change events, in order to detect statements which might be affected by 
organizational shifts. This is an area which has potential for further research. 
I divided the data gathering time into thirds for each ofT-O-P. This was a self-
imposed discipline to examine the effects of even time distribution. I found that their was 
much more T data gathered in that third of time, due to its greater availability. Therefore, 
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more T data was left unused in my research ftles because such a large volume of data was 
not necessary for building an understanding of the research domain. 
Multiple perspectives methodology was an important contribution to the Knowledge 
Systems Transfer Project in that it enabled me to better assess the dynamics of the 
information systems organization. Without the balanced and integrated infonnation gained 
through the analysis process, I doubt if the technology would have been successfully 
integrated in the two year KSTP time span. So I believe that the adoption of knowledge 
systems technology was inevitable, but it was a matter of timing. My usage of MP and the 
Technology Integration Model accelerated the use of knowledge systems. 
Thinking about accelerating the use of new technology, I submit that a company 
that can productively integrate technology faster than it's competitors is going to have the 
competitive edge. 
Being an insider to an organization provides great advantages with respect to access 
to infonnation. As a research, it is easier to identify where to look for relevant data and 
how to recognize when it has been found. Simply knowing the people and who to talk to 
also helps. However, being an insider can blind an investigator by preconditioning him or 
her to see a situation in a particular light. Perhaps a solution to this is to have an 
investigative team composed of insiders and outsiders. 
While the data collection process was time consuming, the integration of the data 
during cross-cuing was the activity with which I struggled most. The cross-cue chart as 
presented in Figure 48 shows 49 elements, and to ma..'lY reviewers of that chart, it was 
about as complex as they wanted to see. Contrast this with the 121 elements in my original 
cross-cue chart. 
I realized that 121 elements were far too many to work with. This told me that I 
had more chunking to do, but it could also have meant that my research area was too large. 
This is a potentially useful checkpoint for other practitioners to assess. 
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Although I did not have to develop the goal defiI'jtion for KSTP, I suggest that the 
mutliple perspectives methodology could also be used in that part of the TIM. This is 
another area that could be explored in future research. 
Multiple perspectives analysis enabled me to learn about the T-O-P dimensions 
which affected the technology integration process. Knowing this, it was necessary to 
devise a way to put the technology into the h~ds of the IS staff. The AMF Process was 
developed and tested on a number of knowledge systems projects, two of which were 
described in Chapter VIII. Moving a potential technology user through the awareness, 
motivation, and functioning capability stages provides an organized way to manage the 
integration process with the user's needs in mind. While I have demonstrated its use in the 
knowledge systems domain, I believe that the AMF process is general enough to use in any 
technology integration process, or perhaps any change process. 
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APPENDIX A 
MULTIPLE PERSPECTIVES 
World View 
Ethical basis 
Goal 
Modes of inquiry 
Time concept 
Planning horizon 
Discount rate 
Constraints 
TECHNICAL. m 
Science-technology 
Rationality 
Problem solving 
Product (study, design, 
explanation) 
Abstraction and 
modeling 
Data and analysis 
Techl1ological time 
Far 
Often little breadth 
Minimal 
Problem simplification 
by limiting variables, 
relations 
Cause and effect 
Need for validation, 
replicability (or "audit 
trail") 
Objectivity emphasized 
1 Usually applies to hierarchical structures only 
ORGANIZATIONAL (0) 
Social Infrastructure: 
Hierarchical (caste) 
Egalitarian (sect) 
Justice/fairness 
Stability and continuity 1 
Process 
Action and 
implementation 
Dialectic/adversary 
Negotiated 
reality/con sensual 
Social time 
Intermediate distance 
Intermediate breadth 
Moderate 
Fractionating/factoring 
problems 
Problem delegation to 
others or avoidance if 
possible 
Agenda ("problem of the 
moment")1 
Bureaucracy often 
pervasive1 
Political sensitivity and 
expediency 1 
Loyalties, credentials 
Restricted access by 
outsiders (caste) or 
recruits members (sect) 
Reasonableness, common 
advantage 
PERSONAL (P) 
Individuation-the self 
Morality 
Power, influence, 
prestige 
Status maintenance or 
improvement 
Intuition, persona, 
individual reality 
Experience, learning 
Personal time 
Short distance 
Variable breadth 
High (with rare 
exceptions) 
Hierarchy of individual 
needs (security, 
acceptance, self-
fulfillment) 
Challenge and response 
Each construes 
attributes of others 
Inner world 
( subjectivity) 
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Worid View 
Ethical basis 
Characteristics 
Communication 
From Unstone. 1984 
TECHNICAL{] 
Scianca-,achnology 
Rationality 
Prediction 
Optimization (best 
solution) 
Feedback loops 
recognized 
Quantification 
Usa of averages, 
probabilities 
Trade-ofts 
Uncertainties noted: 
many caveats ("on one 
hand .• .") 
Technical reporting, 
briefing 
ORGANIZATIONAL (0) 
Social infrastructure: 
Hierarchical (caste) ••• 
Egalitarian (sect) 
Justice/fairness 
Recognition of partial 
unpredictability 
Long-range planning 
often ritualized 
Satisficing (first 
acceptable, rather than 
best, solution) 1 
Incremental change, 
slow adaptation 
Parochial priorities 
Standard operating 
procedures 
Compromise and 
bargaining 1 
Monitoring and 
correction 
Uncertainties avoided 
Fear of error 1 
Directive, conference, 
interview 
Private language with 
insiders 
Hortatory language with 
public 
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PERSONAL (P) 
Individuation-the self 
Morality 
Need for certainty, 
beliefs 
Creativity and vision of 
the few 
Cope with few 
alternatives or 
variables only 
Filter out images 
inconsistent with past 
experience 
Game playing ("homo 
ludens") 
Focus on simplistic 
hypotheses rather than 
scanning many 
Leaders and followers, 
mystique 
Faai of chaiige and 
unknown 
Narrative (story), 
discussion, speech 
Importance of 
personality 
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Application Identification and Selection 
This package is intended to guide you through the assessment of a potential expert 
system project. In using this package it is important to realize that not all of the 
documents are appropriate for every project or user. There are many options available 
when contemplating an expert system project. To determine which of these options is 
appropriate it is importaoy to first make an estimate of how large an effort a particular 
task will require. Many of these documents are aimed at l.a.rg§,. projects and are 
. inappropriate for small projects, as well as intimidating to the proposer. 
This brings us to the document you are now reading. This document has two purposes: 
1. Provide a basic methodology for the assessment and development of an expert 
system application. 
2. Provide a table of contents for this package, with some guidelines on the 
appropriateness of each document. 
Knowledge Based Systems Development 
There are two pieces to developing a knowledge based system: 
1. Choosing and assessing the project. 
2. Designing, implementing and delivering the system. 
This is not much different from determining the feasibility and desirability of a 
possible conventional data processing system and then designing, implementing and 
delivering it. Some differences in the assessment and choice phase come from the need 
for caution in introducing any new technology. The other differences are based on the 
nature of knowledge based technology. 
Choosing and assessing proiects 
What sorts of problems are currently solvable using knowledge based system 
technology? How do I assess potential projects? In the next few pages we'll look at a 
simple worksheet which should be filled out for each potential knowledge based sy~tem 
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project to help answer these questions. (A blank worksheet is one of the documents 
included in this package.) 
EXPERT SysTEM PROPOSAL 
1. Describe the proposed application context. 
(a) Describe the setting. 
Business office, computer operations, network, number services, . . . ? What is 
the overall job that is done? Do the people use terminals or pes? How 
comfortable are they with the technology that they are using? 
It is important to take a step back and look again at the work group and its goals. 
Make certain that the application is in their best interests and that you have 
assessed their response to a new technology. 
(b) What are the tasks/decisions? 
What tasks and decisions are you intending to include in the expert system? 
Include some detail about information sources and decision support resources. 
It is important to decide on some bounds for the project rather early in the 
planning process. This can be changed iater, but an attempt s,'iould be made to 
realistically set these boundaries. 
(c) Is the task manual or mechanized today? 
There may be less resistance to changing the way a mechanized system works than 
to mechanizing a manual system. 
(d) Are there any recognized experts? 
Are there one or two people who are viewed as expert at the complete task? Or 
are there several people who are each experts on some piece or pieces of the 
task? Or is there no expert at all? 
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The ideal case is that of one or two experts, who agree with each other on what the 
right solution is? Experts who disagree on the correct solution are a large 
danger signal (research is being done on on how to use conflicting know/edge to 
obtain a better answer than either expert would gotten alone.) Muitiple partiai 
experts can also be a dangerous situation and care must be taken to properly 
handle the politics. Cases where there is no expert and perhaps never has been 
are also potentially very dangerous. In these cases the knowledge engineer has to 
develop the expertise as she or he goes. Books and manuals are DlI1 a substitute 
for an expertl 
(e) Who is involved? How many people are involved? 
How many people does it take to make a decision or complete the task? What sorts 
of skills do they have? Who are they? Who are the clients? 
If the decision or task involves discussion among several people, don't expect to 
be able to easily mechanize it. Again it is important to think about who is 
involved and what their skills are. Many problems that seem ideal are undoabJe 
because of the people involved. 
(f) How important is the task? Why? Is it "politicallyn sensitive? Describe. 
Does the task affect revenues, expenses, and/or service? Is it a regional task? Is 
the task part of a high visibility project? 
The best projects in a sense are all of these things. They have the highest 
potential payoff. Unfortunately these projects also have the highest risk. It is 
important to balance the payoff, risk, doability and political backing of the 
proposed expert system. More projects die for political reasons than for any 
other. 
2. Why does an expert system seem like a good solution? 
Is there some part of the task that would be difficult to solve using conventional 
technology? Is there truly knowledge being applied? 
If the problem can be reasonably solved using conventional technology then that is 
a much wiser soiution. If there is no real knowledge being applied then knowledge 
based technology won't help. 
3. What should the expert system do? 
(a) Describe a sample consultation 
Think through a complete "consultation", cycle of the task or decision making 
process. Look back at question 1, especially (b) and (e). Make sure that you 
include reference materials used, questions asked, systems accessed and results. 
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(b) What kinds of knowledge would it access? 
Examples: Manuals, reports, databases, personal experience, standard questions. 
(c) What formes} should the output take? 
Examples: Printed reports. computer display, spoken, electronic mail, messages 
or commands to the operating system or other applications, phone call, file, 
database update(s)? 
These three questions are intended to make sure that you have thought through 
what the system will need to do. This is really preparation for the knowledge 
acquisition and development phases. The answers to these questions can be very 
useful in deciding whether to do the project or not. 
4. What are the benefits the expert system would provide? 
Examples: cost savings, revenue generation, decreased time to solve problems, 
improved performance, employee education, employee or customer satisfaction. 
(For more benefits look at the "Generic Expert System Benefits" document 
included in this package.) 
Write up a first cut business case for the proposed project. If you can't find 
reasonable justification for it, then don't do it. 
5 . Who would be the players in developing your expert system? (Names, job 
responsibilities, & phone numbers) 
Proposer/champion: 
Subject-matter expert(s): 
Developer(s): 
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At this time there are around six different choices for expert system development 
within U S WEST: 
- Do it yourself with assistance and consultation from the various support groups 
within US WEST. If the project is small to medium sized this may be an option. 
It is important to think about what your programming resources are if you 
choose this option. Medium to large projects should be done using one of the other 
development options, unless you have an experienced knowledge engineer on your 
staff. 
- KBS Development Group U S WEST AT. Medium to large projects where funding 
is available should consider working with the KBS group in Enge/wood. (For 
information on how projects are assessed for development by the KBS group read 
the "Qualifying Engagements for Expert Systems" document included in 
this package) 
- Large projects may also consider working through the KBS group with the 
Carnegie Group. This company has a good deal of experience working with 
f.~r:owledge based systems and artificial intelligence in general. 
- Large projects of a general telephone company nature should consider using the 
KBS Development District at BELL CORE. The desire here is to be careful of giving 
away a competitive advantage by having something be centrally developed. 
- Other outside consultants. This should only be considered after all the other 
options have been considered and discarded. 
6. Proposed name for the project. 
For some reason project which choose a name early in the process are more 
likely to be treated seriously and go on to completion. 
In other words (just like with a more traditional project): Is there a good reason to do 
this and is it doable? If not, don't! Do I nave the money, people, skills, hardware 
and/or software to do it? If not, can I get them? No? Tilen again, don't! 
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Development 
The development life cye!s lor a knowledge based system is different from that of a more 
traditional technology, but not much. 
Table of Contents 
The following documents are all Microsoft Word 3.0 except for 5 which is an Excel 
spreadsheet document. 
1. Expert System Proposal - Brent Larson and Loren Sanderson (U S WEST 
IT -S, KSTP). This is a blank copy of the worksheet used above in the 
assessment of a potential expert system application. Generally applicable. 
2. Generic Expert System Benefits - Chuck Astor (U S WEST AT, KBS). 
A general survey of possible benefits of using knowledge based technology in a 
project. Generally applicable. 
3. Qualifying Engagements for Expert Systems - Alvin Vail (U S WEST 
AT, KBS). A look at how the KBS group determines which applications are 
appropriate for them to work on. Mostly appropriate for those considering KBS 
development of their project. (This document is in postscript and must be 
dumped to a postscript printer, like an Apple LaserWriter. This can be done 
from Microsoft Word just by choosing "Print".) 
4. Estimating Return on Investments for Expert Systems Projects-
Alvin Vail (U S WEST AT, KBS). Explains how to figure return on 
investment for an expert system project. Generally applicable. (This document 
is in postscript and must be dumped to a postscript printer, like an Apple 
LaserWriter. This can be done from Microsoft Word just by choosing "Print".) 
5. Return on Investment Worksheet - Alvin Vail (U S WEST AT, KBS). A 
Microsoft Excel spreadsheet to help in figuring return on investment. (Excel) 
PLEASE NOTE: 
Copyrighted materials in this document have 
not been filmed at the request of the author. 
They are available for consultation, however, 
in the author's university library. 
These consist of pages: 
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Memorandum of Agreement 
Knowledge Systems Transfer Project 
April IS, 1988 
Bellevue, Washington 
Memorandum for: TonyPearch 
Da'lSwena 
Donald Malek 
US WEST 
Judy Nelson 
Jim Hicks 
Bob Habennan 
292 
Attached is the project memo which establishes the Knowledge Systems Transfer Project (KSTP). The 
purpose of this project is to facilitate the transfer of expert systems (knowledge systems) technologies 
(theories, methods, development tools, languages) into Corporate Information Services application, 
development, and maintenance groups. 
KSTP j. a two-year effort within US VV"EST CIS and in cooperation with US WEST Advanced 
Technologies. The primary sponsors are Doug Gunter, Louis Schroder, Glen Dillon, and myself. 
In order to most efficiently develop our potential in expert systems, KSTP will serve as the focal point for 
expert systems activities within CIS, while expert system project responsibility will reside in the 
appropriate development organization. Please contact me or Sid Thompson if you have questions or 
comments. 
Alan Medina 
Attachments 
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USWEST 
Knowledge Systems Transfer Project 
April IS, 1988, Belle\"Je 
Memorandum of Agreement Among Project Co-sponsors 
This memorandum establishes the Knowledge Systems Transfer Project (KSTP), a two-year effort within 
U S WEST Corporate Information S,ervices and in cooperation with US WEST Advanced Technologies. 
Sponsorship: 
Pumose: 
Start Date: 
End Date: 
Staffing: 
Rej)Orting: 
Louis Schroder, Alan Medina. Glen Dillon, and Doug Gunter are each contributing 
expense dollars, head count, and/or equipment. Application set directors have also 
committed their support to the Knowledge Systems Transfer Project. 
To facilitate the transfer of expert systems (knowledge systems) technologies (theories, 
methods, development tools, languages) into Corporate Information Services application, 
development, and maintenance groups. 
April 16, 1988 
April IS, 1990 
Sid Thompson, MTS-55, Project Leader 
Reporting to Sid are: Loren Sanderson, MTS44 
Heinz Neuroth, MTS-44 
Ray Gallegos, MTS-44 
Brent Larson, MTS-l1 
Sid will report to Bill Kolb of CIS Application and Data Support Services (for 
administrative purposes) and to Glen Dillon of the Expert Systems Technology Group, 
US WEST Advanced Technologies (for coordination with strategic directions). 
Questions about the Knowledge Systems Transfer Project should be directed to Sid Thompson by electronic 
mail (sit or telephone (211-564-1122). 
Louis Schroder Alan Medina Glen Dillon Doug Gunter 
Attachment 
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April IS, 1988, Bellevue 
Knowledge Systems Transfer Project 
Memorandum of Agreement among Project Co-sponsors 
This memorandum establishes the Knowledge Systems Transfer Project (KSTP), a two-year effort within 
US WEST Corporate Infonnation Services and in cooper.ilion with US WEST Advanced Technologies. 
Sponsorship: 
Puawse: 
Start Date: 
End Date: 
The following organizations are contributing expense dollars. head count, and/or 
equipment to the project, consolidating current expert systems activities: 
Louis Schroder Systems Management and Support, Computing and Communications 
AianMedina Application and Data Suppon Services. Application Services 
Glen Dillon Expen Systems Technology Group, AJvanced Technologies 
Doug Gunter Small Business Systems and Information Resources, Application Services 
Application set directors have also committed their support to the Knowledge Systems 
Transfer Project. 
To facilitate the transfer of expert systems (knowledge systems) technologies (theories, 
methods, development tools, languages) into Corporate Infonnation Services application, 
development, and maintenance groups. 
The major goal of this project will be to transfer knowledge systems technology into the 
CIS environment, and into the environments of the client groups CIS serves, as demand 
and need dictate. The specific objectives will be as follows: 
• Training: develop and deliver courses in knowledge systems topics; 
• Technical suppurt: provide direct consultation to clients with development 
efforts; 
• Technical currency: review and publicize the most up-to-date information 
regarding knowledge systems theories and tools; 
• Development: Take a proactive role in the initiation. design, and implementation 
of at least one large knowledge system with important financial rewards, 
recognizing that the specific project responsibility will remain in the appropriate 
development organization. 
• Advanced Technical Education: support the development of project staff 
capabilities via higher education in computer science. 
April 16, 1988 
April 15. 1990 
Staffing: 
Re,porting: 
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The project will have a central staff and a network of affiliates. The central staff, housed 
in Bellevue will be composed of a senior technical lead and four analysts: 
Sid Thompson, MTS-55, Project Leader 
Reporting to Sid are: Loren Sanderson, MTS-44 
Heinz Neuroth, MTS-44 
Roy Gallegos, MTS-44 
Brent~n,MTS-l1 
The affiliates are iocated in other data centers in the region and at U S WEST AT. 
Sid will report to Bill Kolb of CIS Application and Data Support Services (for 
administrative purposes) and to Glen Dillon of the Expert Systems Technology Group, 
U S WEST Advanced Technologies (for coordination with strategic directions). Sid will 
have all decision-making authority for the group's activities as well as all budget 
authority. 
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Research Committee on EX!ler! Systems Report 
BACKGROUND & MOTIVATION 
Expert systems, or knowledge-based systems, represent the first technology relying 
on principles of artificial intelligence to achieve widespread application in mainstream 
computing. Systems of this relatively new genre are being constructed in a wide variety of 
commercial applications. e.g. fmancial planning, network fault diagnosis and recovery, and 
computer system configuration. Distinguished from traditional computing by their 
emphasis on knowledge and reasoning, they afford the opportunity to capture the subtle 
reasoning of expert practitioners in the perfonnance of complex-but narrowly defined-
tasks and to make those expert methods available to less e~-perienced personnel. Their user 
interfaces are designed for ease of use, and often can help train less experience personnel 
during the course of their usage. Because expert systems can be applied to a host of 
problems not addressed by traditional data processing methods, they are the object of much 
interest and experimentation within many enterprises worldwide. 
Expert systems are precursors of the cmraing fifth generation of computer systems. 
And they are more different from third and fourth generation systems than those two 
generations are from each other. A significant area of difference is the nature of the tools 
which are used to build them: they rely on different programming constructs than 
traditional computer systems, e.g. rules and object-oriented programming. Tne tool 
marketplace is expanding rapidly, and offers a wide variation of capabilities, host 
computers, and prices. The methodology for developing expert systems is also somewhat 
different than traditional methodologies, relying heavily on "domain experts" during design 
and implementation, and requiring successive phases of prototyping rather than the 
traditional "waterfall" methodology. Experimentation without fonnal training is possible, 
but most practitioners quickly feel the need for formal training to help them select 
appropriate problems, tools, and programming constructs for serious efforts. 
U S WEST Advanced Technologies has embraced the potential for expert systems to 
provide competitive advantage in its computer systems. AThas a group dedicated to 
working with clients within the corpof"dtion to build expert systems and has sponsored 
seminars to encourage its subsidiaries to exploit the new technology. Encouraged and 
stimulated by U S WEST AT's activities, the Information Systems Technology Group has 
been building expertise with expert systems since early 1986. One analyst in that group 
has worked with two different Pacific Northwest Bell groups to build prototype systems, 
has written a report introducing the technology to managers, and has assembled a testbed 
environment on a Sun 3/160 workstation. In 1987 that analyst was joined by another, 
from Interdepartmental Data Systems, to provide a path for moving prototype expert 
systems into production. 
Summer 1987 found these two analysts fully engaged in prototype-building for 
clients in PNB' s engineering and accounting organizations. That same timeframe saw at 
least four new groups in the CIS organization express serious interest in developing 
expertise in building expert systems. The ISTG/IDS partnership was able to provide 
limited consultation, but these groups were forced to go outside U S WEST to receive 
training. adding to already significant expenditures for training in this area \~stimated at 
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over $80,000 in 1986 and 1.987 by Bellevue CIS staff alone). Further, these groups have 
largely proceeded on their own to evaluate tools in the complex and changing marketplace, 
despite a shallow level of expertise in the technology. 
Several of these groups attended U S WEST AT's Artificial Intelligence Team 
meeting in August. This meeting further whetted interest in the technology and 
demonstrated that other organizations were exploring the technology in a variety of ways. 
On August 31, 1987, ISTG and U S WEST AT sponsored an all-daymeeting in Bellevue 
on the topic of "Expert Systems Development for PNB". Based on the presentations and 
discussions of that meeting, the Research Committee on Expert Systems was formed from 
a subset of the attendees. 
OBJECflVES OF TIm RESEARCH COMMlTIEE 
The Research Committee on Expert Systems held its :f'trst meeting in September and 
developed its objectives, of which this report and recommendation are the fruition. The 
objectives that were established were to: 
• examine the expert system development activities of the entire CIS organization, 
and determine the level of expertise being brought to bear on those activities; 
• research the activities and organizatiC'ln3J structures employed by companies 
which have had some success in building expert systems; 
• provide consultation to groups desiring to start exploration and development 
immediately; 
• make a recommendation as to what organizational changes, if any, should be 
made to facilitate successful application of expert system technology in the CIS 
organization. 
FINDINGS 
Committee members contacted representatives of all known expert system activities 
within CIS and U S WEST AT. A summary of activities and contact persons is provided 
in the appendix. 
CIS activities can be categorized into tbrele general groupings: technology-focused 
groups; application-focused groups; and access to consultation, training, and tools. All 
three IDCs and U S WEST AT have groups that are focused on expert system technology 
itself, and seek to find applications and clients (often outside CIS) to showcase its potential 
benefits. A rather recent development is the spur~ of interest within CIS application 
groups, in some cases oriented toward specific applications a.nd in others toward building 
general expertise in the technology. The US WEST AT/Carnegie Group alliance is the 
only effort at this time focused on providing access to training, consultation, and a tool-in 
this case Carnegie's family of tools which run on Unix- and Lisp-based workstations. 
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Resulting from these activities, a few prototypes have been built, several more are in 
progress, but no industrial-strength, production expert systems have yet been fielded. The 
corporation as a whole is still experimenting on a group by group basis with the plethora of 
tools available, and no coherent mechanism exists for sharing information about the 
experiences being gained. Training likewise has been garnered on aa"1 ad hc·~ basis by each 
group and has relied on outside vendors. No uniform core curriculum of training courses 
exists for the various individuals and groups attempting to build expertise in the 
technology, although the new Carnegie alliance has the potential to provide such in the 
future. 
A picture of expert system building activiti.es in others companies was garnered from 
interviews with consultants and from a survey of relevant literature. The findings are 
described fully in the appendix and summarized below. 
Expert systems are being successfully fielded in many industries. A few, well-
publicized ones are large, but many more are small and medium-sized. The latter point 
argues that expert systems technology need not be prohibitively expensive to exploit. 
Many good applications of expert systems can be found in U S WEST that could contribute 
to the profitability of the corporation. In industry, as in U S WEST, many more prototypes 
than production systems are being built 
Small and medium-sized expert systems can be developed and maintained by the end 
users of the system, with appropriate training. All the publicly discussed large systems 
were developed by experienced knowledge engineers. Knowledge engineers are often 
grown from within an organization, sometimes contracted from outside, but rarely hired 
from outside. 
The tool marketplace is volatile and expected to remain so. It is too early to set rigid 
standards' for tool environments. 
Analysis of unsuccessful expert Systf '''011S has linked their failure to unrealistic 
expectations, inadequate financing, or lack or c(J&.amitment by domain experts. 
A successful expert systems strategy focuses on the technology as a solution r.o 
appropriate problems, not on the technology itself. The most successful formal expert 
system groups have not centralized development, but rather acted as points of technology 
transfer. 
Both industry-wide and US WEST-specific experience indicates that need exists for 
a centralized group to support building expert system expertise in the following areas: 
• training 
.. matching tools with problems 
Q prototyping 
.. maintaining technical cu..~ency. 
The committee considered three alternatives to providing support to the CIS 
organization's burgeoning demand for consultation, training, and tool evaluations. 
Continuing in the current uncoordinated fashion would not prevent CIS groups from 
adopting expert systems technology; but it would not leverage the expertise being 
developed across the region to the corporation's maximum advantage. In a worst case, it 
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might result in duplicate efforts or even costly mistakes in training or tool selection. A 
logical approach might be for' U S WEST AT to provide support activities, in addition to its 
current functio!!~ {If project development and Carnegie services management. Two 
problems surface with this approach. First, the AT staffs would potentially need to be 
enlarged to manage these functions in addition to their current missions of developing 
systems for clients in the IDCs and the unregulated subsidiaries. Secondly, the AT staff 
consists of highly qualified technologists, largely hired from outside the corporation; as 
such they are somewhat removed from many CIS issues and concerns. The third 
approach, the recommendation below, would utilize existing CIS employees with expertise 
in expert systems development to supplement U S WEST AT's larger corporate mission 
with support tailored to the CIS organization and its clients in the IDCs. 
RECOMMENDATION 
The Research Committee on Expert Systems recommends the formation of a two-year 
project, jointly sponsored by CIS and U S WEST Advanced Technologies, entitled the 
Knowledge Systems Transfer project, or KSTP. 
Goal and Objectives: The goal of this project will be to transfer expert systems 
technology into the CIS environment, and into the environments of the client groups CIS 
serves, as demand and need dictate. The specific objectives will be as follows: 
• Training: develop and deliver courses in expert systems topics; 
" Technical support: provide direct consultation to clients with development 
efforts; 
e Technical cmrency: review and publicize the most up-to-date information 
regarding expert systems theories and tools; 
• Development: design and implement at least one large expert system with 
important financial rewards; 
• Advanced Technical Education: support the development of project staff 
capabilities via higher education in computer science. 
Organization: The project will have a central staff and a network of affiliates. The 
central staff, housed in Bellevue will be composed of a senior technical lead and four 
analysts experienced in various aspects of expert systems technologies. The affiliates will 
be located in other data centers in the region and at U S WEST AT. 
The central staff will be attached to a second-level group for administrative purposes 
only. The technical lead will have all decision-making authority for the group's activities as 
well as all budget authority. Four analysts for the central staff have been identified. The 
technical lead for the project requires a level of skills and knowledge not present within the 
CIS work force. It is the opinion of the committee that securing this expertise may require 
an outside hire. 
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Distribution of Resources: Over the two year life of the project, the project's 
focus will start with providing technical support and building technical currency, shift 
toward developing training, then shift again to a major development effort. The projected 
distribution of project resources is illustrated below: 
Year 1 Year 2 
1st half 2nd half 1st half 2nd half 
Training 30% 25% 10% 
Technical Support 30% 15% 15% 15% 
Technical Currency 40% 20% 15% 15% 
Development 15% 20% 30% 45% 
A1EP 15% 15% 15% 15% 
Specific Objectives: The Training objective is targeted priwarily at the key 
players in an expert system development project: the knowledge engmeer, his or her 
manager, and the domain expert. The project will produce a core curriculum of courses 
covering basic and advanced expert systems concepts. Potential courses include: 
• Artificial Intelligence & Expert Systems Overview 
CD Introduction to Expert Systems 
CD Knowledge Representation 
CD Knowledge Acquisition Techniques 
• Expert Systems Project Management (based on Triad 20(0) 
CD Specific Expert System Building Tools. 
The Technical Support objective is targeted at potential and active knowledge 
engineers. The project staff will deliver talks and demonstrations on demand to groups 
interested in learning about the technology in general. To leverage the expertise developed 
by groups with development efforts across as wide an audience as possible, the project 
staff will organize and support a users group. In addition, the staff will provide direct 
consultation to clients with development efforts, including problem identification, 
preliminary design, rapid prototyping, project-tool matching, and testing and validation. 
The Technical Currency objective is targeted at active knowledge engineers and CIS 
support groups such as SDlVIE and IR. Project staff will be responsible for ensuring that 
the most up-to-date information regarding expert systems theories and tools are reviewed. 
Via the users group, that information will be shared with all groups actively developing 
expert systems. Support groups will be kept current on the state-of-the-art of tools in the 
environments of their areas of responsibility. 
The Development objective is targeted at the company at large, focused through client 
organizations. Project staff will design and implement at least one large expert system with 
important financial rewards. This effort is intended to be both an opportunity to build full-
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scale development expertise in the project staff and the client group, and a major vehicle for 
delivering the benefits of the technology to the corporation. Potential candidates exist today 
for this application in efforts currently in various phases within PNB: the completed ISTG-
Engineering Planning prototype, in-progress U S WEST-CIS Storage Management 
prototype, in-progress CIS CCR Design Advisor, a.."ld proposed CIS Accounting projects. 
(Other candidate applications will likely surface in coming months.) The project staff will 
work with the client group from its current state to a finished production system, and 
provide support necessary to enable the client organization to maintain the finished system. 
The Adyanced Technical Education objective is targeted at the company at large, 
focused through selected members of the project staff. Members of the project staff will 
participate in A 1EP to develop advanced computer science knowledge required to maximize 
the benefit of the transfer of expert systems and artificial int~~l1igence technology, as they 
mature, into the mainstream of CIS systems. 
Project Staff Responsibilities: All the project staff will be involved in personal 
training. tool evaluation, reviewing literature and attending professional associations related 
to expert systems work, preparing and delivering talks and/or demonstrations, rapid 
prototyping, and the delivery of training. In addition, each of the staff members will have 
major responsibilities in certain key activities: 
• Technical Lead: Responsible for overall coordination and decisbn making. Will 
determine training curriculum for staff, conduct training where feasible, provide 
quality assurance on course development, set objectives for tool evaluation, 
assign consulting duties, and playa major role in the development and 
implementation of a production system. In addition, the technical lead will be the 
principal liaison to U S WEST Advanced Technologies. 
• Technician #1: Training coordination, including setting objectives, working with 
corporate training facilities, setting schedules and time lines, publicity, evaluation 
and follow-up. Principal technical consultant on training and education issues, 
both internal and external. 
• Technician #2: Technical support coordination, including initial interviews with 
prospective clients, development of consulting assignments with Technical Lead, 
maintain published materials, tool evaluations, other infonnation resources. 
• Technician #3: Expert Systems Users Group chair, and coordinator of the 
KSTP regional affiliates. Principal function is to develop and mru...,tain expert 
system users network. 
• Technician #4: Production system project coordinator. Principal function is to 
define and conduct process for the identification of major developmental project 
Approximately fifteen percent of the project sta..ff activities will include A TEP 
participation on the part of KSTP staff members. This will involve enrollm~nt in graduate 
school or graduate level courses specifically related to expert systems technologies or 
techniques. Fifteen percent of the staff time is equivalent to 30 hours per week, or one Tier 
I and one Tier II scholarship throughout the duration of the project. 
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Working Environment: The KSTP staff will be located in Bellevue, in close 
proximity to the ISTG laboratory facilities, in order to share tools. In addition, the KSTP 
will acquire the hardware and software resources it requires for development, consultation, 
tool evaluation, and training. Members of the staff will travel throughout the region as 
necessary to consult with clients, confer with affiliates, and present training courses. 
Budget: The budget over the life of the project is estimated below. Uncertainties in 
particular estimates are described in the succeeding text. 
Year 1 Year 2 
Staff Training $30,000 $0 
Software $100,000 $0 
Hardware $130,000 $0 
Travel $36,000 $36,000 
Training l\1aterials $7,500 $2,500 
User Group/AffiY:,'es Support $10,000 $10,000 
Miscellaneous $10,000 $10,000 
Total Expense $323,500 $58,500 
Salary $250,000 $250,000 
Total Annual Budget $573,500 $308,500 
GRAND TOTAL PROmCTBUDGET $882,000 
Uncertainty in the estimate for staff trainh;,~; is due to the fact that it is unclear how the 
Carnegie alliance can best be leveraged to redn;e overall outlays. The objective of staff 
training is to bring all members of the project staff to the same level of exposure to expert 
system concepts, to provide training on specific software tools, and to develop expertise in 
the training of others. 
It is premature to specify exactly what software will be purchased for the project. 
The experience of the technical lead will strongly influence this decision, which will be one 
of the first tasks once the project is underway. It is anticipated that software resources will 
include one or more PC-based tools and one or more workstation-based tools. Assuming 
significant improvement in mainframe-based tools, a mainframe-based tool may be 
purchased as well. 
304 
The hardware bud;get is intended to provide workstations, one for each analyst, 
connected by a local area network to each other and to a laser printer. The workstations 
must be powerful enol1,gh to support both desktop publishing for creating training materials 
and to function a~ a development environment using PC-based expert system building 
tools. 
No internal candidate for the technical lead position is known to the committee; filling 
this position may require an outside hire. It is anticipated that his or. her salary will be 
shared between CIS and US WEST AT. The rest of the staff will ct:ne with their own 
budget allocations (i.e. no backfill), so that real salary dollars will be much less than 
indicated. 
The research committee estimated that approximately $84,000 was spent in 1986 and 
1987 by CIS staff in Bellevue alone on tuition for outside training courses equivalent to 
those which will be offered through the KSTP. The savings which will be realized by 
teaching these courses in-house will recover a significant portion of the expense budget. 
In addition to savings on training, the KSTP can have important influence over major 
tool purchase decisions, saving the corporation from waste due to redundancy and/or 
misinfonnation. 
At the time of this writing. the full extent of the co-sponsorship of U S WEST 
Advanced Technologies is not known, but whatever involvement will further reduce CIS 
dollar commitment. 
Project Progress Reports: The project staff will supply CIS and U S WEST 
management with semi-annual progress reports. 
P.,.pPENDIX E 
LOANER PROGRAM PROPOSAL 
TO: 
FROM: 
SUBJECf: 
DATE: 
Knowledge Systems Transfer Project 
US WEST Communications 
Mike Moore 
Knowledge Systems Transfer Project 
Expert System Proposal 
February 23, 1989 
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Thank you for your interest in developing an expert system application through the 
Knowledge Systems Transfer Project Loaner Program. Enclosed are the guidelines 
of the Program and the Expert System Proposal worksheets. 
Please complete the Proposal and return it to: 
Joe Martin 
USWEST 
Koll Center Bellewe 
555 328th Ave NE 
Bellevue, WA 98004 
The KSTP team will evaluate your proposal and contact you within 5 days of receipt. 
If you have other questions or expert system ideas, feel free to call 206-555-1111. 
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1. Due to the limite-d number of the loaner expert systems tools available, certain criteria will be 
used to ensure that interests ofU S WEST are best served. Tnese criteria fall into three basic 
categories: 
a. Business case of the application (potential benefits, savings to the company). 
b. Skills of requestor. Considerations here include PC experience, programming experience, 
and AI or ES exposure. 
c. Resourtes of the requestor (access to PC, people available to commit to the project). 
2. There is some flexibility to each loaner agreement, but here are some guidelines to what the 
KSTP expects to generally be the case: 
a. The loan of the tool is for two months. 
b. If at the end of that two months the requestor has fmished the tutorial and has a working 
prototype of the application, they are free to keep the tool. There are no preset size 
requirements in defming a "working prototype." The key is enough functionality to 
demonstrate that the application is at least feasible. 
c. If at the end of two months a working prototype is not completed, a renegotiation 
between the project and the KSTP is possible. That renegotiation would perhaps include 
some additional services on the part of KSTP to facilitate the project development 
3. The KSTP offers services during the 2 month loan period. 
a. Normai training support services such as tutorials, supplemental reading, and course 
recommendations. 
b. Shoring up deficiencies in decision criteria 
c. Refining application idea 
d PC usage training (enough to use VP-Expert and back up their files) 
e. Helping with tutorial 
f. Answering VP-Expert specific questions 
g. Helping with knowledge representation questions 
h. Presenting your project with you to management or peers 
4. The KSTP also will offer further support with a successful application prototype: 
a. Normal support services: training, tools, contact with ESTG, eGI. etc. 
b. If there is a good business case, we'll review and help polish it 
